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HE nature of claims asserted by employees against employers has
changed dramatically in recent years. In the past, the overwhelming
majority of employment and labor law activity was before the federal
courts and agencies and involved non-jury proceedings. Relief was generally
equitable in the nature of back pay and perhaps reinstatement or front pay in
wrongful, typically discriminatory, termination cases. However, in an at-
tempt to recover punitive and extra-contractual damages, increase access to
jury trials, and circumvent administrative and procedural issues, employees
and former employees are now seeking relief under an ever-broadening
group of Texas common law causes of action. In addition to allegations of
discrimination or wrongful discharge, the range of employment torts now
being asserted include defamation, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, negligent hiring and retention of an employee, and invasion of privacy.
In response to the ever widening range of wrongful discharge claims, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved
and recommended for enactment by the various states the Model Uniform
Employment-Termination Act.1 As described in the Uniform Law Commis-
sioner's press release: "The underlying basic philosophy of the Model Act is
one of balance - an equitable compromise of competing interests." Under
the Model Act, covered employees are provided expanded substantive rights
against discharge from employment without good cause, but the range of
available remedies and the scope of claims otherwise potentially available are
limited. Arbitration is the recommended mechanism for the resolution of
claims under the Model Act.2
Through a series of decisions over the past decade, the Court has steadily
expanded the reach of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) so that today an
enforceable agreement to arbitrate can reach federal and state statutory
claims and common law torts, as well as breach of contract claims.3 The
* Partner-in-Charge, Fulbright & Jaworski, San Antonio. B.S. Sam Houston State Uni-
versity; J.D., Southern Methodist University.
** Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski, San Antonio. B.A., The University of Texas; J.D., St.
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1. 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) § 540:21 (Dec. 1991). The Model Act was approved on
August 8, 1991. Id.
2. Id. § 540:37.
3. See part VI supra.
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expanded use of arbitration as a forum for disposing of employment disputes
was given a significant boost in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.4 In
mandating arbitration of an employee's claim brought under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act, the United States Supreme Court once
again broadly interpreted the FAA. Arbitration may become more preva-
lent if employers experience, as expected, a significant increase in claims
with the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.
II. EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE
Although the Texas legislature has enacted statutory exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine 5 the doctrine has remained intact, with only
one narrow public policy exception, for the last 103 years.6 In 1985, the
4. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
5. TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 125.001 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge for exercising
rights under Agricultural Hazard Communication Act); TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 122.001 (Vernon 1986) (discharge for jury service); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 161.007
(Vernon 1986) (discharge for attending political convention); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§§ 431.005-431.006 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge for military service); TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 4512.7, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge for refusing to participate in an
abortion); Id. arts. 5154g, 5207a (Vernon 1987) (discharge for membership or nonmembership
in a union); Id. art. 5182b, § 15 (Vernon 1987) (discharge for exercising rights under Hazard
Communication Act); Id. art. 5196g (Vernon 1987) (discharge for refusing to make purchase
from employer's store); Id. art. 5207c (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge for complying with a
subpoena); Id. art. 5221k, § 5.01 (Vernon 1987) (Texas Commission on Human Rights Act)
(discharge based on race, color, handicap, religion, national origin, age, or sex); Id. art. 5221k,
§ 5.05(a) (Vernon 1989) (discharge for reporting violations of the Commission on Human
Rights Act); Id. art. 5547-300, § 9 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge due to mental retardation);
Id. art. 6252-16a, §§ 2-4 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge of public employee for reporting
violation of law to appropriate enforcement authority); Id. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1990)
(discharge based on good faith workers' compensation claim); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.43(m) (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge due to withholding order for child support); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.. § 242.133 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge of nursing home
employee for reporting abuse or neglect of a resident).
There are also numerous federal statutory exceptions to an employer's right to discharge an
employee at-will. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168
(1988) (discharge for union activity, protected concerted activity, filing charges or giving testi-
mony); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-16 (1988) (dis-
charge on the basis of race, sex, pregnancy, national origin and religion); Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989) (discharge based on
discrimination); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988 & Supp. 1 1989)
(discharge on basis of disability in programs receiving federal funds); Civil Rights Act of 1866,
1870, and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985-1992, 1994-1996 (1988) (discharge for discrimi-
natory reasons); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988)
(discharge of employees for exercising rights under the Act); Employment Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140-1141 (1988) (discharge of employees to prevent them
from attaining vested pension rights); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215-216
(1988 & Supp. 1 1989) (discharge for exercising rights guaranteed by the minimum wage and
overtime provisions of the Act); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 12101-12108 (West 1991) (discharge on basis of disabibility).
6. Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991); McClendon v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 807 S.W.2d 577, 577 (Tex. 1991); Winters v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co.,
795 S.W.2d 723, 724-25 (Tex. 1990); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 734
(Tex. 1985); East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888); see also
Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 1991) (at-will doctrine alive and
well in Texas); Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1991) (recognizing only
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Texas supreme court created the only exception 7 to the at-will doctrine in
Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck 8 in which the court held public policy, as
expressed in the laws of Texas and the United States that carry criminal
penalties, requires an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine when an
employee has been discharged for refusing to perform a criminally illegal act
ordered by his employer.9 Since Sabine Pilot many discharged employees
have unsuccessfully tried to bring their claim of wrongful discharge within
that exception. 10
one exception to at-will doctrine in Texas); Zimmerman v. H. E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d
469, 471 (5th Cir. 1991) (Texas courts continue to follow historical at-will rule); Spiller v. Ella
Smithers Geriatric Ctr., 919 F.2d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 1990) (Texas supreme court "has decided
that a public policy halo surrounds the at-will doctrine"); Manning v. Upjohn Co., 862 F.2d
545, 547 (5th Cir. 1989) (Texas courts not hesitant to declare employment-at-will doctrine
alive and well); Morton v. Southern Union Co., No. 3-89-0939-H, slip op. at 6-7 (N.D. Tex.
June 17, 1991) (recognizing long-standing at-will rule in Texas); Perez v. Vinnell Corp., 763 F.
Supp. 199, 200 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (recognizing long-standing at-will doctrine); Taylor v. Hous-
ton Lighting & Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 301 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (Texas courts have contin-
uously recognized at-will rule); Scott v. Vetco Gray, Inc., No. 89-1839, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 20, 1990) (at-will doctrine remains firmly entrenched in Texas common law).
7. In 1989, the Texas supreme court in McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d
69 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990), created a short-lived second exception by holding
that public policy favoring the integrity in pension plans requires an exception to the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine when an employee proves that the principal reason for his discharge was
the employer's desire to avoid contributing, to or paying for, benefits under the employee's
pension fund. Id. at 71. The United States Supreme Court, however, held that ERISA pre-
empted the McClendon common law cause of action. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111
S. Ct. 478 (1990). In 1990, the Texas supreme court declined an opportunity to expand the
public policy exception in Sabine Pilot (see infra note 8) or to adopt a private "whistle blower"
exception to the at-will doctrine. Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d
723, 733 (Tex. 1990) (Texas Whistle Blower Act, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a,
§ 2 (Vernon Supp. 1991) protects state employees from adverse employment decisions for re-
porting in good faith a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority). For a
complete discussion of Winters, see Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and
Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 331, 334-36 (1991). Assuming that the
Texas supreme court eventually recognizes a second exception to the at-will doctrine to protect
private employees from adverse employment decisions for reporting in good faith a violation of
law to an appropriate law enforcement authority, see Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 725, such a cause
of action will probably generate a significant amount of litigation. See Green v. Texas Dep't of
Human Servs., No. 480,701 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 53rd Judicial Dist. of Texas, Sept. 23,
1991) (jury awarded $13,500,000 to a state employee discharged for reporting wrongdoings
within his agency); see also City of Houston v. Leach, 819 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1991, no writ); Lastor v. City of Hearne, 810 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991,
writ denied) (city employee discharged for reporting violation of law recovered damages under
Texas Whistle Blower Act).
8. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
9. Id. at 735; see Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1171 n.16 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Sab-
ine Pilot can be reasonably read as restricted to instances where the violations of law the em-
ployee refused to commit 'carry criminal penalties' "). But see Johnston v. Del Mar Distrib.
Co., 776 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied). In Del Mar, the court
held that
the Sabine Pilot exception necessarily covers a situation where an employee has
a good faith belief that her employer has requested her to perform an act which
may subject her to criminal penalties. Public policy demands that she be al-
lowed to investigate into whether such actions are legal so that she can deter-
mine what course of action to take (i.e., whether or not to perform the act).
Id. at 771.
10. Guthrie v. Tifco Industries, 941 F.2d 374, 374 (5th Cir. 1991) (claim that plaintiff was
instructed to violate unspecified customs regulations does not state claim under Sabine Pilot);
1992] 1723
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A. Common Law Claims
When the term of employment is left to the discretion of either party or is
left indefinite, either party may terminate the contract at will and without
cause.I1  During the past several years, however, wrongful discharge litiga-
tion based on the violation of a written or oral employment agreement has
increased. Written or oral employment agreements may indeed modify the
at-will rule and require the employer to have good cause for the discharge of
an employee. 12
1. Written Agreements
To avoid the employment-at-will doctrine and establish a cause of action
for wrongful termination based on a written contract, an employee must
prove that he and his employer had a contract that specifically prohibited
the employer from terminating the employee's service at-will.13 The written
Aitkens v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., No. 90-2884, slip op. at 3 (5th Cir. June 14, 1991) (not
published) (dentist's contention that he was fired for refusing to violate ethical or professional
standards or to engage in tortious activities insufficient under Sabine Pilot); Willy v. Coastal
Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1171 n.16 (5th Cir. 1988) (Sabine Pilot exception restricted to cases
where the law the employee refused to violate carried criminal penalties); Gallagher v. Mans-
field Scientific, Inc., No. H-90-2999, slip op. at 4-5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 1991) (plaintiff's refusal
to sell inter-aortic balloons he believed to be defective and unreasonably dangerous and
presenting risk of death or serious bodily injury not within Sabine Pilot exception); Haynes v.
Henry S. Miller Mgmt. Corp., No. CA3-88-2556-T, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1990)
(discharge in retaliation for reporting illegal fraudulent expense reports of former high-ranking
management employees not within Sabine Pilot exception); McCain v. Target Stores, No. H-
89-0140, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 1990) (discharge in retaliation for investigating falsifi-
cation of time cards by another employee not within Sabine Pilot exception); Winters v. Hous-
ton Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. 1990) (Texas supreme court declined to
extend Sabine Pilot to cover employees who reported illegal activities to their employers);
Casas v. Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ requested)
(discharged employee who claimed discharge was due to her possession of information which
could implicate the company in criminal misconduct did not state claim under Sabine Pilot);
Paul v. P.B.-K.B.B., Inc., 801 S.W.2d 229, 229 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ
denied) (claim of discharge due to objections to exploratory shaft for a nuclear waste storage
project for Department of Energy not within Sabine Pilot); Hancock v. Express One Int'l, Inc.,
800 S.W.2d 634, 636-37 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (court declined to extend Sabine
Pilot to include employees discharged for performing illegal acts which carry civil penalties);
Burt v. City of Burkburnett, 800 S.W.2d 625, 626-27 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ)
(claim of discharged police officer that discharge was the result of his refusal not to arrest a
prominent citizen for public intoxication and thus refusing to perform an illegal act not within
Sabine Pilot).
11. East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888); see also
Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 97, 98-99 nn.8 & 9 (1988) (cites several cases discussing employment-at-will
doctrine).
12. East Line, 72 Tex. at 75, 10 S.W. at 102; cf. Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687
S.W.2d at 735 (court held that an at-will employee may not be terminated for refusing to
commit illegal act; noting statutory limitations on employment-at-will doctrine). See generally
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-941 (1988) (employees of the state are generally at-will
employees).
13. Zimmerman v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying
Texas law); Wilhite v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 812 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1991, no writ); Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1988, no writ); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406
1724 [Vol. 45
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contract must provide in a "special and meaningful way" that the employer
does not have the right to terminate the employment relationship at will. 14
The necessity of a written contract arises from the statute of frauds require-
ment that an agreement which is not to be performed within one year from
the date of the making must be in writing to be enforceable. 1
Employees often attempt to avoid the employment-at-will doctrine by
contending that the employee handbook or employment application consti-
tutes a contractual modification of the at-will relationship.' 6 The Texas
courts, however, have adhered to the general rule that employee handbooks
do not constitute written employment agreements, provided the handbooks
(1) give the employer the right to unilaterally amend or withdraw the hand-
book, (2) contain an express disclaimer that the handbook constitutes an
employment contract, or (3) do not include an express agreement mandat-
ing specific procedures for discharging employees. 17 Therefore, employee
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124,
127 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
14. Morton v. Southern Union Co., No. 3-89-0939-H, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Tex. June 17,
1991); Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275, 277 (W.D. Tex. 1989); Mc-
Clendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988),
rev'd on other grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, Ill S. Ct. 478 (1990), aff'd, 807
S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991) (quoting Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d at 406); Stiver
v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d at 846; Webber v. M. W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d at
127. In Webber v. M. W. Kellogg Co., the court held that to establish a cause of action for
wrongful discharge, the discharged employee must prove that there was a written employment
agreement that specifically provided that the employer did not have the right to terminate the
contract at will. 720 S.W.2d at 126. In Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d at 406,
the court added that the writing must "in a meaningful and special way" limit the employer's
right to terminate the employment at will. But cf Winograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (court suggested that the phrase "in a special
and meaningful way" is not a necessary part of analysis).
15. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Vernon 1987); Rodriguez v. Benson
Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. at 277; Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. 839, 842
(S.D. Tex. 1989); Winograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d at 310-11 (citing Niday v. Niday, 643
S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982)); Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc. 764 S.W.2d 825, 827
(Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ dism'd); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d at 846;
Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d at 406.
16. Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., No. 89-2216, slip op. at 8-9 (5th Cir. Sept. 12,
1989) (not published); Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. at 842; Glagola v. North
Tex. Mun. Water Dist., 705 F. Supp. 1220, 1224 (E.D. Tex. 1989); Valdez v. Church's Fried
Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 596, 622 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F.
Supp. 152, 156 (E.D. Tex. 1987); Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d at 846; see
also Brian K. Lowry, The Vestiges of the Texas Employment-At- Will Doctrine in the Wake of
Progressive Law: The Employment Handbook Exception, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 327 (1986) (ap-
plying principles of consideration and mutuality to employment handbooks).
17. Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d at 427; Zimmerman v. H. E. Butt Grocery
Co., 932 F.2d at 471-72; Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 462-63 (5th Cir. 1991);
Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., No. 89-2216, slip op. at 8-9; Manning v. Upjohn Co., 862
F.2d 545, 547 n.2 (5th Cir. 1989); Joachim v. AT & T Info. Sys., 793 F.2d 113, 114 (5th Cir.
1986); Blinker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. SA-88-CA-1256, slip op. at 7-11 (W.D. Tex. Sept.
6, 1991); Morton v. Southern Union Co., No. 3-89-0939-H, slip op. at 6-7 (N.D. Tex. June 17,
1991); Perez v. Vinnell Corp., 763 F. Supp. 199, 200-01 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Bowser v. McDon-
ald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. at 842; Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. at 622;
Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F. Supp. at 156; Horton v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 04-
91-00060-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio Jan. 8, 1992, no writ) (not published); Hicks v. Baylor
Univ. Medical Ctr., 789 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied); Musquiz v.
1992] 1725
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claims of a contractual modification of the at-will relationship based on a
handbook have generally been unsuccessful. " The Fifth Circuit recently de-
livered three opinions reconfirming Texas law in this area. 19
The sole exception to the general rule is the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc. 20 In Aiello a divided panel held that when an
employee handbook (1) contains detailed procedures for discipline and dis-
charge; and (2) expressly recognizes an obligation to discharge only for
good cause, the handbook may constitute a contract modifying the at-will
relationship. 21 In Aiello the employee handbook included a statement that it
was not a contract and that employment was at-will. The court, however,
found that the handbook was an employment agreement that modified the
employment at-will relationship. The court focused on the following three
factors that it deemed of "great significance": 22 (1) the employee manual
contained not only detailed procedures for discipline and discharge but also
an obligation to discharge only for good cause; (2) the employer followed
these procedures and notified the employee that she was entitled to them;
and (3) the supervisor who discharged the employee treated the provisions
of the employee manual as a contractual obligation. 23 Significantly, the em-
ployer in Aiello stipulated that its personnel policies prohibited it from dis-
charging an employee without good cause. 24 Although the Fifth Circuit has
Diamond Shamrock & Refining Co., No. 04-88-00093-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio July 12,
1989, no writ) (not published); Lumpkin v. H&C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 539
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc., 754
S.W.2d at 413; Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d at 846; Benoit v. Polysar Gulf
Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d at 407; Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d at 128; Berry v.
Doctor's Health Facilities, 715 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); Totman v.
Control Data Corp., 707 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ); Vallone v.
Agip Petroleum Co., Inc., 705 S.W.2d 757, 758 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1983, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1982, no writ). But see Texas Health Enters., Inc. v. Gentry, 787 S.W.2d 604, 608 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1990, no writ) (oral representation and portion of employee handbook sup-
ported breach of contract finding). Contra Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1996,
1998 (5th Cir. 1987) (Fifth Circuit found a contract modifying at-will rule where employee
handbook included detailed procedures for discipline and discharge and expressly recognized
an obligation to discharge only for good cause).
18. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d at 818.
19. Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1991); Zimmerman v. H.E.
Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1991); Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458
(5th Cir. 1991); Blinker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. SA-88-CA-1256 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 6,
1991); Morton v. Southern Union Co., No. 3-89-0939-H (W.D. Tex. June 17, 1991); Perez v.
Vinnell Corp., 763 F. Supp. 199, 200-01 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
20. 818 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1987).
21. Id. at 1200. See also Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d at 426; Zimmerman
v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d at 471; Pruitt v. Levi-Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d at 463;
Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 789 S.W.2d at 302-03.
22. Aiello, 818 F.2d at 1201.
23. Id. at 1198; see Zimmerman, 932 F.2d at 472 (reciting three factors); Pruitt v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d at 463 (reciting three factors); see also Glagola v. North Tex. Mun.
Water Dist., 705 F. Supp. 1220, 1223 (E.D. Tex. 1989) ("[B]ecause of the detailed nature of
the regulations contained in the manuals providing dismissal only for good cause and the
testimony of employees and supervisory personnel alike that the manuals were understood to
contractually limit the at-will rule, the [Aiello] court held that the case was not controlled by
the at-will rule.").
24. Aiello, 818 F.2d at 1198.
1726 [Vol. 45
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not overruled Aiello, nor have Texas courts held it to be an incorrect inter-
pretation of Texas law, it is doubtful that Aiello is a correct interpretation of
Texas law.25 It is important to note that the Aiello exception has never been
followed in any other cases.26
In Zimmerman v. HE. Butt Grocery Co.27 Paul Zimmerman sued H.E.
Butt Grocery Co. (HEB) for breach of contract based on the HEB employee
handbook. The handbook consisted of company history, employee compen-
sation and benefits, customer relations, policies, general work requirements,
and disciplinary and termination procedures. The last page of the handbook
contained an employee signature page stating: "I further understand that
the contents of this guide in no way constitutes an employment contract." '28
Zimmerman signed the page and returned it to HEB. The evidence reflected
that Zimmerman was informed by HEB managers that the handbook was a
contract and that he felt bound by the terms of the handbook. The district
court held that the handbook constituted a contract modifying HER's right
to terminate Zimmerman at will. The Fifth Circuit reversed, citing the
Texas general rule that employee handbooks issued unilaterally by an em-
ployer do not limit the at-will doctrine, 29 absent an express agreement that
the procedures in the handbook are binding. 30 Zimmerman and the district
court relied on the Aiello exception to the general rule, but the court found
Zimmerman's reliance misplaced. The court noted that the district court
25. Whether Aiello is a correct interpretation of Texas law has not been resolved by the
Texas courts. See Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 789 S.W.2d at 303 (distinguished Aiello
rather than deciding if it was correctly decided). The incongruity between Aiello and Joachim
v. AT&T Info. Sys., 793 S.W.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1986), which Judge Edith Jones highlighted in
her well-reasoned dissent in Aiello, and an analysis of Texas cases establishes Aiello as an
aberration and not a correct interpretation of Texas law. Aiello, 818 F.2d at 1202 (Jones, J.,
dissenting). See Zimmerman, 932 F.2d at 474 n.2 (noting that the Texas courts have yet to
decide whether Aiello is a correct interpretation of Texas law); Ramos v. H. E. Butt Grocery
Co., No. L-85-85 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 1987) (Kazen, J.) (recognizing that Aiello and Joachim
could not be reconciled). See also Crum v. Anderson Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d at 427 (recogniz-
ing Aiello as an "exceedingly close case"). For a complete discussion of Aiello and Joachim,
see Pfeiffer & Hall, supra note 11, at 104-06.
26. In Zimmerman, 932 F.2d at 472 n.2, the Fifth Circuit recognized that there are no
cases applying the Aiello exception.
27. 932 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Texas law).
28. Id. at 470.
29. Id. at 471 (citing Aiello, 818 F.2d at 1198); Joachim v. AT&T Info. Sys., 793 F.2d 113
(5th Cir. 1986)). See also Horton v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 04-91-00060-CV (Tex.
App.-San Antonio Jan. 8, 1992, writ requested) (not published). In Horton the court of
appeals held that the following statement in Montgomery Ward's manual was conclusive that
Ginette Horton was an at-will employee:
I have read and fully understand the rules governing my employment with
Montgomery Ward. I agree that I will conform to these rules and regulations
and, further understand and agree that my employment is for no definite period
and may, regardless of the time and manner of payment of my wages and salary,
be terminated at any time by Montgomery Ward or me, with or without cause,
and without any previous notice.
Id. slip op. at 18.
30. 932 F.2d at 471 (citing Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 789 S.W.2d at 302; Vallone
v. Agip Petroleum Co., 705 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd




supported its conclusion that there was a written contract by finding that
HEB felt bound by, and attempted to comply with, the handbook.31 The
Fifth Circuit held that the district court's finding was erroneous, stating that
an employer's "[c]ompliance, or attempted compliance, with guidelines for
discipline and discharge" in an employee handbook "should not be turned
against an employer" to establish that it treated the handbook as a con-
tract.32 Equating compliance with employee handbook guidelines with con-
tractual obligations based on the handbook, the court observed, creates a
"catch-22" for employers:
[I]f an employer follows the guidelines in disciplining or discharging an
employee, the employee could argue that the employer thereby treated
the manual as a contract; but if an employer does not follow the guide-
lines, then the employee could excoriate the employer for failing to fol-
low guidelines that it represented would follow. 33
The court also held that Aiello was further distinguishable because the HEB
handbook did not provide that employees would only be discharged for good
cause.
34
In Crum v. American Airlines, Inc.35 Jay Crum was discharged as pub-
lisher for the American Airlines in-flight magazine, American Way. Crum
alleged that his job application, which was for an indefinite period of em-
ployment, constituted a written employment contract 36 and that his dis-
charge breached this contract. Crum argued that the job application made
American Airline's Rules and Regulations outlining employee discipline and
termination procedures part of an employment contract in which American
Airlines waived its right to discharge him at will. The federal district court
held that the job application did not modify the at-will relationship and
31. Id. at 472.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. The court pointed out that in Aiello the employer stipulated that its personnel
policies prohibited it from discharging an employee without good cause. Id. at n.1 (citing
Aiello, 818 F.2d at 1198). The court also noted that there are no other cases applying the
Aiello exception and that it is unclear whether it correctly applies Texas law. Id. at n.2 (citing
Hicks, 789 S.W.2d at 303).
35. 946 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Texas law).
36. The job application, read and signed by Crum, read:
I, the undersigned, state that all information given by me in this application is
true to the best of my knowledge. I authorize American Airlines, Inc. (herein
called the company) to verify such information and to contact any reference
given by me. Should I be employed by the company, I agree that:
I. My employment shall be in accordance with the terms of (A) this applica-
tion, (B) company rules and regulations and any amendments thereto and (C)
any applicable labor agreement. The company shall have the right to amend,
modify or revoke its rules and regulations at any time. I will familiarize myself
promptly with such rules and regulations now or hereafter in effect.
2. My employment may be terminated by the company at any time without ad-
vance notice, its only obligation being to pay wages or salary earned by me to
date of termination. Without limitation, failure to abide by company rules and
regulations, failure to pass any company physical examination and the falsifica-
tion of any information given by me in this application will entitle the company
to terminate my employment.
Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
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granted American Airline's summary judgment request. On appeal, Crum
relied on Aiello. Specifically, Crum pointed out that he was required to fol-
low the procedures established in the American Airlines Rules and Regula-
tions in handling his staff, and that at his post-termination hearing American
Airlines followed the rules and regulations, establishing that these rules and
regulations govern the employment of American Airlines employees. The
Fifth Circuit initially observed that neither company rules and regulations
dealing with discipline and discharge nor employee handbooks issued uni-
laterally by an employer limit an employer's right to terminate an employee
at-will. 37 Turning to Aiello the court noted that "[i]n that exceedingly close
case, a divided panel found" 38 that the at-will rule may be modified when an
employee handbook includes detailed procedures for discipline and dis-
charge and expressly recognizes an obligation to discharge only for good
cause.3 9 Distinguishing Aiello, the court stated that the American Airlines
Rules and Regulations did not provide that employees would only be dis-
charged for good cause.40 Furthermore, the American Airlines job applica-
tion expressly stated that employment was at-will.41 Accordingly, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the summary judgment. 42
In Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co.4 3 Billy Pruitt claimed that the Levi Strauss
home officer personnel manual, which prescribed procedures for employ-
ment termination, constituted a written employment contract that modified
Levi Strauss' right to terminate his employment at will.44 The district court
disagreed and granted summary judgment to Levi Strauss. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed, holding that Aiello 45 did not apply to Pruitt because there was no
evidence that Levi Strauss treated the procedures as anything more than
advisory guidelines or that the person who discharged Pruitt considered the
personnel manual as a binding contract. 46
2. Oral Modifications of the Employment-at- Will Doctrine
Usually, an employment relationship is created when employee and em-
ployer orally agree to the terms and conditions of employment. Oral em-
ployment contracts, however, may defeat an employer's right to terminate
37. Id. at 427 (citing Zimmerman, 932 F.2d at 471 and Aiello, 818 F.2d at 1198). The
court also recognized that although the employment-at-will rule has been under attack in sev-
eral states, the Texas courts have continued to declare that it is alive and well in Texas. Id. at
426 (citing Manning v. Upjohn Co., 862 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1989)).
38. Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
39. Id.
40. 946 F.2d at 426.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 429.
43. 932 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Texas law).
44. Id. at 463 (citing Vallone v. Agip Petroleum Co., 705 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536,
539 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ)).
45. 818 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1987). The court noted the three factors of great significance
in Aiello. 932 F.2d at 463.
46. 932 F.2d at 463.
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an employee at-will depending upon the terms of the agreement and the facts
and circumstances surrounding the employment.
An employee may avoid the at-will rule when an employer enters into an
oral agreement that the employee will be terminated only for good cause.47
An employee may also allege that the employer's oral assurance of employ-
ment for a specified period of time (greater than one year) creates an enforce-
able contract of employment. Normally, the employer will counter this
argument by alleging that the agreement violates the statute of frauds, which
provides that an oral agreement not to be performed within one year from
the date of its making is unenforceable. 48 The duration of the oral agree-
ment determines whether the statute of frauds renders the agreement inva-
lid.49 When no period of performance is stated in an oral employment
contract, the general rule in Texas is that the statute of frauds does not apply
because the contract is performable within a year.50 If an oral agreement
can cease upon some contingency, other than by some fortuitous event or the
death of one of the parties, 5' the agreement may be performed within one
year, and the statute of frauds does not apply. 52 Generally, the statute of
frauds nullifies only contracts that must last longer than one year. 53
The success of the employee's claim depends largely on the nature of the
employer's assurance. 54 For example, an oral agreement for employment
until normal retirement age is unenforceable because the agreement "must"
last longer than one year, unless the promisee is within one year of normal
retirement age at the time the promise is made.' 5 The courts are split on the
47. Mansell v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 135 Tex. 31, 137 S.W.2d 997, 999-1000 (1940); Mor-
gan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied);
Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); John-
son v. Ford Motor Co., 690 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); St.
Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Booker, 5 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1928, no
writ), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 852 (1929).
48. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. art. 26.01(a)(6) (Vernon 1987); see Morgan v. Jack
Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, writ denied).
49. Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 463 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Morgan v. Jack
Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d at 827).
50. Id. at 468 n.4; Mercer v. C.A. Roberts Co., 570 F.2d 1232, 1236 (5th Cir. 1978)
(interpreting Texas law); Miller v. Riata Cadillac Co., 517 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1974);
Bratches v. Dozier, 162 Tex. 319, 321-22, 346 S.W.2d 795, 796-97 (1961); Wright v.
Donaubauer, 137 Tex. 473, 477, 154 S.W.2d 637, 639 (1941); Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners,
Inc., 764 S.W.2d at 827; Kelley v. Apache Prods., Inc., 709 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Robertson v. Pohorelsky, 583 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51. Hurt v. Standard Oil Co., 444 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, no
writ) (If, by terms of oral employment agreement, its period is to extend beyond a year from
date of its making, " 'the mere possibility of termination ... within a year because of death or
other fortuitous event does not render [the statute of frauds] inapplicable.' ") quoting Cheva-
lier v. Lane's Inc., 147 Tex. 106, 110, 213 S.W.2d 530, 532 (1948)).
52. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 463-64 (citing McRae v. Lindale Indep. School Dist., 450 S.W.2d
118, 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Fruth v. Gaston, 187 S.W.2d 581, 584
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
53. Pruitt, 923 F.2d at 464; Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982); Morgan v.
Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d at 827.
54. Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d at 827 (citing Niday, 643 S.W.2d at
920).
55. Crenshaw v. General Dynamics Corp., 940 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1991); Schroeder
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applicability of the statute of frauds to an oral promise of lifetime employ-
ment. Some cases hold that the promise of lifetime employment must be in
writing, 56 while other cases conclude that such a promise does not need to be
in writing because the employee could conceivably die within one year of the
oral promise. 57 The courts are also split on the applicability of the statute of
frauds to an oral promise of continued employment for as long as the prom-
isee performs his work satisfactorily. 58 Some cases hold that such a promise
must be in writing, 59 while other cases conclude that a writing is not re-
quired because the termination of employment could occur within a year of
the oral promise. 6° The law in this area is unclear in Texas and in the Fifth
Circuit. Hopefully, the Texas supreme court will have the opportunity to
resolve the confusion in the near future.
3. Defamation and Employment Decisions
Defamation under Texas law is a defamatory statement orally communi-
cated or published without legal excuse.6 1 Under Texas law, the court must
make the threshold determination of whether the complained of statement
v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc.,
750 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); Benoit v. Polysar Gulf
Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Molder v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Hurt v. Standard Oil Co., 444 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, no
writ); Green v. Texas Eastern Prod. Pipeline Co., No. H-89-1005, slip op. at 6-7 (S.D. Tex.
Jan. 30, 1991).
56. Zimmerman, 932 F.2d at 472-73 & n.3; Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464; Falconer v. Soltex
Polymer Corp., No. 89-2216 (5th Cir. Sept. 12, 1989) (not published); Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at
407; Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. App.-Houston 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
57. Chevalier v. Lane's, Inc., 147 Tex. 106, 110-11, 213 S.W.2d 530, 532 (1948); Central
Nat'l Bank v. Cox, 96 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1936, no writ); see also Gil-
liam v. Kouchoucos, 161 Tex. 299, 301, 340 S.W.2d 27, 27-28 (1960) (oral contract of employ-
ment for 10 years not excluded from statute of frauds by provision that it would terminate
upon death of employee).
58. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464-65 (applying Texas law, recognizing split of authority).
59. Id. at 464-66 (The Fifth Circuit held that it was bound to follow Falconer even though
the court recognized that Falconer is contrary to Texas law); Falconer v. Soltex Polymer
Corp., No. 89-2216 (5th Cir. Sept. 12, 1989) (not published) (oral agreement of employment
for as long as the employee "obeyed the company rules and did his job" barred by the statute
of frauds); Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275, 277 (W.D. Tex. 1989)
(interpreting Texas law) (oral agreement of employment so long as employee performed satis-
factorily violates statute of fraud).
60. McRae v. Lindale Indep. School Dist., 450 S.W.2d 118, 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hardison v. A.H. Belo Corp., 247 S.W.2d 167, 168-69 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1952, no writ). See also Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 690 S.W.2d 90, 91-93 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (plaintiff stated cause of action for breach of express
employment contract by alleging that his at-will status was modified by oral agreements with
supervisory personnel that he would not be terminated except for good cause and that his
employment would continue so long as his work was satisfactory).
61. Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Texas
law); Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 311, 333 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
A defamatory statement is defined in TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon
1986) as
a statement that tends to blacken the memory of the dead or that tends to injure
a living person's reputation and thereby expose the person to public hatred, con-
tempt or ridicule, or financial injury or to impeach any person's honesty, integ-
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or publication is capable of conveying a defamatory meaning. 62 In making
this determination, the court construes the statement as a whole, in light of
the surrounding circumstances, based upon how a person of ordinary intelli-
gence would perceive the entire statement.63 Only when the court deter-
mines the language is ambiguous or of doubtful import should a jury
determine the statement's meaning and the effect the statement has on an
ordinary reader.64
a. The Doctrine of Self-Publication.
Generally, in the employment context, publication of defamation occurs
when an employer communicates to a third party a defamatory statement
about a former employee. The doctrine of self-publication provides that
publication also occurs when an individual is compelled to publish defama-
tory statements in response to inquiries of prospective employers, and the
former employer should have foreseen that compulsion. 65 Unlike other ju-
risdictions, Texas does not analyze the circumstances in terms of whether
rity, virtue, or reputation or to publish the natural defects of anyone and thereby
expose the person to public hatred, ridicule, or financial injury.
62. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989); Musser v. Smith Protective Serv.,
Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653, 654-55 (Tex. 1987); Baubles & Beads v. Louis Vuitton, S.A., 766
S.W.2d 377, 381 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
63. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 570; Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655; Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle Pub-
lishing Co., 149 Tex. 87, 95, 228 S.W.2d 499, 504 (1950). See Crum v. American Airlines,
Inc., 946 F.2d at 428 (announcement to staff that employee was on leave pending results of an
investigation by an industrial psychologist/management consultant cannot be construed as an
allegation of mental disturbance).
64. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 570; Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655; Denton Publishing Co. v. Boyd,
460 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. 1970). Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1009 (1985) illustrates how
a statement that may not appear defamatory may be construed as defamatory by a jury. In
Buck a prospective new employer of Buck telephoned Hall & Co. to learn about the circum-
stances surrounding Buck's termination. One of Hall & Co.'s employees stated that Buck
hadn't reached his production goals. When pressed for more information, Eckert declined to
comment, stating he couldn't go into it. The prospective employer then asked if the company
would rehire Buck, and the employee answered no. The prospective employer testified that
because of the company's employee's comments, he was unwilling to extend an offer of em-
ployment. Buck sued his former employer for defamation of character alleging that Hall &
Co. employees made defamatory statements about him during the course of telephone refer-
ences with Buck's prospective employers. The jury found in favor of Buck. The company
appealed the jury determination that the alleged statements were defamatory and argued that
the words were susceptible to a nondefamatory interpretation because Buck was never explic-
itly accused of any wrongdoing nor was he called anything disparaging. The court disagreed
and concluded that there was evidence sufficient to show that the prospective employer under-
stood the statements made by the defendant's employee in a defamatory sense. Because the
statements were ambiguous, the court held that the jury was entitled to find that the com-
pany's statements were calculated to convey that Buck had been terminated because of serious
misconduct.
65. See Diane H. Mazur, Note, Self-Publication of Defamation and Employee Discharge, 6
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION 313, 314 (1987). Two cases in Texas recognize the doctrine of
self-publication. See Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (it was reasonable to expect that contractor dismissed from
project for theft would be required to repeat reason to others); First State Bank of Corpus
Christi v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (it was
reasonable to expect that former bank employee discharged for dishonesty would be required
to admit in employment interview or in application for employment about same).
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the facts compelled the former employee to repeat the defamatory words;66
focusing instead on the foreseeability that the words would be communi-
cated to a third party. 67
b. Absolute Privilege.
Any communication, oral or written, which is uttered or published in the
course of or in contemplation of a judicial proceeding is absolutely privi-
leged.68 No action for damages will lie for such communication even though
it is false and published with malice.69 The privilege has also been extended
to proceedings before executive officers, boards, and commissions exercising
quasi-judicial powers.70 Examples of quasi-judicial bodies include the State
Bar Grievance Committee, a grand jury, the Railroad Commission, the
Pharmacy Board, the Internal Affairs Division of the Police Department of
Dallas,7 1 and the Texas Employment Commission. 72
c. An Employer's Qualified Privilege.
An employer will not be liable if the statement is published under circum-
stances that make it conditionally privileged and if the privilege is not
66. See McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 793, 168 Cal. Rptr.
89, 94 (1980); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988); Belcher v. Little,
315 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa 1982); Lewis v. Equitable Life Ins. Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn.
1986) (the following must be proven for a finding that a statement is self-compelled: (1) exist-
ence of a strong compulsion to disclose the defamatory statement to third parties; (2) the
existence of the strong compulsion was reasonably foreseeable to the wrongdoer; and (3) such
disclosures were actually made).
67. Chasewood, 696 S.W.2d at 445; Ake, 606 S.W.2d at 701. The Texas courts' recogni-
tion of the doctrine of self-publication is based upon comment k of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977). See Chasewood, 696 S.W.2d at 444, 446. Comment k provides:
k. Intentional or negligent publication. There is an intent to publish defama-
tory matter when the actor does an act for the purpose of communicating it to a
third person or with knowledge that it is substantially certain to be so communi-
cated .... It is not necessary, however, that the communication to a third
person be intentional. If a reasonable person would recognize that an act creates
an unreasonable risk that the defamatory matter will be communicated to a
third person, the conduct becomes a negligent communication. A negligent
communication amounts to a publication just as effectively as an intentional
communication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. k (1977).
68. See James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916-17 (Tex. 1982).
69. See Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 105, 109, 166 S.W.2d 909, 912 (1942).
70. Id. at 11, 166 S.W.2d at 912.
71. See Putter v. Anderson, 601 S.W.2d 73, 77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
72. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-9(j) (Vernon 1987); Taylor v. Houston
Lighting & Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 303 (S.D. Tex 1990); Krenek v. Abel, 594 S.W.2d
821, 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
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abused. 73 Whether a qualified privilege exists is a question of law. 74 "A
qualified privilege comprehends communications made in good faith on sub-
ject matter in which the author has an interest or with reference to which he
has an interest or with reference to which he has a duty to perform to an-
other person having a corresponding interest or duty."' 75 Generally, defama-
tory statements by an employer about an employee, or former employee, to a
person having a common interest in the matter to which the communication
relates, such as a prospective employer, are qualifiedly privileged. 76
An employer may lose the qualified privilege if his communication or pub-
lication is accompanied by actual malice. 77 Actual malice is a term of art in
the defamation context and is separate and distinct from traditional common
law malice. 78 Actual malice does not include ill will, spite or evil motive;
rather, it requires the making of a statement with knowledge that it is false,
or with reckless disregard of whether it is true. 79 Reckless disregard is de-
fined as a high degree of awareness of probable falsity, and the plaintiff must
establish sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.80 An error
in judgment is not sufficient to show actual malice. 8'
While the Texas cases adopting the doctrine of self-publication do not ad-
dress the issue of whether a qualified privilege exists in self-defamation ac-
tions,82 decisions in other jurisdictions which recognize the doctrine of self-
publication have recognized a qualified privilege in the employment con-
text.83 Recently, however, a federal district court in Texas has recognized
73. Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 806 (5th Cir. 1990); Gaines v. CUNA Mut. Ins.
Soc'y, 681 F.2d 982, 986 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Bergman v. Oshman's Sporting Goods, 594
S.W.2d 814, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ); Butler v. Central Bank & Trust Co.,
458 S.W.2d 510, 514-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ dism'd)); Houston v. Grocers
Supply Co., 625 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Duncantell
v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 446 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
74. Boze, 912 F.2d at 806 (interpreting Texas law); Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800
(citing Oshman's Sporting Goods, 594 S.W.2d at 816; Mayfield v. Gleichert, 484 S.W.2d 619,
626 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, no writ)).
75. Boze, 912 F.2d at 806 (quoting Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800).
76. Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no
writ) (citing Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800; Oshman's Sporting Goods, 594 S.W.2d at 816);
Duncantell, 446 S.W.2d at 937.
77. Dixon v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 607 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. 1980); Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. O'Neil, 456 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tex. 1970); Marathon Oil Co. v. Salazar, 682
S.W.2d 624, 631 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Grocers Supply, 625
S.W.2d at 801; Bridges v. Farmer, 483 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no
writ).
78. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tex. 1989); see Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d at
571.
79. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 571 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 328
(1974)).
80. Id. (citing St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Casso, 776 S.W.2d at
558).
81. Id.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
83. See, e.g., Steinbach v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn.
1989); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1988); Elmore v. Shell Oil Co., 733
F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876
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that such a privilege may exist in self-defamation actions; however, the court
rendered judgment on other grounds.84
In Young v. Dow Chemical Co. 85 Onezone Young had been employed by
Dow Chemical for twenty five years prior to his termination in April 1988.
Young claimed that representatives of Dow Chemical stated that he was too
dumb to learn, slept on the job, and made mistakes. Young further claimed
that he had to disclose these facts to prospective employers because he
"could not ignore the likelihood of those remarks being reported. ' 86 Citing
Duncantell v. Universal Life Insurance Co. 87 the district court recognized
that under Texas law, statements of a former employer about the work rec-
ord of a former employee made to a prospective employer are qualifiedly
privileged. To overcome this privilege, Young was required to prove that
Dow Chemical acted with malice.88
However, the court focused on Young's supporting case law and his proof
that the statements had been published to third parties. In asserting his
claim for self-defamation, Young relied on First State Bank of Corpus Christi
v. Ake.89 The district court determined that his reliance on Ake was inap-
propriate because the act alleged in Ake - the filing of the bond claim -
represented a charge of dishonesty. 9° In that situation, an employee knows
that the alleged dishonesty will most likely be communicated by the former
employer to the prospective employer, and, as a consequence, the employee
will feel compelled to explain the act to the prospective employer. The court
reasoned that the same was not true of an allegation of incompetence.
"Many businesses only release information about an employer's length of
service. [Young] has produced no evidence that he would have to publish
the information during interviews." 91 The court then noted that Young had
not produced any evidence that any alleged defamatory remarks had in fact
been published or communicated to any prospective employers. Conse-
quently, the district court found no evidence to support Young's allegations
of defamation and therefore granted Dow Chemical summary judgment on
(Minn. 1986). In Lewis the Minnesota supreme court correctly acknowledged the reason for
allowing the qualified privilege in self-publication cases:
Where an employer would be entitled to a privilege if it had actually published
the statement, it makes little sense to deny the privilege where the identical com-
munication is made to identical third parties with the only difference being the
mode of publication. Finally, recognition of a qualified privilege seems to be the
only effective means of addressing the concern that every time an employer
states the reason for discharging an employee it will subject itself to potential
liability for defamation.
Id. at 889-90.
84. Young v. Dow Chem. Co., 1991 WL 138322, 56 Emp. Prac. Dec. 40,793 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 5, 1991).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2.
87. 446 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
88. Young, 1991 WL 138222 at 1.
89. 606 S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
90. Young, 1991 WL 138222 at 1.




d. Employer's Liability for Employee's Defamatory Statements.
Statements made by a supervisor or management level employee about
another employee or a former employee while in the course and scope of the
discharge of his responsibilities will generally be imputed to the company. 93
Neither express authorization, nor subsequent ratification by the company is
necessary in order to establish liability.94 An action is sustainable against
the company for defamation by its employee if the defamation is referable to
the duty owing by the employee to the company and is made while in the
discharge of that duty. 95 A company will not be liable, however, for acts of
an employee which are not referable to the company's business or which are
unauthorized by the company. 96
Unlike an award of compensatory damages against an employer for de-
famatory statements of an employee, liability for punitive damages does not
flow from the employment relationship through the doctrine of respondeat
superior. 97 Instead, the employer must have either some direct culpability,
such as ratification of the act, or recklessness in retaining or hiring the em-
ployee, or the agent must have more authority than a mere employee, such
as a manager or vice principal.98 For example, if an employee has authority
to employ, direct, or discharge other employees, or if an employee has mana-
gerial authority over the whole or part of a department or division of the
business of his employer, that employee will be considered a manager or vice
principal for purposes of finding the employer liable for exemplary
damages.99
In Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Tucker 0o Tucker, an employee of
92. Id.
93. Ryder Truck Rentals v. Latham, 593 S.W.2d 334, 337 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
94. Wagner v. Caprock Beef Packers Co., 540 S.W.2d 303, 304 (Tex. 1976); Texam Oil
Corp. v. Poynor, 436 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex. 1968); Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d
612, 627 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1009
(1985).
95. Texam Oil Corp., 436 S.W.2d at 130; Frank B. Hall, 678 S.W.2d at 627.
96. Muldrow v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., No. 89-2528 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 1990) (interpreting
Texas law) (not published); Horton v. Robinson, 776 S.W.2d 260, 267 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1989, no writ).
97. Shearson Lehman, Inc. v. Tucker, 806 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991,
writ dism'd w.o.j.).
98. The court in Shearson Lehman outlined the circumstances when a corpora-
tion/employer may be held liable for exemplary damages:
A corporation may be liable for exemplary damages because of the acts of an
employee or agent if (1) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of
the act, or (2) the employee or agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in
employing him, or (3) the employee or agent was employed in a managerial
capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, or (4) the employer or a
manager of the employer ratified or approved the act.
Id. at 926 (citing King v. McGuff, 149 Tex. 432, 234 S.W.2d 403, 405 (1950); Southern Pac.
Transp. Co. v. Harlow, 729 S.W.2d 946, 952 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied)).
99. Id.
100. 806 S.W.2d at 926.
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Shearson, was terminated for violating a company policy. Tucker brought
suit against Shearson alleging Wilde, a supervisor, made certain slanderous
statements to two former clients of Tucker. Specifically, Tucker alleged that
Wilde made statements that Tucker was going to lose his license as a broker,
was in trouble with the Securities Exchange Commission, and would never
work as a broker again. Shearson was held liable for exemplary damages as
a consequence of Wilde's slanderous statements concerning another stock-
broker. Shearson challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jury's finding that Wilde was a vice principal.
In addressing Shearson's assertion that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that Shearson was legally responsible for Wilde's statements, the
court noted that Wilde was a senior vice president of sales with Shearson. 101
The court added that Wilde was one of only two brokers in the Shearson
office who had such a title. The court further noted that the evidence
showed that Wilde was acting within the scope of his employment when he
made statements to two former clients of Tucker during a sales call.102
Although Wilde denied having any management responsibilities, the court
noted that he had authority to make the statements to the former clients. 0 3
Furthermore, Wilde admitted that he had a minor role in recruiting new
stockbrokers. In light of this evidence, the court determined that there was
sufficient evidence to support a finding that Wilde was a vice principal of
Shearson and that Shearson authorized Wilde's acts. 104 Consequently,
Shearson was held liable for the punitive damage award due to Wilde's
slander.
4. Invasion of Privacy
In 1973, the Texas supreme court recognized the right of privacy 05 by
stating that "an unwarranted invasion of the right of privacy constitutes a
legal injury for which a remedy will be granted."'06 Subsequently, the
supreme court recognized four categories of invasion of privacy identified by
Dean Prosser: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another;
(2) appropriation of another's name or likeness; (3) unreasonable publicity
given to another's private life; and (4) publicity that unreasonably places





105. In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis propounded a concept of a right of
privacy which they asserted justified an independent tort remedy. Samuel D. Warren & Louis
D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1990). The Warren and Brandeis
article resulted from a Boston newspaper's regular practice of elaborating on Warren's social
life. Bruce A. McKenna, False Light: Invasion of Privacy?, 15 TULSA L. J. 113, 114 (1979).
As McKenna observed, Warren's concern with the publication of this gossip and his discus-
sions with Brandeis led to the birth of the law of privacy. The overriding concern of the
Warren and Brandeis article was how to deal with excesses by the press. Warren & Brandeis
supra, at 195-96.
106. Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tex. 1973).
107. Industrial Found. of the South v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 682
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a. False Light Theory.
Recently, in Diamond Shamrock Refining and Marketing Co. v. Men-
dez 108 the San Antonio court of appeals recognized a cause of action for the
false light theory of invasion of privacy arising out of the termination of
employment. In that case, Roque Mendez sued Diamond Shamrock after
his termination of employment for theft, claiming that his discharge invaded
his privacy, because the ensuing publicity unreasonably placed him in a false
light before the public.'°9 Diamond Shamrock had experienced a series of
thefts at its refinery. A security guard discovered Mendez' lunch bag in the
clock house, containing a box of nails. Wayne Billings and John Hoffman,
refinery management, subsequently called Mendez and asked him to return
to the plant to explain why the nails were in his lunch bag.I 10 After Mendez
(1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930 (1977) (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 383, 389 (1960); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 at 805-14 (4th ed.
1971)). Interestingly, Dean Prosser was skeptical about the desirability of the false light pri-
vacy action because of its potential confusion with defamation. See PROSSER, supra § 117 at
813-14; Prosser, supra at 400-01. Nevertheless, Prosser's analysis of the four categories of
invasion of privacy was subsequently adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 652A-E (1977).
108. 809 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991), writ granted, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 12,
12-13 (Oct. 9, 1991).
109. The RESTATEMENT provides the following definition of "publicity placing [a] person
in a false light:"
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
privacy if,
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977); see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF
DEFAMATION § 10.02[1] at 10-7 (1989). The Texas courts of appeals have followed the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS when reviewing the false light theory of invasion of privacy.
Clark v. Denton Publishing Co., 793 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ
denied); Covington v. Houston Post, 743 S.W.2d 345, 346-47 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987, no writ); Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222, 223-24 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no
writ); see Moore v. Big Picture Co., 828 F.2d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 1987) (interpreting Texas law).
Two commentators have concluded that the false light theory should be rejected in its en-
tirety. See Diane L. Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy. The Light That Failed, 64
N.Y.U.L. REV. 364, 452 (May 1989); Bruce A. McKenna, False Light: Invasion of Privacy?,
15 TULSA L.J. 113, 139 (1979). North Carolina (which also recognizes the right of privacy)
has rejected the false light theory in its entirety, see Hall v. Post, 323 N.C. 259, 372 S.E.2d 711,
713 (1988); Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405, 412
(1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984), and Missouri has seriously questioned its viability,
see Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broadcasting Co., 709 S.W.2d 475, 480-81 (Mo. 1986); Lacey v. Marsh,
741 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (Missouri Supreme Court indicated hesitation to recog-
nize false light theory). The Zimmerman article is undoubtedly the most thorough article
discussing the false light theory. Zimmerman concludes that "[flalse light invasion of privacy
has caused enough theoretical and practical problems to make a compelling case for a stricter
standard of birth control in the evolution of the common law." Zimmerman, supra at 366.
110. Mendez then explained that his supervisor called him at the end of his shift and told
him to clean up the area, and that he was angered by the way his supervisor talked to him.
Mendez slammed down the telephone, saw where a carpenter had left some nails on the floor,
threw the nails in a box, put the box in his lunch bag, and placed his lunch bag on a shelf in the
control room. Thereafter, the plaintiff took his lunch bag out of the control room, walked to
the clock house to clock out, and left his lunch bag on a table in the clock house.
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explained, Hoffman asked Mendez if he agreed with Hoffman's assessment
that Mendez's actions constituted stealing. Mendez responded, "Yes, I
guess so." Hoffman then discharged Mendez and left the room."l' Billings
told his supervisors of Mendez' termination, but not the reason for the ter-
mination. One employee stated that news of Mendez's termination was all
over the plant. While Mendez left the refinery without talking to anyone,
Mendez and his wife discussed his termination with more than 200 people in
the community. Mendez sued Diamond Shamrock for false light invasion of
privacy and prevailed. On appeal, Diamond Shamrock challenged, among
other things, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding of
false light invasion of privacy.
The San Antonio court of appeals first reviewed the evidence to determine
whether the statement alleged to have been published about Mendez was
false or at least capable of conveying a false impression.1 12 The court held
that there was evidence sufficient for such finding because Mendez testified
at trial that he did not intend to steal the nails.1 13 The court's conclusion is
erroneous. The truth of the statement is determined as of the time of the
defamatory publication.114 At the time of discharge, Mendez admitted steal-
ing the box of nails. Therefore, measuring the truthfulness of the statement
at the time of the alleged publication compels the conclusion that the state-
ment was true.
The court then addressed the sufficiency of the evidence that Diamond
Shamrock gave publicity to the statement "by communicating it to the pub-
lic at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as sub-
stantially certain to become one of public knowledge."' 15 Disregarding the
111. Billings then asked Mendez why he had not come to Billings first because he could
have used a gate pass (a company procedure to remove company property from the plant).
Mendez replied that he did not know - that he just messed up.
112. Mendez, 809 S.W.2d at 517. The jury was instructed that theft occurs when a person,
"without the owner's consent, appropriates property with the intent to deprive the owner of
said property." Id. (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (Vernon 1989 & Supp. 1991)).
To "appropriate" does not require the plaintiff to remove the property from the premises;
rather, it simply requires that he exercise control over the property. See BLACK'S LAW DiC-
TIONARY 92 (5th ed. 1979).
113. 809 S.W.2d at 517. Ironically, in another part of the opinion, the court acknowledged
that Mendez admitted stealing the box of nails at his meeting with Billings and Hoffman. Id.
at 522.
114. The critical issue is whether the statement was false at the time it was allegedly made.
Section 652E of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS does not address the issue of when
the falsity of a statement is determined. Nevertheless, chapter 24 of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS regarding defamation provides clear guidance. Section 581A provides that
"[olne who publishes a defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability for defamation if
the statement is true." Specifically, comment g adds: The truth of a defamatory imputation of
fact must be determined as of the time of the defamatory publication. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 581A cmt. g (1977); See also Ruebke v. Globe Communications Corp., 241
Kan. 595, 738 P.2d 1246, 1249-50 (Kan. 1987); Reilly v. Giller, 176 N.J. Super. 321, 423 A.2d
311, 314 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (truth of a statement must be measured at the time
of publication). Similarly, under false light invasion of privacy, the truthfulness of the state-
ment must be judged at the time of the publication.
115. Mendez, 809 S.W.2d at 518. Section 652E of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS




fact that Mendez and his wife talked to over 200 people about his discharge,
and the fact that no one testified that Diamond Shamrock communicated the
reason for Mendez's discharge to anyone, the court held that Diamond
Shamrock publicized the matter.'16 Because the information about the con-
tents of the lunch bag was known generally throughout the plant, the court
inferred that Diamond Shamrock publicized the reason for Mendez's dis-
charge to the employees. 117 Accordingly, the court held Diamond Sham-
rock responsible for the publicity of the information in the community.1 18
Finally, the court addressed Diamond Shamrock's complaint that the trial
'Publicity,'... means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the
public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as sub-
stantially certain to become one of public knowledge.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977). See Moore v. Big Picture Co., 828
F.2d at 273. Thus, "widespread publicity of the highly offensive matter is required before a
successful false light cause of action may be established." Id. The RESTATEMENTprovides in
pertinent part:
Thus it is not an invasion of the right of privacy, within the rule stated in this
Section, to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff's private life to a single
person or even to a small group of persons.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977). The supreme court has adopted
that definition and stated that publicity requires communication to more than a small group of
people. Industrial Found. of the South v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d at 683-84;
see Wilhite v. H.E. Butt Co., 812 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1991, n.w.h.) (dis-
cussion of reasons for plaintiff's dismissal discussed only with management; therefore, court
held that there was no fact issue regarding publicity to support the plaintiff's false light claim);
Stewart v. Pantry, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 (W.D. Ky. 1988) (plaintiff told others of the
reason for their discharge; therefore, false light not attributable to the employer); Wells v.
Thomas, 569 F. Supp. 426, 437 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("Publication to the community of employees
at staff meetings and discussions between defendants and other employees is clearly different
from the type of public disclosure found in cases relied upon by plaintiff."); Beard v. Akzona,
Inc., 517 F. Supp. 128, 133 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (information disclosed to five management level
employees held not sufficient to constitute publicity); Rogers v. International Business Mach.
Corp., 500 F. Supp. at 870 (information regarding plaintiff's discharge communicated to em-
ployees with a duty, responsibility and a need for such information; therefore, no evidence of
publicity); Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 458 Pa. 124, 327 A.2d 133, 137 (1974) (communication to
an employer and three relatives concerning credit arrearage did not constitute sufficient
publicity).
116. Mendez, 809 S.W.2d at 518.
117. Id. at 518-19.
118. Id. at 519. This conclusion probably qualifies for the inference stacking olympics. See
Briones v. Levine's Dep't Store, Inc., 447 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Tex. 1969) (inference may not be based
upon another inference); Bel-Go Assoc.-Mula Road v. Vitale, 723 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tex.
App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1986, no writ) (stacking inferences not allowed). There is no evi-
dence in Mendez that the reason for Mendez's discharge was publicized. Beyond the assump-
tion that the workforce gossiped about Mendez' discharge, there is no evidence of publicity. In
Stewart v. Pantry, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1361 (W.D. Ky. 1988), two employees were discharged
after their polygraph examinations indicated deception. The employees sued Pantry, Inc. for,
among other things, false light invasion of privacy. Identifying the need to restrict false light
claims in the employment context, the court stated:
If the act itself can give right to a cause of action for false light, then any time an
employer discharges an employee, the employer runs the risk that the accompa-
nying stigma will result in a false-light lawsuit. That risk may be exacerbated
where the events occur in a small town, where plaintiffs may be well known and
news spreads quickly. False-light liability must be limited only to those cases in
which the employer unreasonably communicates to the public false reasons for a
dismissal, not the mere fact of dismissal. Otherwise the terminable-at-will em-
ployment doctrine is unreasonably restricted.
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court erred in omitting from the jury question the standard of care, i.e.,
whether Diamond Shamrock had knowledge that the statement was false or
that it acted in reckless disregard of its falsity. 119 While the actual malice
standard of care was repeatedly recited in Texas cases,120 the court of ap-
peals held that the issue of the standard of care in false light cases had not
been resolved in Texas. The court adopted the negligence standard of care
in defamation cases and - it would apply it to false light cases.12' Because
Id. at 1370 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court rejected the employees' false light
claims.
The court's analysis in Stewart should apply to Mendez. In the small town of Three Rivers,
news of the plaintiff's discharge apparently spread quickly. While the news may have spread
quickly, Diamond Shamrock cannot be held responsible for unreasonably communicating false
reasons for dismissal to the public. Mendez, 809 S.W.2d at 519. Similarly, in Rouly v. Enserch
Corp., 1987 WL 8454 (E.D. La. 1987), an employee who was suspended from his job (which
allegedly became widely known) sued his employer for false light invasion of privacy. The
employer investigated several employees for possible wrongdoing, including the plaintiff, and
some of the employees were later convicted of crime. Although the plaintiff was not convicted,
he alleged that others concluded he was also guilty. The district court granted summary judg-
ment for the employer and held:
To deny an employer an otherwise reasonable course of action simply because of
possible misperceptions by third parties would make no sense at all. To expose
that employer to damages under circumstances such as plaintiff claims here is
not the law. The plaintiff has provided testimony by persons who claimed to
have learned that the plaintiff was investigated and was later fired for 'impropri-
eties.' What is not provided, however, is evidence of how those persons learned of
the plaintiff's situation. There is no indication that the defendants disclosed em-
barrassing or private facts about the plaintiff to anyone not entitled to the infor-
mation. Nor is there evidence that the defendants gave the plaintiff publicity
which placed him in a false light in the public eye.
Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added). Like Rouly, Diamond Shamrock should not be discouraged from
investigating what appears to be theft simply because of possible misperceptions by third par-
ties. Also like Rouly, there is evidence in Mendez that people knew of Mendez' discharge, but
there is no evidence of how those persons learned of Mendez' situation or the reason for his
discharge.
119. Mendez, 809 S.W.2d at 519. Thus, evidence of reckless disregard requires proof that
the false statement was made with a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity and that
the defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement. Boiling v. Baker, 671
S.W.2d 559, 564 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ dism'd w.o.j.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 824
(1985).
120. Mendez, 809 S.W.2d at 519. The Texas courts repeatedly recited the elements as set
forth in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). See Clarke v. Denton Publishing
Co., 793 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied); Covington v. Houston
Post, 743 S.W.2d at 346-47; Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222, 223-24 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1982, no writ). Specifically, the RESTATEMENT standard of care is:
the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the
publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
644 S.W.2d at 224. Citing a Fifth Circuit case, one commentator has recognized the conflict
under Texas law regarding the appropriate standard of care. See Jerry A. Gibson, The Devel-
oping Law of Tort Liability for Non-Physical Harm: A Guide for the Texas Practitioner, 18 ST.
MARY'S L. J. 899, 928 (1987) ("A conflict exists as to the standard of care required in order to
recover under a false light cause of action."). Compare McLean v. International Harvester
Co., 817 F.2d 1214, 1220 (5th Cir. 1987) (reciting knowledge/reckless disregard standard of
care) with Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1107 (1985) (Fifth Circuit concluding that Texas courts would probably apply negli-
gence standard of care to a false light claim).
121. Mendez, 809 S.W.2d at 520 (citing Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d
809, 819 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977) ("a private individual may recover
damages from a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory falsehood as compensation for actual
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Diamond Shamrock objected to the jury question based on the omission of
the actual malice standard of care, the court held that Diamond Shamrock
waived the issue because it failed to object to the omission of the negligence
standard of care.' 22 The supreme court has granted Diamond Shamrock's
application for a writ of error to consider whether there is legally sufficient
evidence to support Mendez's claim for false light invasion of privacy and
whether the court of appeals was correct in adopting the negligence standard
of care. 123
b. The False Light Theory and Defamation - Does Texas Really Need
Both?
Although defamation and false light invasion of privacy share certain sim-
ilar characteristics, there are important differences. 124 First, the nature of
the interests protected by each action differs substantially. 25 A defamation
action compensates damage to reputation or good name caused by the publi-
cation of false information. 126 In Texas, bringing a lawsuit for a reputational
tort is protected by the Texas Constitution. 127 Privacy, on the other hand,
does not protect reputation but protects mental and emotional interests.' 28
The essence of a privacy action is the injury to the feelings 129 of the plaintiff
caused by the publication.130 The remedy is available to protect an individ-
ual's right "to be left alone, to live a life of seclusion, to be free from unwar-
ranted publicity."'1' 3
Second, with defamation, a publication must be false and must expose the
defamed person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or financial injury or
impeach his honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation.132 In false light cases,
the false light need not be defamatory, only false, 133 but it must be such as to
injury upon a showing that the publisher or broadcaster knew or should have known that the
defamatory statement was false.")). See Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d at 1091
(Fifth Circuit opined that a Texas court would apply same standard of care in a false light case
as in a defamation case, i.e., negligence).
122. Mendez, 809 S.W.2d at 521.
123. Mendez, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 12-13. The case was argued and submitted on Decem-
ber 17, 1991. Id.
124. See Covington v. Houston Post, 743 S.W.2d at 437 (defamation and false light causes
of action often overlap).
125. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 at 864 (5th ed. 1984).
126. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384 n. 9.
127. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989) (quoting TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 13).
128. McKenna, supra note 109 at 139 ("Privacy Law was not intended to protect a per-
son's reputation.").
129. Thomas I. Emerson, The Right to Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 HARV. C.R.-
C.L.L. REV. 329, 333 (1979).
130. Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 162 Ariz. 335, 783 P.2d 781, 787 (Ariz.
1989); see Industrial Found. of the South v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d at 682
(quoting Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d at 859).
131. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d at 682
132. TEX. REV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 1986); TEX. TORTS & REM.
§ 53.05[4] at 53-57 (1991).
133. Clarke v. Denton Publishing Co., 793 S.W.2d at 331.
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be offensive to a reasonable person.' 3 4 A false light cause of action may arise
when something untrue has been published about an individual,1 35 or when
the publication of true information creates a false implication about the indi-
vidual. In the latter type of case, the false innuendo created by the highly
offensive presentation of a true fact constitutes injury.' 36
Finally, in defamation cases, publication is required only to a third per-
son.' 37 In false light cases, widespread publicity is an essential element of
the claim. 13 8
While the false light cause of action has suffered sharp criticism, even in
its general application to media cases (e.g., newspaper, magazine, television
and radio), the application of this tort theory to employment cases makes no
sense whatsoever. Due to the controversial nature of the false light theory in
its typical application to media cases, its application to an employment case
deserves careful scrutiny. Applying a lower standard of care of negligence,
as adopted by the Mendez court of appeals, versus the standard of knowl-
edge and reckless disregard, as set forth in the Restatement (Second) Of
Torts § 652E has far-reaching and adverse ramifications for employers.
If the court of appeals' decision in Mendez is affirmed, then the message to
employers is clear: do not investigate employee problems and do not discuss
the reason for termination with the affected employee; instead, simply dis-
charge the at-will employee without investigation and without comment. As
the supreme court recognized over one hundred years ago, Diamond Sham-
rock had the right to discharge Mendez, an at-will employee, with or with-
out cause, for any reason or no reason, and without liability for failure to
continue employment. 139 If the Mendez opinion is affirmed, an employer
may avoid the possibility of liability for substantial damages in false light
cases only by avoiding any communication with an employee, as well as to a
third person, regarding the reason for termination of the employee. 140
5. Intentional or Negligent Infliction of Severe Emotional Distress
In addition to breach of contract and wrongful termination claims, dis-
134. Williams v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 96 F.R.D. 658, 669 (W.D. Ark. 1983);
Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 87 (W.Va. 1984).
135. See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 at 863-66.
136. Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d at 787; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
137. Clarke v. Denton Publishing Co., 793 S.W.2d at 331.
138. Moore v. Big Picture Co., 828 F.2d at 273; Industrial Found. of the South v. Texas
Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d at 683-84; Clarke v. Denton Publishing Co., 793 S.W.2d at
331; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977).
139. See McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 807 S.W.2d 577, 577 (Tex. 1991); Winters v.
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d at 723-24; East Line & R.R.R. Co., 72 Tex. at
70, 10 S.W. at 102.
140. See Layne v. Builders Plumbing Supply Co., 210 Ill. App. 3d 966, 975, 569 N.E.2d
1104, 1111 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). See Ross H. Fishman, When Silence is Golden, NATION'S
BUSINESS, July 1991, at 48.
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charged employees regularly claim damages for intentional 41 or negligent 142
infliction of emotional distress. While Texas courts have not recognized a
cause of action for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress
arising solely from the act of termination of employment,1 43 events occur-
141. To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must
show four elements: (1) the defendant acted either intentionally or recklessly; (2) this con-
duct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendants' actions caused the emotional distress of
the plaintiff; and, finally (4) the emotional distress was severe. Tidelands Auto. Club v. Wal-
ters, 699 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The two year stat-
ute of limitations applies to intentional infliction of emotional distress. Stevenson v.
Koutzarov, 795 S.W.2d 313, 319 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
142. In St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard, the Texas supreme court recognized a cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from the mishandling of a corpse.
730 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tex. 1987). The supreme court, however, may be rethinking the issue.
In Boyles v. Kerr the supreme court granted a writ of error in part to determine whether Texas
recognizes a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 806 S.W.2d 255, 259
(Tex. App.-Texarkana), writ granted, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 34, 34-35 (June 19, 1991). Garrard
may be limited to its facts, that is, mishandling of a corpse.
143. Mayon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 805 F.2d 1250, 1253 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) (mere
wrongful discharge will not support a claim for emotional distress damages); Lucas v. Colum-
bia Gas Dev. Corp., No. 89-2175 (S.D. Tex. May 9, 1991) ("An employer who does no more
than exercise its right to terminate an employee has not committed outrageous conduct in the
degree and character required for liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress....
Plaintiff's discharge alone may not form the basis of a claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress."); Young v. Dow Chem. Co., 1991 WL 138322, 56 Emp. Prac. Dec. $ 40,793
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 1991) (holding termination alone is insufficient to support a claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. The discharge must be accompanied by some extreme or
outrageous act. In Young, the plaintiff alleged that following his discharge he experienced
continuing emotional distress. He made no allegations of any outrageous act which occurred
during the termination process.); Davis v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., No. H-89-2806 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
28, 1991) (termination alone will not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Green v. Texas E. Prods. Pipeline Co., No. 89-1005 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 1991) (Ter-
mination alone is not enough and the discharge must be accompanied by some extreme or
outrageous act.); Taylor v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 301 (S.D. Tex.
1990) (Termination alone is insufficient; the discharge must be accompanied by some extreme
or outrageous conduct.); Scott v. Vetco Gray, Inc., No. 89-1839 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 1990)
(The mere act of wrongful discharge cannot form the basis for a claim of intentional infliction
of emotional distress.); Nichols v. Columbia Gas Dev. Corp., No. 89-2418 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14,
1990) (Because plaintiff was told of her discharge in private, and she alleged only vague, gen-
eral references to offensive comments, identifying only one specific comment from her supervi-
sor, plaintiff failed to establish her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.); Ismail v.
Wendy's Int'l, Inc., No. 90-1817 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 1990) (Plaintiff's claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress dismissed because the complaint merely stated an ordinary em-
ployment dispute.); Austin v. Champion Int'l Corp., No. H-87-1845 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 1990)
(An employer who does no more than exercise its right to terminate an employee has not
committed outrageous conduct in the degree and character required for liability for intentional
infliction of emotional harm.); Starrett v. Iberia Airlines of Spain, 756 F. Supp. 292, 296 (S.D.
Tex. 1989) (no evidence of extreme or outrageous conduct or that plaintiff's distress was se-
vere); Yarbrough v. La Petite Academy, No. H-87-3967 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 1989) (termination
of an employment relationship normally cannot give rise to a claim for emotional distress.);
Fiorenza v. First City Bank-Central, 710 F. Supp. 1104, 1105 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (Texas law
does not recognize claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of termination
of employment); Laird v. Texas Commerce Bank--Odessa, 707 F. Supp. 938, 941 (W.D. Tex.
1988) (single act of discharge will not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress); McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d at 820 (claim of discharge just prior
to 10 years service to prevent plaintiff from receiving certain benefits does not create an issue of
fact of extreme or outrageous conduct); Mendez, 809 S.W.2d at 522 (mere discharge from
employment held insufficient evidence of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress).
See also Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d at 429 (mere allegations of malice associ-
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ring during employment or events surrounding a discharge may support a
claim for intentional'" or negligent infliction of emotional distress. But, it is
a question of law, in the first instance, whether a defendant's conduct may
reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit
recovery. 1
4 5
a. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
In a case of first impression, the San Antonio court of appeals held that a
plaintiff may be able to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress arising out of the termination of employment. In McAlister v. Me-
dina Electric Cooperative, Inc. 146 Rita McAlister sued Medina Electric Co-
ated with discharge held insufficient). But see Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. CA-3-89-
2663-C (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 1990) (question of fact regarding the plaintiff's termination from
employment due to handicap discrimination precludes summary judgment as to claims for
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress); Scott v. Vetco Gray, Inc., No. 89-
1839 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 1989) (plaintiff's allegations that the defendants, in response to in-
quiries, consistently failed to accurately communicate his prospects of continued employment
even though the defendants knew that he had foregone a job opportunity with a competitor,
held sufficient to create a material issue of fact as to his claims for intentional and negligent
infliction of severe emotional distress); Casas v. Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d 466, 470-71 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied) (motion for rehearing pending)) (termination from
employment creates issue of fact regarding plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of severe
emotional distress); Mendez, 809 S.W.2d at 522.
144. Cases where the courts have applied intentional infliction of emotional distress to ter-
mination of employment include Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1991)
(applying Texas law); Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 885 S.W.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1989)
(applying Texas law); Casas, 818 S.W.2d at 466; Havens v. Tomball Community Hosp., 793
S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ); Bushell v. Dean, 781 S.W.2d 652
(Tex. App.-Austin 1989), writ denied in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 803 S.W.2d 711
(Tex. 1991); Guzman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., No. SA-88-CA-533 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 16,
1990); Nicholls v. Columbia Gas Dev. Corp., No. 89-2418 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 1990).
145. Garcia v. Webb County Dist. Attorney, 764 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Casas,
818 S.W.2d at 766; Mendez, 809 S.W.2d at 522.
146. 822 S.W.2d 83 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1991). See also Peterson v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., No. CA-3-89-2663-C (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 1990) (question of fact regarding the plaintiff's
termination from employment due to handicap discrimination precludes summary judgment as
to claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress); Scott v. Vetco Gray,
Inc., No. 89-1839 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 1989) (plaintiff's allegations that the defendants, in
response to inquiries, consistently failed to accurately communicate his prospects of continued
employment even though the defendants knew that he had foregone a job opportunity with a
competitor, held sufficient to create a material issue of fact as to his claims for intentional and
negligent infliction of severe emotional distress).
The Fifth Circuit recently reached a conclusion contrary to McAlister. In Conaway v. Con-
trol Data Corp., No. 91-2695, slip op. at 3149 & n. 1(5th Cir. Mar. 10, 1992), the Fifth Circuit
held that Judge Justice's opinion in Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F. Supp. 152 (E.D. Tex.
1987) is an incorrect interpretation of Texas law. In Abston, Judge Justice ruled that circum-
stances surrounding discharge may support a claim for the independent tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and rejected the employer's argument that discharge from em-
ployment cannot legally be grounds for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Id. at 157. Nevertheless, the court found the emloyer's conduct was not extreme and outra-
geous, therefore, it granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. However, Judge Justice ruled that the plaintiff
had established a genuine issue of a material fact regarding his claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Id. at 157-58. In Conaway, the Fifth Circuit overruled Abston and held
that under Texas law there is not a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
arising out of the employment relationship. Conaway, slip op. at 3149 & n.1. See Austin v.
Champion Int'l Corp., No. 87-1845 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 2, 1992) (under Texas law, an employer
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operative, Inc. (Cooperative) for breach of employment contract and
negligent and intentional147 infliction of severe emotional distress. The trial
court granted Cooperative's special exceptions to McAlister's claim for neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress. Cooperative argued that no such cause
of action exists under Texas law in the context of the employment relation-
ship or, alternatively, even if such a cause of action exists, her exclusive rem-
edy would be under the Workers' Compensation Act. The court dismissed
McAlister's claim without giving her the opportunity to amend her pleading.
The court of appeals reversed and held that it was reversible error to deny
McAlister the right to amend her pleading to allege a negligent infliction of
emotional distress cause of action.148 The court also found that a negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim may be appropriate in the context of
McAlister's breach of employment contract claim.' 49 The court further held
that McAlister could pursue her claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress because her injury was not sustained in the course of employment as
defined in the Workers' Compensation Act. Because she could not be com-
pensated under the Workers' Compensation Act, the court erroneously rea-
soned that McAlister could seek a common law remedy from
Cooperative.150 The court concluded that while it could not forecast
may not be held liable for negligently terminating an employee); Taylor v. Houston Lighting
and Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 301-02 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (allegations that after an investiga-
tion, plaintiff suspended and later discharged over the telephone do not constitute negligent or
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
147. The court affirmed the summary judgment for the Cooperative on the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress claim. McAlister, 822 S.W.2d at 90. The undisputed facts re-
flected that in January 1989 the Cooperative's general manager informed McAlister that her
position was going to be eliminated for economic reasons effective six months later. While
McAlister was told that she would be considered for any job openings for which she qualified,
no such openings became available before her position was eliminated. The court held that as
a matter of law the Cooperative's conduct was not extreme or outrageous and that McAlister's
emotional distress was not severe. Id.
148. Id. at 87 n.1 & 87-88.
149. The Cooperative relied on Fiorenza v. First City Bank-Central, 710 F. Supp. 1104,
1105 (E.D. Tex. 1988) to support its argument that Texas law does not recognize a cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the context of an employer-employee
relationship. McAlister, 822 S.W.2d at 87-88. The court rejected the argument because Fi-
orenza involved an employment-at-will relationship, whereas the McAlister pleading alleged a
breach of contract. Id. at 87. The court observed that McAlister raised a fact issue regarding
her breach of contract claim. Id. at 89. Therefore, for purposes of the special exception, she
was not an at-will employee. Id. at 87. The court held that in limited circumstances a negli-
gence claim is possible in conjunction with a breach of contract claim, and that McAlister
must be afforded the right to amend her pleading before resolving the issue. Id. at 87-88.
(citing Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Delanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. 1991); and Mont-
gomery Ward & Co. v. Scharenbeck, 146 Tex. 153, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex. 1947)).
150. Id. at 86-87. (citing Transportation Ins. Co. v. Maksyn, 580 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Tex.
1979); Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex. 1972); Bailey v.
American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315, 322 (1955)). While the court's inter-
pretation of the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers Compensation Act (Act) is beyond
the scope of this article, the court's holding is very significant. The court's opinion that the
exclusive remedy provision encompasses only those injuries that actually are compensable
under the Act is simply wrong. The result of the court's reasoning is that if an injury suffered
by an employee because of her employment is not, for whatever reason, compensable under the
Act, the employee may sue her employer at common law. "The notion that a subscribing
employer's immunity under an exclusive remedy provision is coterminous with injuries com-
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whether McAlister could amend her pleadings sufficiently to allege an ap-
propriate negligence cause of action that could withstand other special ex-
ceptions, she nevertheless had the right to try to do So. 1
b. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
In Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 152 Wilson sued his former employer,
Monarch, for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) and filed a pendent state law claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. Wilson recovered $156,000 in damages for his ADEA claim,
plus an equal amount in liquidated damages. He also recovered on his claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, receiving an award for past
damages of $622,359.15, future damages of $225,000, and punitive damages
of $2,250,000. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Wilson was a college educated
twenty-year employee of Monarch, By 1981, Wilson was the Corporate Di-
rector of Physical Distribution, Vice President and Assistant to the Presi-
dent. At that time division managers began making repeated references to
the age of employees, including Wilson. Monarch hired a new President,
Hamilton Bisbee, who was forty two years old and from outside the com-
pany. Soon thereafter, according to Wilson, Bisbee began to give him the
silent treatment, and in 1982, the efforts to get rid of him intensified. During
this time Bisbee also expressed his desire to bring in new blood and to de-
velop a young team. Bisbee began removing Wilson's responsibilities and
assigning them to other employees, and in June 1982, Wilson was given
three options: accept a sales job at half his pay; accept termination with
three months severance pay; or accept a job as warehouse supervisor in the
Houston warehouse at the same salary but with a reduction in benefits. Wil-
son accepted the warehouse position believing that he was being offered the
position of warehouse manager. When Wilson reported for duty however,
he was placed instead in the position of an entry level supervisor, a position
that required no more than one year's experience in the paper business.
Soon after he went to the warehouse, Wilson was subjected to harassment
and verbal abuse by his supervisor, an individual who had previously been
subordinate to him. Wilson was repeatedly referred to as an old man, and a
sign was posted in the warehouse that said "Wilson is old." In the supervi-
sor's absence, Wilson was placed under the supervision of a man in his twen-
ties. Finally, Wilson was placed in charge of housekeeping, but was not
given any employees to assist him in his housekeeping duties. Thus, Wilson,
a former vice president and assistant to the president, was thus reduced to
sweeping the floors and cleaning up the employee's cafeteria, duties which
occupied 75% of his working time.
Due to the dusty conditions in the warehouse, Wilson began suffering
pensable under the Act represents a high-water mark of the dream of every plaintiff's lawyer,
but a disturbing societal notion: For every injury, the law must provide a remedy." Stephen
Fink & Elizabeth Schartz, Workers' Comp and the New Breed of Employee Tort Claims, 7
THE TEXAS LAWYER 45 at 18, 19 (Feb. 3, 1992).
151. McAlister, 822 S.W.2d at 87-88.
152. 939 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1991).
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from respiratory problems. Additionally, a psychiatrist diagnosed him as
suffering from reactive depression, possibly suicidal, resulting from the on-
the-job stress. Prior to the difficulties with his employer, Wilson had no
history of emotional illness. His condition deteriorated to the point that he
was involuntarily hospitalized with a psychotic manic episode. This emo-
tional illness was severe and long-lasting. After his first hospitalization for a
manic episode, in which he was locked in a padded cell and heavily sedated,
he fell into a deep depression. The depression lasted for over two years and
necessitated an additional hospital stay in which he was given shock treat-
ments. In 1987, Wilson's illness began remission.
The Fifth Circuit recognized that the work environment can, in some in-
stances, include a degree of teasing and taunting that otherwise might be
considered cruel and outrageous.15 3 The court noted that in managing a
business, employers must on occasion review, criticize, demote, transfer, and
discipline employees.1 54 The court further acknowledged that it is not un-
common for employees to create unpleasant and onerous work conditions to
force an employee to quit, instead of simply discharging an employee.1 55
The court held, however, that while this conduct may be deplorable, it does
not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct except for the most unusual
cases. '
56
Wilson argued that Monarch's conduct was sufficiently outrageous to
meet the Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Corp.'57 standard, and, alternatively,
that Monarch's conduct was more outrageous than the conduct in Bushell v.
Dean. 15 8 The Fifth Circuit noted Bushell arguably accepts a lower standard
153. Id. at 1143 (citing Page Keeton, et al., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS (5th ed. 1984
& 1988 Supp.)). The court recognized that liability "does not extend to mere insults, indigni-
ties, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. ... There is no occasion for
the law to intervene in every cse where someone's feelings are hurt." Id. (quoting RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)).
154. Id. (citing Keeton et al., supra note 153).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 885 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1989). In Dean, the plaintiff presented evidence that (1) when
she expressed interest in transferring to a higher paying position in the collection department,
she was told that women didn't usually transfer to that department; (2) she was denied a
transfer to the collection department, and a lesser qualified man was selected; (3) the defend-
ant's attitude toward the plaintiff changed after she complained about alleged discriminatory
treatment; (4) management began to transfer her from desk to desk within the administrative
department; (5) a coworker testified she believed management was trying to set Dean up;
(6) she was called upon to do more work than the other clerks and subjected to harassment;
and (7) management used special annual reviews (that only the plaintiff received) to down-
grade her performance. Far more significant to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, however, (8) the plaintiff proved that a supervisor, who had access to the employer's
checks, intentionally placed checks in the plaintiff's purse in order to make it appear that she
was a thief, or to put her in fear of criminal charges for theft. The Court expressly held that
the check incidents were "precisely what [took] this case beyond the realm of an ordinary
employment dispute and into the realm of an outrageous one." Id. at 307. The Court con-
cluded that without the "check incidents" the employer's conduct "would not have been out-
rageous." Id.
158. 781 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989), writ denied in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 803 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1991). In Bushell an employee was awarded damages against
her employer for sexual harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. During a
four-month period, the employer occasionally bought small items for the employee and paid
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of actionable conduct as extreme and outrageous under Texas law (even
though the particular facts, sexual harassment, may account in part for the
court's holding), but found it unnecessary to resolve any such distinction
because Monarch's conduct was actionable under Dean.159 Wilson argued
that there was substantial evidence of outrageous conduct; t6° however, the
Fifth Circuit noted that most of Monarch's conduct was similar in degree to
the conduct in Dean that failed to reach the level of outrageousness.' 6'
While the court held that all of Monarch's conduct was within the realm of
an ordinary employment dispute, the court concluded that what took it out
of this realm was Monarch's intentional and systematic humiliation of Wil-
son in the hopes that he would quit. 162 The Court found it difficult to con-
ceive a workplace scenario more mean spirited, painful and embarrassing
than this situation, where the assistant to the president was subjected to me-
nial janitorial duties of cleaning up after entry level employees.' 63 "The
steep downhill push to total humiliation was complete." 64
In Casas v. Wornick Co.,165 despite a well-reasoned dissent, the trial
court's summary judgment in favor of an employer was reversed on the issue
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Casas Diana Casas was ini-
tially employed by Right Way Foods Corporation as a personnel manager
and was later promoted to the position of director of human resources.
Casas' evidence demonstrated that all of her evaluations were excellent until
she was allegedly asked to misrepresent facts to government auditors and she
attention to her in other ways, such as making complimentary comments about her clothing
and the shape of her body. He touched her several times, rubbing her neck on one occasion,
and poking her in the ribs once or twice. He told her that he loved her and desired a sexual
encounter. After the employee spurned his advances, the employer became much more for-
mal, and assigned her more demanding duties. After almost two weeks of the employer's
retaliation, the employee quit after the employer shouted at her when she informed him that
she had heard of a possible trucker's strike against the company. The jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court of appeals
affirmed, holding that "the jury's determination that Bushell's conduct was outrageous is not
so against the weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust." Id. at
658.
159. Wilson, 939 F.2d at 1143-44 n.3.
160. Wilson cited the following evidence: (1) his duties in physical distribution were as-
signed to a younger person; (2) Bisbee deliberately refused to speak to him in the hallways of
Monarch in order to harass him; (3) certain portions of Monarch's long-range plans expressed
a desire to move younger persons into sales and management positions; (4) Bisbee wanted to
replace Wilson with a younger person; (5) other managers within Monarch would not work
with Wilson, and he did not receive his work directly from Bisbee; (6) he was not offered a
fully guaranteed salary to transfer to Corpus Christi; (7) he was assigned to Monarch's Hous-
ton warehouse as a supervisor, which was demeaning; (8) Paul Bradley, the Warehouse Man-
ager, and other Monarch managers referred to Wilson as old; (9) Bradley prepared a sign
stating "Wilson is old" and, subsequently, "Wilson is a Goldbrick"; and (10) Monarch filed a
counterclaim against Wilson in this action. Id. at 1144-45.
161. Id. at 1145.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 939 F.2d at 1145. The Fifth Circuit recognized the irony that if Monarch had chosen
only to fire Wilson outright, leaving him without a salary, a job, insurance, etc., it would not be
liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 1146 n.5.




refused to do so. She alleged that her refusal was the cause of her termina-
tion. Casas was terminated in the private office of her supervisor. A security
guard was called to escort her off premises, within five minutes, in the pres-
ence of her co-workers. After her termination, Casas wrote a letter to the
company's managerial agent complaining that "the manner in which I was
fired was brutal and incomprehensible, in light of our achievements over the
past six and one half years, and my unquestionable loyalty to the company
throughout my employment."' 66 Casas testified that she felt shock, anger,
humiliation, embarrassment, confusion, and frustration. Although there
was a complete absence of any extreme and outrageous conduct, the court of
appeals held the allegations by Casas raised a fact issue both as to the outra-
geousness of the conduct and the degree of injury.
The Casas majority relied on Havens v. Tomball Community Hospital 167
in concluding that Casas' allegations of emotional distress were separate and
independent from her allegations of wrongful discharge. The majority's reli-
ance on Havens is completely misplaced. In Havens the plaintiff alleged that
the defendants engaged in a course of conduct to harass, humiliate, and de-
grade her good name, eventually leading to her termination. 68 Here, on the
other hand, there was no course of conduct in Casas separate and independ-
ent from her wrongful discharge claim to support an emotional distress
claim.
Chief Justice Nye, dissenting, correctly observed that liability for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claims has "been found only where the
conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, as to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community."' 169 Chief Justice Nye con-
cluded that Casas did not allege any facts amounting to extreme and outra-
geous conduct. She was dismissed in private, and although she was escorted
to the entrance to the complex and not allowed to re-enter the complex,
there was no evidence that this was done in a demeaning manner or that it
was somehow not within the company's purview as a business proprietor.
Chief Justice Nye also observed that there was no evidence of "vituperative
language or vindictive conduct" to create a question of fact to support her
claim.' 70 Chief Justice Nye correctly concluded that Casas failed to show
any proper summary judgment evidence of conduct by the defendants, suffi-
ciently outrageous to create a fact issue regarding her claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
If the majority opinion in Casas stands, it will be virtually impossible for
an employer to obtain summary judgment on any claim for intentional inflic-
tion of severe emotional distress in a wrongful discharge case. Casas is in-
correctly decided for several reasons. First, there was no conduct separate
166. Id.
167. 793 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
168. Id. at 692.
169. Casas, 818 S.W.2d at 466 (Nye, C.J., dissenting).
170. Id.
1750 [Vol. 45
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
and independent from the act of discharging Casas to support an emotional
distress claim. Second, there was nothing extreme or outrageous about the
manner in which Casas was discharged. Further, Casas' employer did not
do anything more than exercise its legal right to discharge an employee
which, as a matter of law, does not constitute outrageous conduct. If Casas'
allegations are sufficient to create a fact issue for a jury with respect to
whether the conduct was extreme and outrageous, then every discharge cre-
ates a potential claim for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress
and every emotional distress claim must be tried to a jury. Finally, Casas'
reaction to her discharge does not constitute severe emotional distress.
There is no evidence that Casas' reaction was anything other than the com-
mon anxiety associated with discharge which should not support a claim for
emotional distress.
The reason that courts must carefully scrutinize intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims and dispose of claims that do not constitute outra-
geous conduct is clearly illustrated in Horton v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 171
Ginette Horton sued Montgomery Ward for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress because a fellow employee, James Lancaster, threw a paper
wad at her. Horton also alleged other conduct that she contended rose to
the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. 72 The trial court granted
Montgomery Ward's motion for summary judgment and the court of ap-
peals affirmed. The court recognized that whether Montgomery Ward's
conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to allow recovery was a question
of law for the court.' 73 The court stated that liability does not extend to
mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or other
trivialities. It is also recognized that the rough edges of our society are
still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs
must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain
amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely
inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion for the law to intervene
in every case where some one's feelings are hurt. There must still be
freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must
be left through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless
171. No. 04-91-00060-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio Jan. 8, 1992 writ requested) (not
published).
172. Specifically, Horton alleged that (1) Montgomery Ward assaulted her and committed
battery upon her on September 22, 1987; (2) Montgomery Ward frightened her and humili-
ated her by placing rattlesnake rattlers on her desk; (3) Montgomery Ward continued to pro-
mote name calling against her for almost two years after the September 22, 1987, incident;
(4) Montgomery Ward caused her personal property to be pilfered and vandalized; (5) Mont-
gomery Ward caused other employees to ostracize her from a normal business relationship
with them; (6) Montgomery Ward defamed her by mutilating her photographs that were dis-
played on a bulletin board along with the photos of other employees (the eyes were scratched
out); (7) Montgomery Ward purposely directed her to order Lancaster to repair a customer's
air conditioner, knowing that the direction would result in harm to her (this order was given to
her after the September 22, 1987, incident); (8) Montgomery Ward wrongfully disciplined her
for reporting incidents that she was duty bound to report; and (9) Montgomery Ward dam-
aged her personal property located in her office. Id. slip op. at 10-12.




The court held that the conflicts between Horton and Lancaster arose after
the paper wad incident and constituted "nothing more than an exchange of
insults, indignities, annoyances, and other trivialities which, as a matter of
law, do not rise to a level of extreme and outrageous conduct." 175
In Diamond Shamrock Refining & Marketing Co. v. Mendez176 Roque
Mendez was terminated from his job with Diamond Shamrock for stealing a
handful of nails. When interviewed prior to his discharge, Mendez admitted
that he intended to steal the nails. Based on Mendez's admission, the court
held that there was no evidence that Diamond Shamrock acted intentionally
or recklessly. 177 Importantly, for the first time, a state appellate court recog-
nized that a certain degree of emotional distress will naturally accompany
losing a job, and that the termination of an at-will employee is a permissible
exercise of a legal right and will not support an action for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.'17
In Guthrie v. Tifco Industries 179 the plaintiff sued alleging age discrimina-
tion, wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
federal district court granted summary judgment as to the discrimination
claims and sua sponte dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The
plaintiff alleged that on three occasions between 1985 and 1987, the founder
of the company made age related remarks, and that after returning to work
following a serious illness in 1985, he was questioned regarding how much
longer he wanted to work.180 In 1987, the plaintiff's performance began to
decline, and thereafter, the company moved Guthrie from vice president to
senior buyer and reduced his annual salary by 40%. The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the district court and held that even if the defendants' "behavior to-
ward [him] was premeditated and organized, it simply was not extreme or
outrageous."181
In American Medical International, Inc. v. Giurintano 182 the court found
that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding on the plaintiff's
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Giurintano the
plaintiff began negotiations with American Medical International, Inc.
(AMI) though its local vice president for a position as executive administra-
tor at its Laredo Hospital. The hospital board unanimously approved Gi-
urintano's placement in the vacant administrator's position. Giurintano
174. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)).
175. Id. slip op. at 15-17 (citing Dean v. Fort Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300, 308 (5th
Cir. 1989); Bushell v. Dean, 781 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989), rev'd on other grounds
and writ denied, 803 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1991)).
176. 809 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ granted on other grounds).
177. Id. at 521.
178. Id. at 522 (citing Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344, 347 (E.D. Mich.
1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g (1965)).
179. 941 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1991).
180. Id. at 376.
181. Id. at 379.
182. 821 S.W.2d 331 Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991 no writ.
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then travelled to Laredo and met with the hospital personnel. During his
visits, however, the hospital assistant administrator and certain doctors at
the hospital were vocal in their opposition to his placement. Eventually, the
administrator position was not given to Giurintano. Guirintano sued the
hospital for, inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Guirintano learned that Mata, the hospital assistant administrator, was
spreading rumors about him to hospital employees, specifically, that he
would fire all department heads and supervisors. Mata also called
Guirintano a son of a bitch. During a cocktail party in Guirintano's honor,
several doctors called Guirintano a Nazi, a Jew, an SOB, and Benito Musso-
lini. He was further asked whether he had ever undergone a lobotomy.
Other comments occurred at the party. The next evening, Guirintano at-
tended a dinner party and he was drilled on recruiting procedures in an
aggravating manner by a physician, Dr. L. F. Mendoza. Dr. Mendoza also
called Guirintano a mother f****r. The jury awarded Guirintano approxi-
mately $2,000,000 in actual and exemplary damages for intentional infliction
of severe emotional distress. Affirming the jury's verdict, the court of ap-
peals observed that each incident, comment or confrontation taken sepa-
rately would not constitute outrageous conduct; 183 however, the conduct
taken together, considered in context was sufficient evidence to support the
jury's verdict. 184
In a whistle blowing case, the federal district court, in Garcia v. Webb
County District Attorney,185 dismissed the plaintiff's intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim. In Garcia the plaintiff claimed that she was
harassed and eventually terminated because of her attempts to bring irregu-
larities in the employment practices in the district attorney's office to the
attention of the district attorney. Among the alleged irregularities raised by
Garcia were the issuance of firearms to non-law enforcement personnel, em-
ployee absences without proper notification, political campaigning by staff
members during working hours, failure of some employees to discharge their
responsibilities, use of seized vehicles by office personnel for personal uses,
and use of office telephones for personal purposes. In dismissing Garcia's
claim for failure to state a cause of action, the court stated that viewing
Garcia's allegations in their most favorable light, the defendants' conduct
was not extreme and outrageous and that Garcia's emotional distress was
not severe. 1
86
In Sauls v. Union Oil Company of California 187 Buel Sauls complained
that his co-workers accused him of being a liar, assailed him with language
that "would likely incite to violence even the most seasoned longshore-
man,"' 188 issued improper equipment to him, frequently bumped into him
with their shoulders while they worked, removed his time card from the time
183. Id. at 342.
184. Id. at 342- 43.
185. 764 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
186. Id. at 460.
187. 750 F. Supp. 783 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
188. Id. at 789.
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card box each day for one week, and told him he was going to lose his job
because he would not cease assisting a female co-worker with her sexual
harassment complaint. The federal district court noted that the employer,
Union Oil Company of California (Unocal), did not dispute Saul's allega-
tions, but rather "blithely assert[ed] that the conduct does not rise to the
level of extreme or outrageous."1 8 9 The court found, however, that Unocal's
very making of this assertion "is extreme and outrageous."' 190 The court
denied Unocal's motion for summary judgment and observed that it was
"not inclined to take the assessment of Unocal's conduct away from the
jury. " 19 1
As noted, intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are receiving a
great deal more attention in wrongful discharge litigation. Despite Judge
Jolly's comment in Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co. 192 that Dean does not
"open the door for a body of new law in the work place,"' 193 if decisions like
Casas are indicative, it appears that indeed the state courts are open to ex-
panding emotional distress claims in wrongful discharge litigation. Such
claims constitute another creative end-run on the employment-at-will doc-
trine. While Texas cases have generally concluded that a certain amount of
distress is unavoidable during a discharge, and that the sole event of dis-
charge will not support an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim, 194 it is clear that events occurring during employment or events sur-
rounding a discharge will be more carefully scrutinized by the courts and
juries alike in the future. 195
189. Id. at 788-90.
190. Id. at 790.
191. Id. at 789.
192. 885 F.2d 300, 308 (5th Cir. 1989) (Jolly, J., concurring).
193. While the conduct in Dean supporting the plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress was in fact extreme and outrageous, Judge Jolly stated that Dean does not
"open the door for a body of new law in the workplace. If I thought so, I would not extend
this nascent cause of action into the field of employee-employer relations. If it were to be done,
I would let the Texas courts do it." Id. at 308 (Jolly, J., concurring).
194. Hoose v. T.I.R.R., No. H-90-2153 (S.D. Tex. June 10, 1991) ("in an effort to show
'outrageous' conduct plaintiff contends that when he was terminated items were confiscated
from his office including allegedly personal files. However, the court held that without more,
such acts would not surpass 'all possible bounds of decency'."); Koehler v. Houston Lighting
& Power Co., No. H-89-909 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 1990) (after being questioned by two supervi-
sors, employee was suspended then voluntarily removed some of his belongings from his office
and left; thereafter, employee was informed by telephone of termination; held, employee failed
to allege any facts of outrageous conduct to support a claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress); Nicholls v. Columbia Gas Dev., No. 89-2418 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 1990) (em-
ployer who does no more than exercise his right to discharge an employee has not committed
outrageous conduct in degree and character required); Austin v. Champion Int'l Corp., No. H-
87-1845 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 1990); Perez v. Airco Carbon Group, Inc., No. C-88-13 (S.D. Tex.
March 9, 1990); Castillo v. Horton Automatics, No. C-88-199 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 1990); Wil-
liams v. Sealed Power Corp., No. 4-88-254-E (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 1990); Benavides v. Wood-
forest Nat'l Bank, No. H-87-3094 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 1989); Yarbrough v. La Petite Academy,
Inc., No. H-87-3967 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 1989); Fiorenza v. First City Bank-Central, 710 F.
Supp. 1104, 1105 (E.D. Tex. 1988); Laird v. Texas Commerce Bank-Odessa, 707 F. Supp. 938,
941 (W.D. Tex. 1988); In re Continental Airlines, Corp., 64 B.R. 858, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1986).
195. See Havens v. Tomball Community Hosp., 793 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (summary judgment reversed where claim for intentional infliction of
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6 Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Although individuals continue to urge the courts to adopt an implied con-
tractual covenant or a tortious duty of good faith and fair dealing in the
employer-employee relationship, the Texas supreme court 96 and the courts
of appeals 197 have refused to recognize such an obligation. It appears that
the supreme court laid the issue to rest in McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand
Co. 198 On remand from the United States Supreme Court, 199 the Texas
supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' decision that there is not an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relation-
ship.2°° The McClendon court of appeals specifically declined to extend the
emotional distress was based upon harsh treatment and rumors circulated about the plaintiff
before her discharge and was separate and independent from her allegations of wrongful dis-
charge); Bushell v. Dean, 781 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989), rev'd and remanded in
part and writ denied in part, 803 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1991) (ongoing sexual harassment of the
plaintiff during her employment and up to the date that the plaintiff quit her employment
supported claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). See also Peterson v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., No. CA-3-89-2663-C (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 1990); Scott v. Vetco Gray, Inc., No. 89-
1839 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 1990); Guzman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., No. SA-88-CA-533
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 1990).
196. See McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 807 S.W.2d 577, 577 (Tex. 1991); Winters v.
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 724 n.2 (Tex. 1990). See also Pruitt v.
Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1991) (Texas courts do not recognize covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship); Haynes v. Henry S. Miller Mgmt.
Corp., No. CA3-88-2556-T, (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1990) (Texas Supreme Court has not recog-
nized implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Caton v. Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939,
948-49 (5th Cir. 1990) (Texas courts do not recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing in
employment relationship); Guzman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., No. SA-88-CA-533 (W.D.
Tex. Nov. 16, 1990) (Texas courts do not recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing in
employment relationship); Nicholls v. Columbia Gas Dev. Corp., No. 89-2418 (S.D. Tex. Nov.
14, 1990) (Texas courts do not recognize claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in employment contract); Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp.
275 (W.D. Tex. 1989); Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (Texas
courts do not recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationship).
197. Casas v. Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d 466, 468-69 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ
denied) (rejecting claim for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, court recognized that
current mood of a majority supreme court is to adhere to at-will rule); Winograd v. Willis, 789
S.W.2d 307, 312 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (neither the legislature
nor the supreme court have recognized an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
the employment relationship); Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 789 S.W.2d 299, 303-04
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied) (supreme court expressly rejected an invitation to rec-
ognize an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship);
Lumpkin v. H&C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (court rejected implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
employment relationship). In Lumpkin the sole point of error on appeal was whether an im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is inherent in the employer-employee relationship.
Id. at 538. The court of appeals overruled Lumpkin's point of error, id. at 539-40, and
Lumpkin appealed the issue to the supreme court. Lumkpin v. H&C Communications, Inc.,
32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 11, 13 (Oct. 15, 1988). Lumpkin's application for a writ of error had been
pending before the supreme court for approximately one year when the court decided McClen-
don. Curiously, the supreme court did not grant Lumpkin's application when it granted Mc-
Clendon's application and consolidate the cases. Nevertheless, shortly after McClendon, the
court denied Lumpkin's application for a writ of error. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 114 (Dec. 6, 1989).
198. 757 S.W.2d 816, 819-20 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990), aff'd on remand, 807 S.W.2d
577 (Tex. 1991).
199. 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990).
200. McClendon, 807 S.W.2d at 577.
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Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. 20 1 duty of good faith
and fair dealing to the employment relationship. It held that the special
relationship between insurers and insureds is not equally applicable to em-
ployers and employees, and that to extend it to the employment relationship
would be tantamount to imposing such a duty on all commercial relation-
ships.202 Imposing the duty on the employment relationship would also vio-
late the supreme court's disapproval of free movement of employees in the
workplace.203 Finally, the plethora of legislation restricting an employer's
right to discharge an employee indicated that such a change in policy affect-
ing the employer-employee relationship should be left to the legislature.2°'
In Casas v. Wornick Co. 205 the Corpus Christi court of appeals reluctantly
affirmed the trial court's summary judgment and held that there was no
cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. While
the court's conclusion was right, its analysis was wrong. The court initially
observed that the issue of whether a duty of good faith and fair dealing exists
in the employment relationship is currently unanswered. 20 6 While the court
recognized that McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. was reversed by the
United States supreme court, nevertheless, it failed to recognize that on re-
mand from the United States Supreme Court, the Texas supreme court af-
firmed the court of appeals' decision that there is no obligation of good faith
and fair dealing in the employment relationship. 20 7 Although recognizing
several jurists and commentators' criticism of the employment-at-will doc-
trine,208 the court concluded that the current mood of a majority of the
201. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987) (duty of good faith and fair dealing extended to insurers
and insureds).
202. McClendon, 757 S.W.2d at 819.
203. Id. at 820 (citing Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1987); Hill v.
Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987)).
204. Id. (citing TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1; Watson v. Zep Mfg. Co., 582 S.W.2d 178, 180
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Molder v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 665
S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
205. 818 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. The court gratuitously noted earlier criticism of the at-will rule:
The at-will doctrine is increasingly seen as a "relic of early industrial times" and
a "tenacious vestige from the industrial revolution and laissez-faire economics."
See Johnston v. Del Mar Distributing Co., 776 S.W.2d 768, 769 (quoting Sabine
Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (Kilgarlin, J., con-
curring)); Little v. Bryce, 733 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1987, no writ) (Levy, J., concurring); Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735 (Kilgarlin,
J., concurring) ("The [at will] doctrine belongs in a museum, not in our law").
Economic realities, the modern worker's quest for security in the workplace,
and respect for human dignity have prompted many commentators to criticize
this rule. Ths modern age of increasing technology, specialization of skills, and
an unstable economy leaves a very risky and unpredictable situation for the
worker whose livelihood depends entirely on his labor. See Little v. Bryce, 733
S.W.2d at 939 (Levy, J., concurring). Because today's worker has no guarantee
that he will be able to find another job if arbitrarily discharged, he has become
more stationary and expects his employer to treat him fairly. See Comment,
The At-Will Doctrine: A Proposal to Modify the Texas Employment Relation-
ship, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 667, 685 (1984).
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supreme court is to follow the at-will rule.20 9
7. Tortious Interference With Business Relationship
An employer is probably wise to follow the old adage: if you don't have
something nice to say about someone, don't say anything at all. In American
Medical International, Inc. v. Giurintano210 a hospital administrator claimed
that the defendant hospital interfered with his prospective business relations
with future employers by failing to respond to inquiries about him. Gi-
urintano left his position as an assistant hospital administrator in hopes of
securing employment as administrator at a hospital owned by defendant
American Medical International (AMI). The hospital ultimately decided
against hiring Giurintano and he was unable to return to his earlier position
because of a hiring freeze. When the plaintiff was unable to obtain employ-
ment elsewhere, he filed suit against the hospital, claiming that it deliber-
ately sought to prevent him from securing other employment. 21' His claims
were not based on any acts of interference by AMI; rather, the plaintiff cited
AMI's failure to respond to a letter of inquiry about him and failure to com-
pletely fill out a reference form about him constituted tortious interference.
The court refused to create a duty on the part of employers to talk to anyone
about a former employee.212 This refusal to require employers to discuss
applicants or former employees protects employers from facing the prospect
of defending a claim for tortious interference with prospective business rela-
tionships or defending a possible defamation or invasion of privacy claim.
209. Id.
210. 821 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ). While interference
with a business relationship is similar to interference with contract, it is unnecessary to prove
the existence of a valid contract in proving interference with a business relationship. Id. at
335. The elements of tortious interference with a prospective business relationship are: (1) a
reasonable probability that the plaintiff would have entered into a business relationship;
(2) the defendant acted with malice in intentionally preventing the relationship from occur-
ring with the purpose of harming the plaintiff; (3) the defendant's actions were not privileged
or justified; and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm or damage as a result. Id. at 337; Gillum
v. Republic Health Corp., 778 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
211. Giurintano also claimed tortious interference with contract against the hospital and
individual physicians who decided not to offer him the position at Doctor's Hospital in Laredo.
The court held that the doctors were agents of the hospital and their legal identity was that of
the principal. Id. at 366. As agents of the hospital, the physicians could not, as a matter of
law, tortiously interfere with the hospital's contract. Id. In addition, the court found no liabil-
ity for tortious interference against Doctor's Hospital, a subsidiary of AMI, because as parent
and subsidiary, they were so closely aligned that one could not tortiously interfere with the
other. Id. at 336-37. A claim for tortious interference with a contract must include proof of a
contract that could be subject to interference. See Exxon Corp. v. Allsup, 808 S.W.2d 648, 654
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied) (lifetime oral contract supported damages for
tortious interference with contract).
212. Giurintano, slip op. at 9-10. The court pointed out that if Giurintano were correct in
his assertion that the failure to act was interference, then "every person and employer would
have a duty to respond to unsolicited mail . . . [and] private parties have neither contempt
powers nor subpoena powers to make someone respond to questions." Id. See also Taylor v.
Houston Lighting & Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 302 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (plaintiff's claim that
she informed each prospective employer of her termination from Housting Lighting & Power





1. Article 8307c Retaliatory Discharge
The legislative purpose of article 8307c2 13 is to "protect persons who are
entitled to benefits under the workers' compensation law and to prevent
them from being discharged by reason of taking steps to collect such bene-
fits." 214 A plaintiff bringing an 8307c claim 215 has the burden of establishing
a causal link between the discharge from employment and the claim for
workers' compensation. 21 6 Once the link is established, the employer must
rebut the alleged discrimination by showing there was a legitimate reason
behind the discharge. 2 17 A plaintiff need not prove that he was discharged
solely because of his workers' compensation claim; he need only prove that
his claim was a determining factor in his discharge. 2 18 Thus, even if other
reasons for discharge exist, the plaintiff may still recover damages if retalia-
tion is also a reason. 219
Section 2 of article 8307c provides that a successful plaintiff is entitled to
reasonable damages and is entitled to reinstatement to his or her former po-
sition. 220 The Texas supreme court has interpreted the phrase "reasonable
damages" in section 2 to embrace both actual and exemplary damages.
22 1
213. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1992).
214. Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. 1980).
215. An employee bringing an 8307c cause of action against a governmental unit is not
required to comply with the notice provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act, TEX. CIv. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101(a) (Vernon 1986). Williams v. Fort Worth Indep. School
Dist., 816 S.W.2d 836, 838-39 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ requested).
216. In Paragon Hotel Corp. v. Ramirez, 783 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ
denied) the court identified four factors in concluding that sufficient evidence supported the
finding of a causal link between the filing of the claim and the discharge: (1) those making the
decision to discharge the plaintiff were aware of his compensation claim; (2) those making the
decision to discharge the plaintiff expressed a negative attitude toward the plaintiff's injured
condition; (3) the company failed to adhere to established company policies with regard to
progressive disciplinary action; and (4) the company discriminated in its treatment of the
plaintiff in comparison to other employees allegedly guilty of similar infractions. Id. at 658.
These four factors may be useful in analyzing whether there is circumstantial evidence to sup-
port a causal link between the filing of a workers' compensation claim and a subsequent
discharge.
217. Hughes Tool Co. v. Richards, 624 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982).
218. Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no
writ); General Elec. Co. v. Kunze, 747 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ denied);
see also Mid-South Bottling Co. v. Cigainero, 799 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990,
writ denied).
219. Santex, 618 S.W.2d at 558-59.
220. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1992).
221. Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 734 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. 1987). Since the Texas supreme
court's decision in Azar Nut, litigation has markedly increased in this area, and plaintiffs have
been successful in obtaining large punitive damage awards. Examples of large punitive damage
awards include: Prince v. City of La Porte, No. 83-66592 (Dist. Court of Harris County,
125th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Oct. 22, 1991) (jury awarded plaintiff $100,000 in actual dam-
ages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages); Rodriguez v. Rio Grande Valley Sugar Growers,
Inc., No. C- 4446-88-B (Dist. Court of Hidalgo County, 93rd Judicial Dist. of Texas, Nov. 8,
1990) (two plaintiffs awarded actual damages of $47,862 and $35,000, respectively, and puni-
tive damages of $2,000,000 and $500,000, respectively); Mundy v. Wells Fargo Co., No. 88-
917 (Dist. Court of El Paso County, 346th Dist. of Texas, Apr. 27, 1989) (El Paso jury
awarded plaintiff $2,5000,000); Farah Mfg. Co. v. Alvarado, 763 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. App.-El
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Actual damages can include lost past wages, lost future wages, lost past re-
tirement, lost future retirement, and other benefits which are ascertainable
with reasonable certainty. Employees seeking reinstatement on the ground
that they were wrongfully discharged must show that they are presently able
to perform the duties of the job that they had before the injury.222
In Borden, Inc. v. De La Rosa223 Jose De La Rosa sued his employer
under article 8307c and the jury awarded him $986,000 actual damages and
$10,000,000 punitive damages. De La Rosa had worked for Borden as a
route salesman for almost twenty years when he received an electrical shock
from a Borden's delivery truck causing him to be knocked to the ground and
injuring his shoulder. He filed a workers' compensation claim and was rep-
resented by an attorney. During the pendency of his claim De La Rosa's
supervisor ordered him to see a company doctor. De La Rosa refused to do
so until he consulted his attorney, and he was fired. On appeal Borden com-
plained, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence that Borden violated
article 8307c, section 1.224 Reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the
court noted that a worker need only show that the claim contributed to the
company's decision to discharge him to prevail.225 The court stated that
Borden knew De La Rosa was represented by an attorney and Borden could
have anticipated his refusal to be examined by a company doctor because of
the directive to fire him if he refused. The court observed that Borden could
also have foreseen that De La Rosa's attorney would resist Borden's request
since the primary issue was the extent of De La Rosa's disability. Borden
responded that De La Rosa was a poor worker, insubordinate, and that the
examination was actually to protect him and the public. Borden also argued
that it had the right to fire De La Rosa because he was an at-will employee.
Noting that the jury rejected Borden's theory of the case, the court held that
the jury could have found that Borden improperly attempted to interfere
with De La Rosa's relationship with his attorney based on the pressure not
to consult his attorney before seeing the company doctor or to either go to
the company doctor in regard to the compensation claim or get fired.226
The court also addressed several evidentiary errors. The court held that
the exclusion of De La Rosa's personnel records was error,227 that the ad-
Paso 1988), aff'd, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 107 (Nov. 21, 1990) (jury awarded plaintiff $138,080 in
actual damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages).
222. Schrader v. Artco Bell Corp., 579 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
223. 1991 WL 247453 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Nov. 27, 1991).
224. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1992) provides:
No person may discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any em-
ployee because the employee has in good faith filed a claim, hired a lawyer to
represent him in a claim, instituted, or caused to be instituted, in good faith, any
proceeding under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, or has testified or is
about to testify in any such proceeding.
225. Borden, 1991 WL 247453 at I (citing Mid-South Bottling Co. v. Cigainero, 799
S.W.2d 385, 389-90 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied)).
226. Id. at 4-5.




mission of expert testimony that De La Rosa was fired because he filed a
compensation claim was error,228 and that the admission of Borden's in-
house counsel's testimony violated the attorney-client privilege and was er-
ror.229 The court held all of the errors to be harmless error. The court
observed Borden's complaint that the cumulative errors required a new
trial, 230 but held that the admission of an economist's testimony regarding
the relative impact various punitive damage amounts might have on Borden
was proper.23 1
Finally, the court addressed the damages awards. The jury awarded
$36,000 in past lost wages, $800,000 in future lost wages and $150,000 in
past mental anguish.232 De La Rosa's economist testified that De La Rosa
suffered $38,093 in past lost wages and that he would suffer $367,288 in
future lost wages. The court affirmed the jury's award for past lost wages
but found that the jury's award of future lost wages exceeded the evidence by
$432,712 and suggested a remittitur of that amount.23 3 Since damages for
mental anguish were uniquely within the province of the jury the mental
anguish damages award was affirmed. 234 With respect to the $10,000,000
punitive damages award, the court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence in
accordance with the actors identified in Alamo National Bank v. Kraus 235
and held that Borden's treatment of De La Rosa "was not so outrageous as
to grossly offend one's sense of justice and demand such a penalty, ' 236 but
rather that the jury was influenced more by Borden's wealth than the evi-
dence of its improper conduct. 237 The court rejected Borden's arguments
that the exemplary damages award violated the excessive fines provisions in
the United States and Texas Constitutions and the open courts provision of
the Texas Constitution.238 The court concluded that the evidence supports
an exemplary damages award of $1,500,000 and, therefore, suggested a re-
mittitur of $8,500,000.239
In Thurman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 240 the Fifth Circuit addressed when
a cause of action under article 8307c accrues. In Thurman Willie Thurman
suffered a series of job-related injuries beginning in 1985. After each injury,
he was placed on leave of absence and reinstated when he was able to per-
228. Id. The court held that the issue of whether De La Rosa was fired because he filed a
compensation claim did not require expert testimony because no specialized or technical
knowledge was necessary to assist the jury in answering the single factual inquiry. Id.
229. Id. at 6-7. The court held that the admission of the testimony violated TEX. R. Civ.
EvID. 513(b).
230. Borden, 1991 WL 247453 at 9.
231. Id. at 6.
232. Id. at 7.
233. Id.
234. Id. The court noted that De La Rosa had financial problems due to his discharge,
including a threatened foreclosure and a reduced lifestyle, that he suffered from depression,
had nightmares, was tense and was unable to talk to his wife about his problems. Id.
235. 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1981).




240. No. 91-1026 (5th Cir. Jan. 30, 1992).
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form his duties. In March 1986, Thurman was injured again, placed on
leave of absence, and returned to light duty in accord with restrictions im-
posed by his doctor. In 1987, due to a reorganization, Sears asked Thurman
to resign voluntarily. Thurman declined and continued his duties until May
18, 1987, when he was informed that his job was eliminated. According to
Thurman, Sears placed him on leave of absence. The next day, Thurman
filed a claim for unemployment compensation with the Texas Employment
Commission. A few weeks later, on June 5, Thurman signed a document
acknowledging that he was placed on leave of absence in exchange for a
lump sum payment. Thurman claimed that he had fully recovered and
sought reinstatement to his job in December 1987 and again in January
1988. Sears denied both requests and, in May 1988, Thurman received noti-
fication from Sears that his leave of absence from Sears had expired. Thur-
man sued Sears for retaliatory discharge and Sears asserted that the two-year
statute of limitations barred his suit. The district court granted Sears' mo-
tion for summary judgment and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held
that under article 8307c a cause of action accrues when facts exists authoriz-
ing the employee to seek judicial relief.24 ' Thurman argued that his cause of
action accrued when he sought reinstatement and it was denied. 242 The
court held that a denial of a request for reinstatement, whether it occurs
after a leave of absence or a termination, is not the measuring stick by which
the accrual date of an 8307c cause of action is determined. 243 Instead, the
limitations period for an 8707c claim commences when the employee re-
ceives unequivocal notice of his termination or when a reasonable person
would know of the termination. 2 " While the court acknowledged that
Thurman's leave of absence was not a complete separation of employment,
the summary judgment evidence established that Thurman knew on May 18
that he had been discharged. 245
Recently, a federal district court granted a defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment on a plaintiff's 8307c claim on the basis that there was no
causal link between plaintiff's workers' compensation claim and her dis-
charge as a matter of law. In Harris v. American Red Cross 246 Marthana
Harris began experiencing vision problems and headaches in October of
1987. She took a two and one-half month sick leave from her employment.
During this time, she saw a series of doctors, some of her own choosing, and
two at the request of her employer, the American Red Cross (Red Cross).
The doctors could not agree on Harris' condition; Harris' doctors recom-
mended she take three to six months off work, while Red Cross's doctors
241. Id. slip op. at 5 (citing Luna v. Frito-Lay, 726 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1987, no writ)).
242. Id. slip op. at 6.
243. Id.
244. Id. slip op. at 8 (citing Bonham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978)).
245. Thurman, No. 91-1026 slip op. at 11-12. The court detailed the summary judgment
evidence and concluded that Thurman knew or should have known that he was discharged on
May 18. Id. slip op. at 8-11.
246. 752 F. Supp. 737 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
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found nothing wrong with Harris. Red Cross asked its chief medical officer
to review all of the doctors' reports. After the medical officer concluded his
review, he determined that Harris was medically able to work and Red Cross
instructed Harris to report to work. Harris refused to report to work as
requested and, as a consequence, she was terminated. After her termination,
Harris filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, alleging job-related
stress from her employment. Thereafter, Harris sued Red Cross for retalia-
tory discharge in violation of article 8307c. Red Cross moved for summary
judgment, alleging Harris failed to prove a causal connection between her
visits to her doctors for the stress claim and her termination. Red Cross
claimed that Harris was terminated for the sole reason that it had deter-
mined that she was able to work, and that it was her choice thereafter not to
return to work.
The federal district court granted Red Cross's motion for summary judg-
ment. The court determined that "Harris cannot hope to prove [a causal]
link, because at the time of her discharge, on December 19, 1987, she had
not filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Only after her termina-
tion, on December 29, 1987, did Harris file a claim."' 247 Harris argued that
under Texas law, she was entitled to follow her doctor's recommendations,
was not required to return to work until she was released by her treating
doctor, and therefore, she could not be terminated by her employer while
undergoing treatment for an on-the-job injury. Harris relied on several
Texas state court decisions in support of her argument.248 The court noted
that although the cases cited by Harris all dealt with retaliatory discharge
under article 8307c, none of the cases held that the occurrence of a work-
place injury guaranteed Harris the right to return to work.249 The court
observed that Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas250 was analogous, but distinguish-
able from the facts in Harris. In Texas Steel the company's supervisor, after
learning that the plaintiff reported an injury, went out of his way to get the
treating doctor to release the plaintiff for light duty and then required the
plaintiff to be at work at 6:00 a.m. When the plaintiff reported late because
of the medicine he was taking, he was immediately fired. The court in Texas
Steel concluded that the employee's receipt of compensation benefits from
the employer's compensation insurer amounted to the initiation of proceed-
ings under the statute, placing the plaintiff within the protective ambit of an
article 8307c action.251 However, the court in Harris distinguished the rea-
247. Id. at 739.
248. Harris relied on Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Plaintiff discharged after employer's insurance carrier paid
plaintiff two weeks of workers' compensation benefits, plaintiff released by his doctor to do
light work, and reported to work three hours late. Court held that plaintiff had instituted
proceeding under workers' compensation; thus, jury verdict would stand.); Luna v. Daniel
Int'l Corp., 683 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ); Hunt v. Vanderhorst
Corp., 711 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); and Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618
S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ) (jury verdict supported because plaintiff
had filed claim prior to discharge, although claim was not the only reason for discharge).
249. Harris, 752 F. Supp. at 739.
250. 533 S.W.2d III (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
251. Id. at 115.
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soning in Texas Steel because there was no evidence that Harris received
benefits or even applied for benefits from the Red Cross prior to her termina-
tion. Furthermore, the court noted that there was no showing of retaliatory
motive. 252 "The only evidence of retaliation presented by Harris is that she
was terminated when she chose her doctor, over her job."'253
Citing Benton v. Kroger,2 4 the court concluded that Harris failed to estab-
lish a causal link between her discharge and the visits to her doctors. More-
over, the court held that under Texas law, an employer may terminate an at-
will employee who is off work with a job-related injury, without violating
article 8307c. 255 The court noted that Texas state courts have consistently
found that an employee with a work-related injury may be lawfully termi-
nated, so long as the employer's motive is not to discriminate for taking steps
to collect workers' compensation benefits. 2 6
Article 8307c does not apply to prospective employers. 257 In order to suc-
cessfully assert an 8307c action, a plaintiff must have commenced employ-
ment with the employer-defendant. 258 In Stoker v. Furrs259 Linda Stoker,
an employee of Safeway Stores since 1966, sustained a work-related injury
and received workers' compensation for her injury in 1986. When Furrs,
Inc. (Furrs), purchased the El Paso Safeway Stores (Safeway), effective No-
vember 7, 1987, Stoker's claim against Safeway remained pending. Furrs
interviewed Safeway employees for continuing employment; Stoker alleged
that on November 2, Furrs offered her a job during her interview and she
accepted. Stoker further alleged that on November 6, before she began to
work, she was terminated by Furrs, in part because of her pending workers'
compensation claim against Safeway. Furrs moved for summary judgment
claiming that because Stoker was never hired, she failed to state a claim
under article 8307c which applies only to employees. The trial court granted
the summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court noted
that the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) defines employee to "mean every
person in the service of another under any contract for hire, express or im-
plied, oral or written.' 26° Stoker argued she was an employee for purposes
of an 8307c action because she had been extended an offer of employment.
The court, however, determined that "[a] person who has contracted with an
employer to begin work at some future time is not yet an employee until that
time because she is not yet in the service of the employer or on the em-
252. Harris, 752 F. Supp. at 740.
253. Id.
254. 640 F. Supp. 1317, 1320 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
255. Harris, 752 F. Supp. at 740.
256. Id.
257. Stoker v. Furrs, 813 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); see also
Lanier v. Hill Petroleum Co., 929 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1991) (former employees of Texas City
Refining, Inc., who sold all of its assets to Hill Petroleum Co., did not state a cause of action
under 8307c against Hill Petroleum for its refusal to hire plaintiffs because of their pending
workers' compensation claims; plaintiffs were not employees of Hill and could not therefore
bring the action).
258. Stoker, 813 S.W.2d at 721.
259. 813 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
260. Id. (quoting TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967)).
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ployer's payroll."' 26' Citing Carnes v. Transport Insurance Co. 262 the court
concluded that to be an employee, there must not only exist a contract of
hire, but the person must also commence work for the employer.263 The
court held that, as a matter of law, Stoker, who was allegedly hired on No-
vember 2, to begin work on November 7, was not an employee of Furrs on
November 2 within the meaning of the Act because she had performed no
work for Furrs and was not yet in its service.264 With regard to Stoker's
alternative argument that article 8307c does not require a present em-
ployer/employee relationship, the court determined that the legislature in-
tended that article 8307c apply only to existing employer/employee
relationships. 26 Stoker argued that a prospective employer is guilty of dis-
crimination under article 8307c if it refuses to employ any person, including
a prospective or current employee, because he or she has filed a claim or has
instituted a proceeding under the Workers' Compensation Act. The Act
provides that "[n]o person may discharge or in any other manner discrimi-
nate against any employee because the employee has in good faith filed a
claim, [or] hired a lawyer to represent him in a claim. ' 266 267 The court,
however, disagreed and held that the Workers' Compensation Act was en-
acted primarily for the purpose of benefiting and protecting employees who
are injured in the course of their employment. 268 The court reasoned that
because a person cannot discharge an employee unless that person is an em-
ployer, it was inconceivable that the legislature intended person to mean em-
ployer as applied to discharge.269 Accordingly, the court held that neither a
wrongful discharge suit nor an employment discrimination suit may be
brought under article 8307c in the absence of an existing em-
ployer/employee relationship. 270
An individual filing suit under article 8307c may not claim damages for
the personal injury which gave rise to the workers' compensation claim and
which allegedly resulted in his retaliatory discharge. In Nash v. Northland
Communications Corp.271 David Nash sustained a back injury while work-
ing as a cable television installer for Northland Communications Corpora-
tion (Northland). As a result of his injury, Nash pursued and settled a
workers' compensation claim. Shortly after returning to work, Nash was
assigned to dig a ditch in a roadbed. He again injured his back. As a conse-
quence of his injury, he filed and settled a second workers' compensation
claim. While Nash was off work recuperating from his second injury, he was
terminated from his employment. Nash filed suit against Northland alleging
261. Id. at 722.
262. 615 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
263. Stoker, 813 S.W.2d at 722.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
267. Stoker, 813 S.W.2d at 723.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 724.
271. 806 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, writ denied).
1764 [Vol. 45
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
that he had been discriminated against in violation of article 8307c. Nash
asserted that his employer's discrimination caused both past and future dam-
ages for loss of wage earning capacity, reasonable and necessary medical
expenses, pain and suffering, mental anguish, physical impairment, and se-
vere emotional and mental distress. Northland moved for partial summary
judgment on Nash's claims for personal injuries received while digging the
ditch. Northland argued that Nash was barred from bringing an action
based on those injuries because he had already received workers' compensa-
tion benefits for the incident and the injuries. The trial court agreed and
severed and granted partial summary judgment on all claims except Nash's
claim for retaliatory discharge under 8307c. 27 2
The court of appeals affirmed that Nash was properly barred from assert-
ing an 8307c claim for personal injuries he received while digging the ditch.
The court stated that Nash did not assert that the discriminatory ditch dig-
ging assignment caused him any damage other than those related to his back
injury for which he had already been compensated under the Act.273
Rather, the damages sought by Nash were for personal injuries that
stemmed solely and inseparably from the back injury incurred in the ditch
digging assignment. Therefore Nash was limited to one workers' compensa-
tion recovery for the same injury and the court stated that "[a]nother recov-
ery under the guise of a discrimination claim would be a double recovery
under the Act."'274 Accordingly, the court affirmed the partial summary
judgment of the plaintiff's personal injury claim.
In an earlier survey, 275 the issue of whether a claim for retaliatory dis-
charge under article 8307c of the Act may be removed to a federal court
with diversity or federal question jurisdiction was analyzed. The issue had
received considerable attention, and the federal district courts were split on
the issue of whether removal of the article 8307c claim was proper. Re-
cently, the Fifth Circuit resolved the issue in Jones v. Roadway Express,
Inc. 276 In Jones William Jones was employed as a truck driver for Roadway
from 1972 until 1988 under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA). After sustaining injuries to his back in 1981, Jones left work and did
not return until 1986. In November of 1987, Jones was discharged for fail-
ing to work on assignments which Roadway had scheduled for him and for
which he had placed a bid. The grievance committee established under the
CBA reduced his discharge to a ten-day suspension. On January 26, 1988,
Jones reinjured his back and was forced to miss work for a few weeks in
February 1988. Roadway issued a warning to Jones that he would be dis-
missed if he failed to work on the assignments for which he had bid. On
February 26, 1988, Jones phoned to say that he could not work on an assign-




275. Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 81, 114 (1990).
276. 931 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir.), petition for rehearing denied, 936 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1991).
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Upon his termination, Jones filed a grievance under the CBA which did not
include an article 8307c claim for retaliatory discharge. After his claim was
denied by the grievance committee, Jones filed a workers' compensation
claim and brought suit in state court. Roadway removed the case to federal
district court on the basis of both diversity and federal question jurisdiction.
As the basis for the federal question jurisdiction, Roadway alleged that sec-
tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA),277 preempted
Jones' claim. Jones moved to remand the case to state court as a nonremov-
able action under 28 U.S.C. § 1445(C). 278 While Jones amended his com-
plaint to assert solely a cause of action under article 8307c, Roadway filed a
motion for summary judgment. The federal district court granted Road-
way's summary judgment and dismissed Jones' lawsuit, concluding that
Jones had opted to pursue his allegations to a final decision before the griev-
ance committee rather than in a judicial proceeding. 279 The district court
reasoned that under the Texas election of remedies doctrine, Jones' choice of
remedies barred him from pursuing an alternative remedy.280 The Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed.
The Fifth Circuit first addressed the issue of election of remedies and pre-
emption of the 8307c claim. The court observed that the Texas supreme
court recently held that an arbitration decision pursuant to a CBA does not
preempt an action under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act.281 Relying
on the supreme court's opinion in Johnson Controls, the Fifth Circuit held
that Jones' adverse arbitration decision did not bar him from bringing his
8307c action. 28 2 The court then turned to the issue of whether section 301
of the LMRA preempted Jones' state law claim of retaliatory discharge.
The court observed that the United States Supreme Court, in Lingle v. Norge
Division of Magic Chef, Inc. ,283 held that "Section 301 preempts an applica-
277. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
278. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) provides that "[a] civil action in any State court arising under the
workmen's compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of the
United States."
279. Jones, 931 F.2d at 1088.
280. Id. The court noted that if Jones were still alleging that Roadway had breached the
CBA and that his union had breached its duty of fair representation, he would be bringing a
hybrid claim which federal law would preempt. However, the district court found that Jones
had expressly withdrawn his § 301 allegations and was instead reasserting his article 8307c
claim. Nonetheless, the court held that Texas election of remedies doctrine foreclosed this
claim, absent an allegation of breach of duty of fair representation - an allegation that Jones
had expressly withdrawn.
281. Id. at 1088 (citing International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 265, 265(Tex. 1990)). In concluding that the Texas election of remedies doctrine barred Jones from
pursuing his 8307c claim in judicial proceedings, the district court relied on Thompson v.
Monsanto Co., 559 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ), and on
Texas supreme court decisions limiting Monsanto, Richards v. Hughes Tool Co., 615 S.W.2d
196 (Tex. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982); Spainhoner v. Western Elec. Co., 615
S.W.2d 190 (Tex. 1981); Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980), which held
that a final decision in arbitration conducted under a CBA bars a later action pursuant to
article 8307c. However, the court in Jones concluded that Monsanto was explicitly disap-
proved by the Texas supreme court in Johnson Controls.
282. Jones, 931 F.2d at 1089.
283. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
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tion of state law 'only if such application requires the interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement.' ",284 The court observed that "Congress
did not intend that section 301 should preempt 'state rules that proscribe
conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor con-
tract.' ",285 The court, which had previously determined that § 301 preemp-
tion occurs when a resolution of a dispute is substantially dependent upon
analysis of the terms of the CBA, 28 6 noted that "[a] plaintiff's state law
claims will not be preempted, even when they are 'intertwined' with a CBA,
so long as they are not 'inextricably intertwined' with it. ' '287
To determine if adjudicating the claim requires interpreting the terms of a
CBA, the Fifth Circuit stated that under Lingle, a court is required to first
analyze the elements of the tort at issue. 288 After analyzing the elements of
an article 8307c action, the court determined that the issue of whether retali-
atory discharge occurred did not require interpretation of the CBA.
Although Roadway may have other reasons, even reasons justified under the
CBA, if retaliation was a factor in its decision to discharge Jones, the CBA
was not inextricably intertwined with the state law claim.28 9 Moreover, the
court noted that the right to be free from retaliatory discharge for pursuing a
workers' compensation claim existed independently of the CBA. Instead,
the right originates in the statute which Texas enacted to protect employees
seeking compensation for work-related injuries.290 Having determined that
the federal law did not preempt Jones' 8307c claim, the court turned its
attention to the remand issue. 291
The court first observed that Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1445(C) 2 9 2 to
restrict diversity jurisdiction and to stop the removal of compensation cases
which were increasing the already overburdened docket of the federal
courts.293 The court observed that the statute "'reflects a strong congres-
sional policy that where the state court has been utilized by one of the par-
ties in the state compensation machinery, the case should remain in the state
court for its ultimate disposition.' "294 However, in order to resolve the is-
sue, the court determined that the preliminary question was whether an ac-
tion under article 8307c was a civil action arising under the workers'
compensation laws of Texas.295 The court observed that several federal dis-
284. Jones, 931 F.2d at 1089 (quoting Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413).
285. Id. (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 219 (1985)).
286. Id. at 1089 (citing Wells v. General Motors Corp., 881 F.2d 166, 173 (5th Cir. 1989)
(citing Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220).
287. Id. (quoting Wells, 881 F.2d at 175; Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213).
288. Id.
289. Jones, 931 F.2d at 1090.
290. Id.
291. Prior to its analysis of the remand issue, the Fifth Circuit recognized that the question
that it confronted was whether the case should be remanded to state court because only state
law claims remained, "not whether the defendant properly removed the case to federal court."
Jones, 931 F.2d at 1091. Nevertheless, the court noted that the issue of removal controlled its
analysis. Id.
292. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c), see supra text accompanying note 278.
293. Jones, 931 F.2d at 1091.




trict courts had answered the question affirmatively 296 and others had an-
swered to the contrary.2 97 The Fifth Circuit then distinguished the federal
district court cases which held that an article 8307c civil action did not arise
under the workers' compensation laws of Texas. It stated that these federal
district court decisions were based on "state court decisions [that] neither
could nor did decide whether for the purposes of Section 1445(c), an article
8307c claim arises under the compensation laws of Texas. ' 298 Recognizing
that Congress intended that all cases arising under a state's workers' com-
pensation scheme remain in state court, the court held that § 1445(c) should
be read broadly to further that purpose.299 The Fifth Circuit noted that it
had previously declared, in analyzing the statute that grants federal ques-
tion jurisdiction,300 that a suit arises under the law that creates the cause of
action.301 Because it did not see any reason not to define arising under in
§ 1445(c) as it did in § 1331, the court applied the definition to an article
8307c claim and concluded that such a suit arises under the workers' com-
pensation laws of Texas within the meaning of § 1445(c). The court also
noted that the Texas legislature enacted article 8307c to safeguard its work-
ers' compensation scheme. 30 2 It observed that if workers refrained from fil-
ing claims for benefits or refused to participate in compensation proceedings
for fear of retaliation, the legislature's elaborate workers' compensation
scheme would be adversely affected. 303 The court concluded that if it were
not for the workers' compensation laws, article 8307c would not exist. Ac-
cordingly, the court held that for purposes of § 1445(c), Jones' action under
article 8307c arose under the workers' compensation laws of Texas and
should have been remanded to the state court.3°4
Following the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Jones, Roadway filed a petition
for rehearing which was subsequently denied. 30 5 One of Roadway's points
for rehearing asserted that the court failed to consider Jones' deposition tes-
timony in assessing whether adjudicating the 8307c claim required the inter-
pretation of the terms of the CBA. In his deposition testimony, Jones
296. Id. (citing Soto v. Tonco Corp., 716 F. Supp. 977, 979 (W.D. Tex. 1989); Chavez v.
Farah Mfg. Co., 715 F. Supp. 177, 178 (W.D. Tex. 1989); Wallace v. Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring
Co., 708 F. Supp. 144, 149 (E.D. Tex. 1989)).
297. Id. (citing Chatman v. Saks Fifth Avenue, 762 F. Supp. 152 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Gillis v.
U.S. Natural Resources, Inc., 1989 WL 132312, 4 IER Cases 1259 (W.D. Tex. 1989); Richard-
son v. Owens-Illinois Glass Container, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Tex. 1988)).
298. Jones, 931 F.2d at 1091 (citing Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Gaedcke Equip. Co., 716
S.W.2d 542, 543 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Artco-Bell Corp. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 649 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983, no writ). The issue
before the courts in Gaedcke and in Artco-Bell was whether an employer's liability insurance
policy covering workers' compensation benefits also covered liability for retaliatory discharge.
Id. at n.4.
299. Id. at 1092.
300. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1980).
301. Jones, 931 F.2d at 1092 (citing Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 723 F.2d 1173, 1178 (5th
Cir. 1984) (quoting American Railworks Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260
(1916); Superior Oil Co. v. Pioneer Corp., 706 F.2d 603, 605 (5th Cir. 1983))).
302. Jones, 931 F.2d at 1092.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. 936 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1991).
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claimed that Roadway " 'explicitly states that the basis for his article 8307c
claim expressly involves a misinterpretation of a provision of the collective
bargaining agreement.' -36 In response to the argument, the court first
noted that it did not find such an explicit statement. 30 7 Moreover, the court
relied on its previous explanation wherein it stated that Roadway may have
fired Jones for an employment reason which the CBA justified, but if it also
fired him in anticipation of his filing a workers' compensation claim, Jones
could recover damages. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit observed that the
United States Supreme Court, in Lingle, acknowledged that state law analy-
sis might involve attention to the same factual considerations as the CBA. 30 8
The court then stated that "a final decision in arbitration precludes only a
suit involving interpretation of the CBA. ''309 Roadway also claimed that
because it relied on the CBA in its defense, Jones' Article 8307c claim was
preempted. The court responded:
Because Jones' retaliatory discharge claim is not, for the reasons stated
in our earlier opinion, 'inextricably intertwined' with the CBA and does
not depend for its resolution upon the 'just cause' provision of the CBA,
it is not preempted. Furthermore, federal law would not preempt
Jones' article 8307c claim even if Roadway had just cause under the
CBA for dismissing Jones, if it also had a motive for dismissing him
that was illegal under article 8307c. 310
The court concluded by emphasizing that in its original opinion, the issue
before it was not whether Roadway had properly removed the case initially.
Rather, the issue was whether to remand the case to state court when only a
state law claim remained. 311 With regard to the issue of remand, the court
noted that the Supreme Court has held that under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, a federal district has discretion to remand a properly removed
case to state court when all federal claims have been eliminated and only
pendent state law claims remain.312 Moreover, the court relied heavily on
the fact that Congress had enacted a statute, barring the removal from state
court of an action arising under the workers' compensation laws of that
state. Thus, Congress clearly intended that state courts should resolve the
workers' compensation suits. 31 3 Given the discretion vested in the court to
remand pendent state law claims to state court and Congress' intent regard-
ing state court adjudication of workers' compensation actions, the Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that remand to state court was appropriate. 31 4
306. Id. at 791.
307. Id.
308. Id. (citing Lingle, 786 U.S. at 408).
309. Id. (emphasis added).
310. Jones, 963 F.2d at 791 (citing Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1981, no writ)).
311. Id. at 792.





2 Texas Commission on Human Rights Act
In Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc.315 the Texas supreme court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a plaintiff, in a claim under the Texas Commis-
sion on Human Rights Act 316 (TCHRA), must exhaust his administrative
remedies as a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit in civil court. Thomas Schroe-
der sued his former employer, Texas Iron Works, for age discrimination in
violation of the TCHRA. 317 Texas Iron Works obtained summary judgment
on Schroeder's age claim on the ground that Schroeder had failed to file a
complaint with the Texas Commission on Human Rights (Commission) as
required under TCHRA, and the court of appeals affirmed. On appeal to the
supreme court, Schroeder argued that a party claiming a violation of
TCHRA could, at the party's option, proceed under either the administra-
tive review procedures of the TCHRA or file a lawsuit in state court.
Schroeder contended that section 6.01(a)318 of TCHRA used the permissive
term "may" rather than the mandatory term "shall" with respect to filing a
charge with the Commission. The supreme court held that the term "may"
merely meant that a person who believes a violation of the TCHRA has
occurred may, but is not obligated to, seek redress for the alleged
violation.319
The court observed that when the legislature created the Commission, it
described its powers, prohibited certain unlawful employment practices, pro-
vided for administrative review of complaints of such practices and for judi-
cial review of Commission decisions.3 20 The supreme court reasoned that
requiring a party to exhaust the Commission's administrative remedies is
consistent with the TCHRA's purpose to provide for the execution of the
policies embodied in Title VII.321 These policies include administrative pro-
cedures involving informal conference, conciliation, persuasion, judicial re-
view of administration action, and the policy of prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies as a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit. 322
In Eckerdt v. Frostex Foods, Inc. 323 Jennifer Eckerdt filed her charge of
sex discrimination with the Commission and subsequently filed her lawsuit
within the requisite sixty-day time limit from receipt of her right-to-sue let-
ter.324 The Commission, however, was tardy in issuing the notice of right-
to-sue letter to Eckerdt; therefore, she failed to file her lawsuit within the one
315. 813 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. 1991).
316. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1992).
317. For a discussion of the underlying facts, see Pfeiffer & Hall, supra note 7, at 342-43.
318. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 6.01(a) (Vernon 1987) provides in relevant
part: "A person claiming to be aggrieved ... may file with the commission a complaint...
stating that an unlawful employment practice has been committed ... 
319. Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 486.
320. Id. at 485-86.
321. Id. (citing § 1.02(1)). See City of Austin v. Gifford, No. 3-91-C94-CV 1992 WL
17820 at 2, 6-7 (Tex. App.-Austin Feb. 6, 1992, writ requested); Syndex Corp. v. Dean, 1991
WL 253352 at 1 (Tex. App.-Austin Nov. 6, 1991, n.w.h.) (TCHRA is modeled on federal law
and its purpose is to provide for the execution of the policies embodied in Title VII).
322. 813 S.W.2d at 487.
323. 802 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
324. The TCHRA also mandates that a claimant file a charge within 180 days of the al-
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year requirement period set forth in the TCHRA.325 Accordingly, the trial
court dismissed Eckerdt's lawsuit for want of jurisdiction, and the court of
appeals affirmed. The court held that the limitation period is jurisdictional
and is not excused or tolled by virtue of the fact that the Commission failed
to send the right-to-sue letter in a timely fashion. 326 The court explained
that the TCHRA does not require that a plaintiff receive a right-to-sue letter
before filing a lawsuit.327 The court also cited a 1989 amendment to the
TCHRA which provides that the Commission's failure to issue a notice of
right-to-sue does not affect a plaintiff's right to bring a civil action under the
TCHRA. 328
In Syndex Corp. v. Dean 329 on remand from the Texas supreme court, the
Austin court of appeals addressed the issue of an employer's liability under
the TCHRA for a supervisor's sexual harassment of an employee. 330 Syndex
argued that corporate liability must be based on principles of agency set
forth in section 219-237 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency as required
by the United States Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 331
Syndex complained that the test for employer liability is "course and scope"
and that the jury charge should have inquired whether Bill Bushell, the su-
pervisor, was acting in the course and scope of his employment when he
allegedly committed the sexual harassment.332 The court rejected Syndex'
argument because the trial court instructed the jury on the issue of course
and scope. 333 The court held that it was not necessary to have an express
leged discrimination and subsequently file his or her lawsuit within 60 days of receipt of a
notice of right-to-sue letter from the Commission. § 7.01(a).
325. The TCHRA provides in relevant part that "[i]n no event may any action be brought
pursuant to this article more than one year after the date of the filing of the complaint to which
the action relates. § 7.01(a). Id.
326. Eckerdt, 803 S.W.2d at 72.
327. Id. at 71.
328. Id. at 72 n.2 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 7.01(i)).
329. 820 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ requested).
330. For a complete history of this case, see Bushell v. Dean, 781 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1989), rev'd and remanded in part and writ denied in part, 803 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1991);
Pfeiffer & Hall, supra note 275, at 102-05 & 109-11; Pfeiffer & Hall, supra note, at 354-55.
331. 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). In the first appeal, the court overruled Syndex' challenge to
the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that Bushell's actions were
within the course and scope of his employment. Bushell v. Dean, 781 S.W.2d at 658-59.
332. The trial court submitted the following questions on employer liability to the jury:
QUESTION 10: Do you find that prior to the date Ms. Dean resigned, that
Syndex Corporation failed to take those actions which a reasonable employer
would have taken under the same or similar circumstances to make its work-
place reasonably safe from unlawful sexual harassment?
ANSWER: Yes.
QUESTION 11: Do you find that Syndex Corporation failed to take immediate
appropriate corrective action upon learning that an allegation of unlawful sexual
harassment had been made?
ANSWER: Yes.
Syndex Corp. v. Dean, 820 S.W,2d at 871.
333. Id. With respect to the jury questions on assault and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, the trial court instructed the jury:
[A] person acts within the course and scope of his employment if the acts...
were done within the scope of the general authority given to Mr. Bushell by
Syndex Corporation. Furthermore, the acts... must have been done in further-
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finding that Bushell acted in the course and scope of employment when he
sexually harassed Dean.334 Syndex conceded on remand that course and
scope was not the proper inquiry and that the trial court should have sub-
mitted a two-part inquiry to the jury: first, whether the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment, and second, assuming the existence of
such notice, whether the employer then failed to take appropriate corrective
action. 335 However, Syndex did not raise this objection at trial, therefore, it
was waived. 336
In Nagel Manufacturing & Supply Co. v. U1loa 337, Lucy Ulloa sued her
former employer for damages which she sustained from being assaulted and
sexually harassed by her former employer's plant superintendent and for be-
ing discharged in retaliation for reporting the offense to management. Ulloa
prevailed on her claims of sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge under
the TCHRA. While the jury did not award damages for mental anguish or
emotional distress, it did award actual damages for lost wages and exem-
plary damages. The employer filed a limited appeal to contest the award of
exemplary damages on the basis that the jury failed to award any underlying
actual damages for the assault.338 The court acknowledged that while exem-
plary damages are not recoverable under the TCHRA, they are recoverable
for assault. Because Ulloa proved she suffered damages (lost wages) as a
result of the unlawful harassment, and because of the way the jury questions
were framed, the court held that the lost wages finding supported the award
of exemplary damages. 339
In Speer v. Presbyterian Childrens Home & Service Agency 34° the Dallas
court of appeals held that the Presbyterian Childrens Home & Service
Agency (PCHSA), a Christian religious organization, which provided serv-
ices for placing children in foster and adoptive homes, did not discriminate
in violation of the TCHRA by refusing to hire a Jewish applicant, Georgette
Speer, for the position of senior adoption worker. During her interview
Speer stated that she was Jewish and thereafter received a rejection letter
which stated that PCHSA hires only Christians. Speer filed a claim of un-
lawful religious discrimination with the Commission. Both Speer and the
Commission eventually brought suit against PCHSA. PCHSA claimed that
it was exempt as a religious corporation under the TCHRA. The trial court
agreed with PCHSA, and the court of appeals affirmed. 341 On appeal, Speer
and the Commission argued that PCHSA's primary purpose and character
ance of Syndex Corporation's business, and the acts must have been done to
accomplish the job for which Mr. Bushell was employed.
Id. at 872.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 872-73.
336. Id. at 873. Syndex' argument was based on cases decided after the trial of the case.
Id. at 872.
337. 812 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
338. Id. at 80.
339. Id.
340. No. 05-90-01211-CV, 1991 WL 185944 (Tex. App.-Dallas Sept. 23, 1991, writ
requested).
341. The TCHRA "does not apply to the employment of an individual of a particular
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were not religious in nature and thus, PCHSA was not exempt from the
prohibition against religious employment discrimination. Noting the ab-
sence of Texas case law, the court held that since the purpose of the TCHRA
was "to provide for the execution of the policies embodied in Title VII of the
federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, ' '342 federal decisions interpreting Title VII
provided guidance in construing the TCHRA. 343 Accordingly, the court re-
viewed the eight factors for determining whether an organization is a reli-
gious entity identified by the Ninth Circuit in EEOC v. Townley Engineering
& Manufacturing Co.344 The court held that PCHSA was a religious corpo-
ration within the TCHRA.3 45 The court found that PCHSA's primary pur-
pose and character were religious in nature, and that although some of the
work could be performed in a secular manner, PCHSA performed its pri-
mary functions in a manner heavily influenced by Christian principles.3 46
The court next addressed whether PCHSA was exempt from the TCHRA's
prohibition against religious employment discrimination, in other words,
whether senior adoption workers performed work of a religious nature.
Although the court noted that the section 5.06 exemption in the TCHRA
was more restrictive than the federal exemption, the court applied the three-
part test laid out in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 347 to determine whether PCHSA's
activity was religious. The court concluded that there was a substantial rela-
tionship between a senior adoption worker's duties and the tenets of the
Presbyterian Church.348 In so concluding, the court observed that Speer
admitted that being Jewish would aid her in determining someone's commit-
ment to the Jewish faith, and therefore, being Christian, by comparison,
would aid an adoption worker in evaluating a prospective couple's commit-
ment to the Christian faith.349 Since PCHSA placed children in only Chris-
tian homes, such decision making duties were considered connected to
religion by a religious corporation, association, or society to perform work connected with the
performance of religious activities by the corporation, association, or society .... § 5.06(1).
342. Speer, 1991 WL 185944 at 6 (quoting § 1.02(1))
343. Id.
344. 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989). The eight factors
identified in Townley Eng'g are: (1) whether the entity operates for profit or as a nonprofit
organization; (2) whether an administrative agency has determined the entity's status;
(3) whether the entity's articles of incorporation or other pertinent documents state a religious
purpose; (4) whether the entity represents to the church its sectarian nature while representing
to the government its secular nature; (5) whether the church intimately involves itself in the
management, day-to-day operations, and financial affairs of the entity; (6) whether the church
supports or affiliates the entity; (7) whether the entity adheres to or deviates from an initial
religious purpose; and (8) whether the entity conducts religious activities, instruction or serv-
ices. Id. at 618.
345. Speer, 1991 WL 185944 at 14.
346. Id.
347. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). Under the three-part test, the court (1) examines the financial
and managerial ties between the religious organization and the activity; (2) considers the
nexus between the primary function of the activity in question and the religious rituals or
tenets of the religious organization; and (3) considers whether the employees' job has a sub-
stantial relationship with the religious organization's rituals or tenets. Id. at 331 n.6.





Effective September 1, 1989, the Texas legislature amended the TCHRA
and replaced the term "handicap" 351 with the term "disability". 352 Despite
repeated requests by plaintiffs to apply the definition retroactively, the courts
have consistently refused to do so. Therefore, a handicap discrimination
lawsuit which was brought under the pre-amendment version of the
TCHRA is construed under the "handicap" definition. For example, in
Hilton v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,353 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a
district court's summary judgment in favor of an employee on the basis that
an employee's AIDS and his resultant low blood platelet count were not
"handicaps" within the meaning of the TCHRA. The court held that even if
the employee's disease could be regarded as a "handicap," it was a handicap
which impaired the employee's ability to reasonably perform the job; there-
fore, the employer was not liable under the TCHRA. The court reasoned
that although the employee may be able to physically perform the tasks of
the job, the evidence established that the slightest shock to the employee,
such as bumping his elbow against the corner of a table, could cause fatal
bleeding, thereby impairing his ability to reasonably perform the job. 354
Similarly, in Jones v. Chevron USA, Inc. 355 William Jones sued his former
employer, Chevron, for handicap discrimination. Jones, a pilot for Chevron,
suffered a heart attack which resulted in the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion revoking his medical certificate. Consequently, Jones could no longer
legally pilot an aircraft. Eventually, Jones was issued a second class air-
man's medical certificate, but Chevron refused to allow him to fly until he
furnished a first class certificate. Jones opined that Chevron would not allow
him to fly and accepted a severance package, and then sued Chevron for
handicap discrimination. The trial court granted Chevron's motion for sum-
mary judgment. On appeal, Jones argued that the trial court erred in refus-
ing to apply the definition of "disability" as set forth in the 1989
amendments to the TCHRA to his claim and in concluding that there was
no question of fact regarding whether Jones was handicapped. First, the
court held that the 1989 amendment to the TCHRA (replacing "handicap"
with the term "disability") was not retroactive and that the term "handicap"
350. Id.
351. The TCHRA provides the following definition of "handicap":
Handicap means a condition either mental or physical that includes mental re-
tardation, hardness of hearing, deafness, speech impairment, visual handicap,
being crippled, or any other health impairment that requires special ambulatory
devices or services, as defined in Section 121.002(4), Human Resources Code
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 2.01(7)(B) (Vernon 1987) (amended by TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 2.01(4) (Vernon Supp. 1991)).
352. Disability is defined as: "[A] mental or physical impairment that substantially limits
at least one major life activity or a record of such a mental or physical impairment." § 2.01(4)
(Vernon Supp. 1991).
353. 936 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1992)
(applying Texas law).
354. Id. at 830.
355. No. 01-90-00999-CV, 1991 WL 114412 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 27,
1991, writ denied) (not published).
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was operative. 356 Second, the court held that Jones' malady did not fall
within the definition of handicap because none of Jones' restrictions "are
generally perceived to severely limit a person's ability to perform work-re-
lated functions in general.1 357 . Additionally, the court found that even if
Jones was handicapped, at least for a certain amount of time while recuper-
ating, his handicap impaired his ability to perform his job at that time be-
cause the uncontested evidence established that without his medical
certificate, he could not legally fly. 358 Finally, the court disregarded the affi-
davit of William Hale, Executive Director of the Commission, which stated
that when the Commission investigated Jones' charge of discrimination, the
Commission was convinced that Jones' heart condition caused him to be a
"handicapped" person under the TCHRA. The court held that Hale's legal
conclusion did not create an issue of fact in response to Chevron's motion
for summary judgment. 359 Accordingly, Chevron's summary judgment was
affirmed.
In Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 360 Charles Peterson, a black male, born
in 1943, had worked for his former employer, Delta Air Lines, for seventeen
years when he was discharged from his position. Peterson sued Delta under
the TCHRA alleging that his discharge was a result of his race, his age, and
his handicap (multiple sclerosis). In response to Peterson's age and race
claims, Delta established that the four employees allegedly hired after Peter-
son's termination were temporary employees36' and that Peterson's job was
filled by existing employees, on a bid basis.362 Delta also submitted substan-
tial evidence establishing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Peter-
son's discharge. 363  Finding that Peterson failed to show that Delta's
articulated reason for discharge were pretextual, the district court granted
summary judgment on his race and age claims.
However, Delta's motion for summary judgment as to Peterson's handi-
cap claim was denied. Peterson was advised by his supervisor that he (the
supervisor) had received information that a physician had diagnosed Peter-
356. Jones, 1991 WL 114412 at 2. The court held that a statute will not be applied retroac-
tively unless it appears by fair implication that the legislature intended to make it retroactive.
Id. (citing Ex Parte Abell, 613 S.W.2d 255, 260 (Tex. 1981); Merchant's Fast Motor Lines, Inc.
v. Texas R.R. Comm'n, 573 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tex. 1978)).
357. Jones, 1991 WL 114412 at 3. Jones' restrictions included (1) no heavy lifting,




360. No. CA-3-89-2663-C (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 1990) (applying Texas law).
361. The temporaries hired were all under 26 years old and white. Id. slip op. at 3.
362. Id.
363. The evidence established that Peterson (1) had a poor performance and discipline
record; (2) was evaluated below standard on 12 of 17 annual evaluations; (3) was placed on
probation seven times for repeatedly abusing his check cashing privileges even after being
warned and using the privileges when they had been revoked; (4) repeatedly cashing workers'
compensation checks even though he knew the checks belonged to Delta since he had received
his full salary; (5) over 650 absences for illness or injury during 17 years of employment; and
(6) failure to provide medical records on request. Id. slip op. at 4. Additionally, Delta submit-
ted statistical evidence which refuted that Delta had implemented a plan of either race or age
discrimination. Id. slip op. at 3.
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son as having symptoms compatible with multiple sclerosis. Peterson was
therefore requested to release his medical records to Delta, and he initially
agreed. Subsequently, Peterson refused to produce his medical records be-
cause his attorney had advised him that he was not required to do so. The
supervisor then suspended and later discharged Peterson for insubordination
and for failing to release his medical records. Without discussion, the fed-
eral district court concluded that Peterson had raised a material issue of fact
regarding his handicap discrimination claim under the TCHRA.364
In City of Austin v. Gifford 3 6 5 Earl Gifford worked as a jailer and lead
jailer in the Austin Police Department from 1974 until 1981. Gifford quit in
1981 to complete his undergraduate degree. In 1984 he sought re-employ-
ment and was again hired as a jailer. The primary duties of a jailer included
staffing one of three duty stations: the "booking desk" where prisoners were
admitted to the jail; the jail cell area where prisoners were detained; and the
jail information desk where prisoners could meet with their legal counsel
and other visitors. Gifford never worked the booking desk during either pe-
riod of employment. In 1984 Gifford sought an exemption from working the
booking desk because of a hearing impairment. The lead jailer was amenable
to the request, but asked Gifford to prepare a written request setting forth
his reasons for the exemption. The written request was forwarded to Cap-
tain Freddie Maxwell who approved the exemption but raised questions re-
garding Gifford's ability to perform safely his duties. Captain Maxwell
asked Gifford to have his hearing tested. The audiologist's test results
showed that Gifford could hear particular sounds, even sounds uttered
within the confines of a noisy background, but that he might not understand
all of the actual words spoken. Based in part on the test results, the City
informed Gifford that he could no longer work as a jailer. Gifford sought
alternative employment but was unsuccessful in locating a comparable posi-
tion. Approximately one year after receiving the test results, Gifford was
transferred to the jail information desk and given sixty days to find other
work. At the end of sixty days, Gifford was fired. He then filed suit pursu-
ant to the TCHRA alleging wrongful termination because of his hearing
handicap. 366 The jury found that Gifford was handicapped under the
TCHRA, awarded actual damages, prejudgment interest, attorney's fees,
and reinstatement to a position financially commensurate with his former
position with front pay until the time of his reinstatement for a maximum of
two years.
On appeal the City first challenged the jury's finding that Gifford was
handicapped. The City argued that his hearing impairment did not rise to
the level of a "handicap" as defined in the TCHRA. 36 7 The court disagreed
and held that the TCHRA included "hardness of hearing" as a possible
364. Id. slip op. at 2.
365. No. 3-91-094-CV, 1992 WL 17820 (Tex. App.-Austin Feb. 5, 1992, n.w.h.).
366. At the time of Gifford's discharge, the TCHRA prohibited "handicap" discrimina-
tion, rather than "disability" discrimination. Id. at 3 n.3.
367. See supra note 351 for the pre-amendment definition of "handicap."
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handicap. 368 Further the evidence of the audiologist's report and "expert
testimony from an advocate of disabled citizens that a person so afflicted is
frequently perceived to be unable to perform regular job duties. ' 369 The
City also challenged the jury's finding that Gifford was discharged because
of his handicap. The court held that there was ample evidence to defeat the
City's argument that Gifford was discharged because of his inability to per-
form his duties, not because of his handicap. 370 The court found that Gif-
ford was a good jailer, he was more alert than other jailers, he conducted
more frequent inspections of the detainees, he used on one occasion extra-
aural sensations to detect that a prisoner was in danger when other jailers
were oblivious, he remained in his position without incident for a year after
his supervisors informed him of their concerns abut his ability to perform his
job safely, and that the City's motivation for removing Gifford was concern
for minimizing the City's potential liability.371 The City also complained
that it offered Gifford alternative employment, a custodial position that paid
approximately $1.00 per hour less than the jailer position, and that Gifford's
backpay should be reduced by the amount he would have earned had he
accepted the position. The court disagreed and held that mitigation of dam-
ages does not mean that Gifford must "go into another line of work, accept a
demotion, or take a demeaning position. '372
The City also challenged the trial court's award of prejudgment interest
against it. The court held that the issue is whether prejudgment interest
constitutes "equitable relief" under section 7.01(c) of the TCHRA. 373 Fol-
lowing federal cases interpreting Title VII which allow the award of prejudg-
ment interest, the court held that the award of prejudgment interest is also
appropriate under the TCHRA. 374 The City next challenged the award of
reinstatement and front pay. The court observed that the TCHRA expressly
provides for reinstatement and back pay. 375 Although the TCHRA does not
specifically provide for front pay, the court noted that federal cases interpret-
ing Title VII permit awards of front pay even though Title VII does not
provide for front pay.3 7 6 Following the TCHRA's federal counterpart, the
court held that front pay constitutes other equitable relief under the
TCHRA. 377 Finally, the defendant supervisors challenged the judgment
which was rendered against them in their individual capacity as well as the
City. The court held that even if they were sued in their individual capacity
they are not liable for damages because under the express terms of the




372. Id. at 5 (quoting Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269, 1274 (4th Cir.
1985)).
373. Gifford, 1992 WL 17820 at 7.
374. Id. (citing Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., 899 F.2d 1449, 1453 (5th
Cir. 1990); Sellers v. Delgado Community College, 839 F.2d 1132, 1140 (5th Cir. 1988)).
375. Id.
376. Id. (citing Carter v. Sedgwick County, Kan., 929 F.2d 1501, 1505 (10th Cir. 1991);




TCHRA, employers may be liable for an unlawful employment practice, but
not supervisors or employees. 378
In Blinker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 379 Jerry Blinker, a store manager for
Sears in Victoria, hosted a party for all Sears sales managers, employees of
the Victoria store, and their spouses. Frances Matthews, a female and
Blinker's assistant manager, attended the party as well. Blinker and Mat-
thews supervised all of Sears' employees in Victoria. During the party,
Blinker and Matthews, at separate times, entered an outdoor hot tub in the
nude (Matthews was wearing underwear but was topless) in front of their
subordinates. News of the incident spread through the Victoria store
quickly. After receiving complaints, the regional manager confirmed the in-
cident with Blinker. The regional manager told Blinker he would be termi-
nated but Blinker asked if he could resign instead, and the regional manager
agreed. Matthews was discharged. Blinker then sued Sears under the
TCHRA alleging that Sears discharged Matthews in retaliation for her views
regarding the promotion of women at Sears and discharged him to cover up
its sexually discriminatory and retaliatory motive for discharging Matthews.
Uncovering Blinker's novel and confusing theory of sex discrimination, the
federal district court granted Sears' motion for summary judgment. First,
the court noted that the TCHRA only provides a remedy for discrimination
or retaliation against an employee on the basis of his oi her sex.380 Because
Blinker did not complain that he was discharged or retaliated against be-
cause of his male sex, the TCHRA did not provide a remedy for his claim. 38 1
Second, the court held that there was no evidence of a causal connection
between Matthews' outspokeness (even if it was protected by the TCHRA)
and Blinker's discharge.38 2 Third, Blinker produced no evidence that the
reason for his discharge (i.e., his conduct at the party) was a pretext to dis-
criminate. 383 Finally, Blinker could not establish that any similarly situated
female employees were treated differently. Moreover, the only such em-
ployee, Matthews, was treated the same as Blinker, and she was discharged
at the same time and for the same reasons.3 8 4
Finally, in Hilton v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 385 the Fifth Circuit,
relying on Chevron Corp. v. Redmon,3 86 concluded that the determination of
whether an individual's condition constitutes a handicap under the TCHRA
is a question of law. 387 However, in the Texas supreme court's decision in
Redmon, the court specifically held that the issue of "whether a person is
378. Gifford, 1992 WL 17820 at 6 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, §§ 5.01-
.07) (Vernon Supp. 1992)).
379. No. SA-88-CA-1256 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 1991) (applying Texas law).
380. Id. slip op. at 6-7 (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, §§ 1.02, 5.01(1),
5.05(a)(1) (Vernon 1987)).
381. Id. slip op. at 8.
382. Id. slip op. at 7. Further, the court observed that there was no evidence that the
regional manager was even aware of Matthews' alleged outspokeness. Id.
383. Id. slip op. at 8.
384. Blinker, No. SA-88-CA-1256.
385. 936 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1991).
386. 745 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1987).
387. Hilton, 936 F.2d at 831-32 (citing Redmon, 745 S.W.2d at 318).
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handicapped is generally a question of fact for the fact finder."' 3 8 The Fifth
Circuit mistakenly relied on Redmon for the proposition that such a ques-
tion is one of law. 38 9 Redmon is a summary judgment case. Because the
plaintiff in Redmon did not raise an issue of fact in response to Chevron's
summary judgment proof, the supreme court concluded that "[a]s a matter
of law" the plaintiff was not handicapped. 390 The supreme court did not,
however, hold that the issue of whether an individual is handicapped (or
disabled) is a question of law in all cases. Under Texas law, whether a plain-
tiff's condition constitutes a handicap or disability is one of fact, unless a
defendant can establish, as a matter of law, that the condition does not con-
stitute a handicap or disability.
3. Juror Reemployment Act
Under the Juror Reemployment Act (Act),391 it is unlawful for a private
employer to terminate a permanent employee because of the employee's ser-
vice as a juror.39 2 Under the Act, an employee discharged in violation of the
Act is entitled to reinstatement to the same employment held when sum-
moned for jury duty, 39 3 to damages not to exceed an amount equal to six
months' compensation,3 94 and reasonable attorney's fees. 3 9 5
In Fuchs v. Lifetime Doors, Inc.3 96 Bonnie Fuchs sued her former em-
ployer, Lifetime Doors, Inc., for firing her in violation of the Juror Reem-
ployment Act. She sought punitive damages in addition to the equivalent of
six months' compensation, the damages permitted under the Act.3 97 The
district court denied her request for punitive damages, awarded the statutory
maximum of damages, and awarded $10,000 in attorney's fees. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed, and held that the Act limits a successful plaintiff's damages
to six months' compensation based on his salary when summoned for jury
service.3 98 Regardless of the characterization of the damages, the court con-
cluded that a plaintiff's total damages were limited by statute and that a
plaintiff could not recover punitive damages above the statutory cap of the
equivalent of six months' compensation. 399 In other words, if, for example,
388. Redmon, 745 S.W.2d at 318. See Jones v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 01-90-009999-CV,
1991 WL 114412 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] June 27, 1991, writ denied (designated for
publication)) (question of whether a person is handicapped is a question of fact); Finney v.
Baylor Medical Ctr. Grapevine, 792 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ
denied) (question of whether a person is handicapped is a question of fact).
389. Hilton, 936 F.2d at 827.
390. Redmon, 745 S.W.2d at 315.
391. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 122.001-002 (Vernon 1986).
392. Id. § 122.001(a).
393. Id. § 122.001(b). The employee must "as soon as practical after release from jury
service, [give] the employer actual notice that [he] intends to return." Id.
394. Id. § 122.002(a). The six months' compensation is based on the rate at which the
employee was compensated when summoned for jury service. Id.
395. Id. § 122.002(b). The amount of attorney's fees must be approved by the court. Id.
396. 939 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1991). The facts of Fuchs are discussed in Pfeiffer & Hall,
supra note 275, at 125.
397. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 122.002(b).
398. 939 F.2d at 1277.
399. Id. at 1278. The concurring opinion agreed, but lamented the fact that the Texas
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a plaintiff only loses four weeks of pay as a result of his employer's violation
of the Act, he may recover as damages the four weeks' pay, plus the remain-
ing balance of the equivalent of six months' compensation.
4. Unemployment Compensation Act
In Mary Lee Foundation v. Texas Employment Commission 400 the central
issues were whether the trial court erred in admitting the administrative rec-
ord of the Texas Employment Commission (TEC) into evidence over the
Foundation's objection and whether there was evidence to medically verify
the illness, injury, or disability of Karron DeGraffenried. 40 1 The TEC found
that DeGraffenried left her employment due to a medically verified illness,
and the trial court affirmed. The court noted that review of a TEC decision
requires a trial de novo with substantial evidence review. 402 The court ob-
served that
A trial de novo review of a TEC ruling requires the court to determine
whether there is substantial evidence to support the ruling of the
agency, but the reviewing court must look to the evidence presented in
trial and not the record created by the agency.4°3
The Foundation argued that the trial court improperly admitted into evi-
dence, over its objection, the TEC's administrative record, which included a
physician's letter and a memorandum of a telephone conversation with the
physician, for the truth of the matters in the record. The TEC argued that
the agency record, specifically the letter and telephone conversation memo-
randum, was admissible under Rule 803(8) of the Texas Rules of Civil Evi-
dence, the public records and reports exception to the hearsay rule. 404 The
court held that the letter and telephone conversation memorandum did not
fit within the exceptions of Rule 803(8). The court observed that "the public
records exception to the hearsay rule does not mean that ex parte statements,
hearsay, conclusions, and opinions contained within such records are admis-
legislature did not permit the recovery of punitive damages for dismissing an employee because
he had served on a jury. Id. at 1281 (Garza, Reynaldo C., J., concurring).
400. 817 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ requested).
401. Generally, when an employee voluntarily quits a job, any benefits paid by the TEC
cannot be charged back to the employer. Id. at 726. The exception to the rule allows pay-
ments to be charged back if the employee quit "due to medically verified illness, injury, disabil-
ity, or pregnancy." Id. (quoting TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-3(a) (Vernon Supp.
1991)).
402. Mary Lee Foundation, 817 S.W.2d at 726 (citing Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 831
(Tex. 1986)).
403. Id. at 727 (citing Mercer, 701 S.W.2d at 831) (emphasis in original).
404. TEX. R. Civ. EvID 803(8) provides:
(8) Public Records and Reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compila-
tions, in any form, of public offices or agencies setting forth (A) the activities of
the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law
as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) against
the state, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to au-
thority granted by law; unless the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness.
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sible."'40 5 While the TEC's fact findings did fall within the Rule 803(8) ex-
ception, the court held that they were not relevant on a trial de novo.406 The
court pointed out:
If the fact findings of the TEC were admissible proof of their own truth
in a trial de novo, the substantial evidence review would be meaningless
because the TEC could bootstrap itself to substantial evidence in every
case merely by finding what it needed to prove.407
The court found that the admission of the agency record constituted revers-
ible error because without the physician's letter and telephone conversation
memorandum the record was devoid of any evidence to medically verify
DeGraffenried's illness, injury, or disability. 4°8 Because the basis of the
court's decision was the prejudicial error in admitting evidence, the trial
court reversed and remanded for a new trial "even though without the hear-
say there was no evidence to support the judgment."'4 9
In Arrellano v. Texas Employment Commission410 the court affirmed a
summary judgment in favor of the TEC and denied the claimant, Gilberto
Arrellano, benefits because of a finding that the claimant left his last job
voluntarily without good cause. Rejecting Arrellano's argument that the hy-
brid substantial evidence/trial de novo standard was confusing, the court
affirmed that "substantial evidence" is the appropriate standard of review.411
The court reiterated that while substantial evidence must be more than a
mere scintilla, it need not be a preponderance of evidence. 412 In fact, the
court noted the evidence may be substantial and yet greatly preponderate the
other way.4 1 3 The decision of the TEC carries a presumption of validity,
and a reviewing court may not set it aside merely because the court would
have reached a different conclusion. 414
Arrellano also complained that the trial court considered only the record
from the administrative hearing and erred in failing to receive evidence in
open court. While the reviewing court must look to the evidence presented
at trial and not the agency record, the court held that the trial court does not
have to receive evidence in open court in every instance.415 The administra-
tive agency record was introduced as summary judgment evidence in sup-
port of the TEC's decision, therefore, the court held, evidence was presented
to the trial court. 416 The court observed that Arrellano was entitled to go to
trial and introduce evidence in open court if the summary judgment proof
405. Mary Lee Found., 817 S.W.2d at 728 (citing Wright v. Lewis, 777 S.W.2d 520 (Tex.




409. Id. at 729 (citing Atlantic Ins. Co. v.. Boyette, 342 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
410. 810 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
411. Id. at 769 (citing Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. 1986)).
412. Id. (citing Olivarez v. Aluminum Corp. of Am., 693 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Tex. 1985)).
413. Id. (citing Olivarez, 693 S.W.2d at 932).
414. Id.




did not demonstrate the existence of substantial evidence as a matter of law,
or if his response to the motion created a fact issue concerning the existence
of substantial evidence. 4 17 In questioning the summary judgment, Arrellano
argued that the TEC's findings of fact admitted the testimony was in con-
flict. 418 Conflicting testimony notwithstanding, the TEC found that on the
last period of employment with this employer, the employer had hired a new
foreman and Arrellano quit rather than work for the new foreman. 4 19 The
court, although agreeing that the evidence before the commission was in
conflict, nevertheless stated that there was substantial evidence to support an
affirmative finding and, therefore, the court was compelled to affirm the deci-
sion of the TEC.420 Although there was a fact issue before the TEC and
there was evidence which could have supported a finding in favor of Arrel-
lano or the employer, the only legal question on appeal to the trial court and
to the court of appeals was whether there was substantial evidence to sup-
port the TEC's findings. 42 1
In Elena E. Francisco, Inc. v. Texas Employment Commission422 the court
affirmed the TEC's decision granting unemployment compensation benefits
to Manuel Diaz, a supervisor who was discharged for allegedly lying to his
employer about his marijuana usage. In the case before the TEC, Diaz testi-
fied that he was not a marijuana user and did not smoke anything during a
particular work day. The employer offered statements that several employ-
ees smelled marijuana smoke and observed a marijuana cigarette on the
ground. No physical evidence of marijuana was found on Diaz. The only
evidence contrary to Diaz's denial of smoking marijuana were the unsworn
written statements of other employees. The court held that there was sub-
stantial evidence to support the TEC's decision. 423
In Texas Employment Commission v. Torres4 24 the TEC denied Luis
Torres unemployment benefits because it found that he was disqualified from
benefits due to his discharge for misconduct. 425 Torres was discharged for
making three pricing errors within a short period of time. The TEC argued
417. Id. at 771.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Arrellano, 810 S.W.2d at 771.
421. Id. at 772. Where there is substantial evidence which will support either an affirma-
tive finding or at the same time a negative finding, the reviewing court must uphold the TEC's
decision, even if the TEC reached a decision contrary to that which the court might have
reached. Id. at 771 (citing Cusson v. Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n, 524
S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ)).
422. 803 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
423. Id. at 886.
424. 804 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ).
425. Misconduct is defined as:
[M]ismanagement of a position of employment by action or inaction, neglect
that places in jeopardy the lives or property of others, intentional wrongdoing or
malfeasance, intentional violation of law, or violation of a policy or rule adopted
to ensure orderly work and the safety of employees, but does not include an act
of misconduct that is in response to an unconscionable act of an employer or
superior."
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-17(q) (Vernon 1987).
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that Torres' conduct was misconduct and was "neglect that places in jeop-
ardy the lives or property of others. '426 Torres argued that he was unable to
perform to the employer's standards and that the neglect constituting mis-
conduct under the statute must be intentional. The TEC did not claim that
Torres' neglect was intentional. The court of appeals agreed with the trial
court's conclusion that the TEC applied an improper standard to the "ne-
glect" argument.427 The court stated
[W]hen the reason for the discharge is neglect that endangers property
of the employer, the neglect must be intentional or must show such
carelessness that it indicates the disregard for the consequences. Mere
failure to perform the task to the satisfaction of the employer, without
more, does not constitute misconduct which disqualifies the employee
from benefits. 428
In Brown v. Texas Employment Commission 429 the TEC sent Marvinell
Brown two determination letters. One letter stated that Brown was eligible
to receive benefits, and the second letter, dated the same date, stated that
Brown was disqualified from receiving benefits because she voluntarily left
her employment for reasons not constituting good cause. Brown did not file
an administrative appeal until several weeks after the fourteen day deadline.
Because her filing was late, the TEC dismissed her appeal for want of juris-
diction. Thereafter, Brown missed her deadline to file a lawsuit in state dis-
trict court after the TEC's final determination. Further, Brown did not join
the employer as a defendant, an indispensable party, in the lawsuit until sev-
eral months later. Reiterating that appeals from orders of the TEC are gov-
erned by the substantial evidence rule, the court held that Brown failed to
demonstrate that the TEC's decision was not reasonably supported by sub-
stantial evidence, that is, Brown must have demonstrated to the trial court
that the TEC's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, and was
made without regard to the facts or law.4 30
C. Texas Constitutional Claims
If a private employer has sufficient connection to the public sector, there is
a possibility that the employer may be sued by his former employee for viola-
tions of the employee's state or federal constitutional rights. To establish
liability of a private employer for violating a constitutional right, a plaintiff
must allege that the employer was so substantially involved with state and
federal activity that its actions should be treated as those of a public entity
for the purposes of a constitutional claim.43'
426. Torres, 804 S.W.2d at 214.
427. Id. at 215.
428. Id. at 215-16. The court relied on Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. 1986), in
which the supreme court held that neglect constituting mismanagement requires intent or a
degree of carelessness that shows disregard for the consequences. See Torres, 804 S.W.2d at
215.
429. 801 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
430. Id. at 7.
431. See Jones v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 746 S.W.2d 891, 895 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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In Jones v. Memorial Hospital System 1432 a nurse sued her former em-
ployer, the hospital, for violating her First Amendment right to freedom of
speech under the Texas Constitution.4 33 Jones was discharged for expres-
sing her viewpoint and feelings in a local Houston publication that as a nurse
she was caught between the doctor who gave the orders to prolong life and a
patient whose desire to die with dignity was being ignored. The hospital
moved for summary judgment on the basis that it was not a public entity,
thereby precluding the nurse from first amendment protection under the
state action doctrine. The trial court434 granted summary judgment to the
hospital. The court of appeals reversed, and held that the hospital failed to
conclusively establish as a matter of law that it was not a public entity within
the state action doctrine. 435 On remand, the trial court436 again granted
summary judgment to the hospital on the basis that as a matter of law the
hospital was not a public entity for state action purposes. On the second
appeal, in Jones v. Memorial Hospital System II,437 the court of appeals re-
visited the same issue. The court of appeals again reversed, and held that the
hospital had failed to carry its burden in conclusively negating as a matter of
law that it was so involved in state and federal activity that its actions should
be treated as those of a public entity for the purpose of enforcing the state
constitutional right of free speech against the hospital.438
In Casas v. Wornick Co. 439 the plaintiff claimed that her former employer
violated the Equal Rights Amendment of the Texas Constitution 44° in her
wrongful termination. The trial court granted the employer's motion for
summary judgment on the basis that it was a private company and, there-
fore, not subject to the Equal Rights Amendment to the Texas Constitution.
On appeal, the court of appeals observed that violations of the Texas Consti-
tution do not apply to purely private conduct. 44 Stating the test differently
432. 677 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
433. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8.
434. Interestingly, the trial judge was the Honorable Thomas R. Phillips, now Chief Justice
of the Texas supreme court.
435. Id. at 226.
436. The trial judge was again then-trial Judge Thomas R. Phillips.
437. 746 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1988, no writ).
438. Id. at 896. The court held that whether the hospital functioned as a public entity
involved a mixed question of fact and law and a consideration of a laundry list of 11 factors.
Id. at 894-95 (citing Annotation, Action of Private Hospital as State Action Under 42 USCA
§ 1983 or Fourteenth Amendment, 42 A.L.R. FED. 463, 472-533 (1979)).
439. 818 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ requested).
440. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a.
441. 818 S.W.2d at 471 (citing Cedillo v. Ewlin Enters., Inc., 744 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1987), writ deniedper curium, 756 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. 1988)). See also In
re Unnamed Baby McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Tex. 1987); Lincoln v. Mid-Cities Pee Wee
Football Ass'n, 576 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ); Junior
Football Ass'n v. Gaudet, 546 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ). In
Cedillo, the employees argued that the Equal Rights Amendment prohibits sexual discrimina-
tion by a private employer. Cedillo, 744 S.W.2d at 218. The court of appeals held that it did
not. Id. at 219. The employees filed an application for a writ of error challenging the court's
decision. 756 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. 1988). The Texas supreme court originally granted the writ of
error on the issue of whether the Equal Rights Amendment prohibits private acts of sexual
discrimination. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 601 (July 13, 1988). Later, the supreme court withdrew its
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from Jones v. Memorial Hospital System II, the court observed that the
words "under the law" in the Equal Rights Amendment 44 2 require that the
constitutional violation be the result of "state action or private conduct that
is encouraged by, enabled by, or closely interrelated in function with state
action."44 3 Because the employer presented summary judgment evidence
that it was a private corporation, and the plaintiff presented no controverting
summary judgment evidence, the court of appeals affirmed.
III. COVENANTS NOT To COMPETE
Generally, an agreement not to compete is a restraint of trade and is unen-
forceable because it violates public policy.444 The Texas Constitution de-
clares that monopolies created by the state or a political subdivision are not
permitted because they are contrary to the "genius of a free government." 44 5
In 1889, the Texas legislature enacted its first antitrust law, and it remained
almost unchanged until the passage of the Texas Free Enterprise and Anti-
trust Act of 1983. 44 6 Generally, this legislation prohibits contracts, combi-
nations or conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade or commerce.447
Historically, Texas courts have closely scrutinized private sector contracts
which restrain trade.
44 8
A. The Texas Supreme Court's Decisions
In the recent decision of Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass,44 9 the Texas
supreme court expanded the applicability of the common law reasonableness
standards governing covenants not to compete beyond the employer-em-
ployee relationship and applied the standards to a damage provision in a
partnership agreement. 450 Lawrence Haass was a partner with a local San
order granting the application for a writ of error and denied the writ. 756 S.W.2d 724 (Tex.
1988).
442. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a provides that "[e]quality under the law shall not be abridged
because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin. This amendment is self-operative."
443. Casas, 818 S.W.2d at 467,
444. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 681 (citing Frankiewicz v. National Computor Assocs., 633
S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. 1982); Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340
S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960); RESTATATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 (1981)).
445. TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 26.
446. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-15.51 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1991).
447. The supreme court noted in DeSantis that while a noncompetition agreement is a
restraint on trade, only those contracts that unreasonably restrain trade violate the Texas Free
Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 687.
448. See, e.g., Peat Marwick, 818 S.W.2d at 385-86; Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24
S.W. 397 (1893); Laadd v. Southern Cotton Press & Mfg. Co., 53 Tex. 172 (1880).
449. 818 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. 1991).
450. The court analyzed the provisions under the common law standards of reasonable-
ness, referring to the Covenants Not to Compete Act (CNCA) only as it pertained to the
defendant's request that the covenant be reformed. Id. at 790. Although the CNCA became
effective on August 28, 1989, and states that it "applies to a covenant entered into before, on,
or after the effective date," the Texas supreme court curiously has avoided directly addressing
the statutory requirements in each of the four cases involving noncompetition agreements that
it has decided since the passage of the Act. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon
Supp. 1991). In Peat Marwick, the promisee argued that under the CNCA, the court should
reform the unreasonable damage provisions and then enforce the agreement. The court quoted
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Antonio accounting firm, Chorpening Jungman & Co. After merger discus-
sions with Main Hurdman, an international accounting firm, Haass' firm
agreed to merge with the local office of Main Hurdman. The merger agree-
ment included a client acquisition cost provision.45' Under the agreement, if
Haass withdrew from Main Hurdman and took clients that Main Hurdman
had acquired in the merger, Haass would pay the out of pocket expenses
incurred by Main Hurdman in acquiring the client base that Haass took with
him upon withdrawal. After joining Main Hurdman, Haass subsequently
left and established his own accounting firm. Haass took a substantial por-
tion of the client base that Main Hurdman acquired in the merger with
Chorpening Jungman. Haass refused to reimburse Main Hurdman for its
out of pocket expenses which Main Hurdman incurred as a result of acquir-
ing that portion of the client base that Haass took with him.
Acknowledging that the acquisition cost provision 452 did not constitute a
noncompetition agreement, 45 3 the supreme court held that the common law
reasonableness tests applied to noncompetition agreements should be applied
to the agreement between Haass and Main Hurdman.45 4 Applying the rea-
sonableness standards applicable to noncompetition agreements, 455 the court
the statutory language regarding the CNCA's applicability and held that even if the CNCA
was given "the sweeping retroactive effect" sought by the promisee, the reformation argument
failed. Peat Marwick, 818 W.W.2d at 388. The court reasoned that the statutory language
limited the relief for breach of a covenant before its reformation to injunctive relief. Id.
451. The relevant provision of the agreement provides:
Termination Other Than by Retirement - Patient to Firm
(1) Any partner or principal who terminates or is involuntarily terminated, and
in either situation is not entitled to any retirement benefits, and who, during
the period of twenty-four months thereafter, solicits or furnishes accounting
or related services to Firm clients shall compensate the Firm as hereinafter
provided. Firm clients shall include any party who was a client of the Firm
as of the termination date or became such a client during the twenty-four
(24)-month period thereafter, or any other party in which such clients are a
principal party in interest. The foregoing includes services provided directly
or indirectly, as an individual, partnership or corporation, engaged in the
business of public accounting or any kind of character.
(2) In the event that any of the aforesaid clients are served, directly or indirectly
as aforesaid, by such a terminated partner or principal (jointly and severally
hereinafter referred to as "terminee"), such terminee shall be liable as
follows:
(a) For payment in full of all fees and expenses, billed or unbilled, due to
the Firm from such clients as of the date the Firm learns that the client will
be served by the terminee or from the date such client notifies the Firm that
it will be served by the terminee.
(b) For reimbursement to the Firm for all direct costs (out-of-pocket ex-
pense), paid or to be paid by the Firm in connection with the acquisition of
such client including, without limitation, retirement benefit obligations of
any predecessor firm.
Peat Marwick, 818 S.W.2d at 383 n.3. Only section 2(b) was in dispute. Id. at 384. The
parties did not have any dispute as to section 2(a). Id. at n.6.




455. To be reasonable, the supreme court stated that a noncompetition agreement must
satisfy three conditions.
First, it must ancillary to an otherwise valid contract, transaction or relation-
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held that the agreement satisfied the first test. Haass' participation in the
merger agreement was supported by consideration in that he received a part-
nership interest in Main Hurdman and a twenty-month guaranteed in-
come. 45 6 The acquisition cost provision was therefore ancillary to an
otherwise valid merger agreement.457 However, the court found that the
provision failed the second and third tests because the definition of "firm
clients" in the cost acquisition provision applied to clients who first became
clients after Haass left Main Hurdman or with whom Haass had no contact
while he was at the prior firm.4 58 The dissent correctly pointed out that
Main Hurdman did not seek its out-of-pocket client acquisition costs for
clients who came and left Main Hurdman to go with Haass in the two years
after Haass withdrew from Main Hurdman.459 Thus, as the dissent noted,
by refusing to enforce the client acquisition cost provision, Main Hurdman
paid for the privilege of merging with Haass' previous firm, but was denied
the benefits to which it was entitled under its bargain. 46°
In Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc.461 the Texas supreme court
made it clear that an employment-at-will relationship, although valid, does
not constitute an otherwise enforceable agreement which will support a cov-
enant not to compete.462 In Travel Masters the employee executed a cove-
nant not to compete at the inception of her at-will employment. Because the
employment-at-will relationship was not binding on the employer or em-
ployee, the court held the covenant not to compete unenforceable because it
was not ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement.463 Previously, in
Martin v. Great Protection Association, Inc. the court held that a covenant
not to compete executed three years after the inception of an at-will employ-
ment relationship is unenforceable because it is not ancillary to an otherwise
enforceable agreement.464 Taking these cases together, it is clear that a cov-
enant not to compete that is executed at the inception of, or during, an at-
will relationship is unenforceable as a matter of law,465 and must be sup-
ship. DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 681-82 (Tex. 1990); Justin
Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 683-84 (Tex. 1973). Second, the restraint
created must not be greater than necessary to protect the promisee's legitimate
interests such as business goodwill, trade secrets, or other confidential or propri-
etary information. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 682; Henshaw, 656 S.W.2d at 418;
Frankiewicz, 633 S.W.2d at 507; Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161
Tex. 310, 312-13, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960). Third, the promisee's need for
the protection given by the agreement must not be outweighed by either the
hardship to the promisor or any injury likely to the public. DeSantis, 793
S.W.2d 682; Henshaw, 656 S.W.2d at 418; Weatherford Oil Tool, 161 Tex. at
312, 340 S.W.2d at 951.
Id. at 386.
456. Peat Marwick, 818 S.W.2d at 386.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 386-88.
459. Id. at 391 (Cornyn, J., dissenting, joined by Gonzalez, J.).
460. Id.
461. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 254 (Dec. 18, 1991).
462. Id. at 255.
463. Id.
464. 793 S.W.2d 667, 669-70 (Tex. 1990).
465. Travel Masters, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 255. In Daytona Group of Tex., Inc. v. Smith,
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ported by independent consideration. 466 A noncompetition agreement that
is executed contemporaneously with an employment contract or contract for
the sale of a business should meet the independent consideration require-
ment. Also, the court noted in Martin that special training or knowledge
acquired by the employee during employment may constitute sufficient in-
dependent valuable consideration to support a noncompetition agreement. 467
Prior to Peat Marwick and Travel Masters, in 1990, the Texas supreme
court handed down decisions in three important covenant not to compete
cases, Martin v. Credit Protection Association, Inc.,468 Juliette Fowler Homes,
Inc. v. Welch Associates, Inc.,469 and DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.,470 and
denied an application for writ of error in a fourth case, Bland v. Henry &
Peters, P.C471 The court decided the cases under the common law even
though the Covenants Not to Compete Act 472 (CNCA), a newly enacted
statute, specifically provided that it applied to covenants entered into before,
on, or after the effective date of the legislation, August 28, 1989.473 While
the supreme court did not address the CNCA, the court noted that the result
in Martin, Juliette Fowler Homes, and DeSantis would have been the same
under the CNCA as under the common law.474 Although the court indi-
800 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ), the Corpus Christi court of appeals
noted the similarities in the requirements under common law and under the CNCA for a
covenant not to compete to be enforceable. The court then focused its discussion on whether
the agreement was supported by consideration and whether it was necessary to protect a legiti-
mate business interest. The court noted that the agreement not to compete was ancillary to an
at-will employment relationship. Relying on Martin and the CNCA, the court found that the
agreement was not enforceable under either § 15.50 or common law because it was not ancil-
lary to an otherwise enforceable agreement. 800 S.W.2d at 289.
466. Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 670. In Recon Exploration, Inc. v. Hodges, 798 S.W.2d 848,
850 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) one employee had already begun working when he
signed a secrecy and noncompetition agreement. A second employee was required to sign the
agreement as a condition of full-time employment. The court held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding the agreements unenforceable because the promisee had not
given adequate independent consideration to support the agreements. Id. at 853. See also
Property Tax Assocs., Inc. v. Staffeldt, 800 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ de-
nied) (noncompetition agreement executed as part of employment contract needs no independ-
ent consideration); Webb v. Hartman Newspapers, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) (no independent consideration needed where covenant part of em-
ployment contract).
467. Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 670. The supreme court specifically disapproved of the holding
in Bland v. Henry & Peters P.C., 763 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, writ denied), that
the only consideration that can support a covenant not to compete is special training or knowl-
edge. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 681 n.6. The court stated that a noncompetition agreement
must be supported by consideration, but the consideration is not limited to special training or
knowledge. Id.
468. 793 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990).
469. 793 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. 1990).
470. 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 755 (1991).
471. 763 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, writ denied).
472. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
473. Id. The Fourteenth court of appeals applied CNCA to a noncompetition agreement
that was entered into before the effective date of the statute in Webb v. Hartman Newspapers,
Inc., 793 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ). Because the cause of
action arose after the effective date of the statute, the court rejected the promisor's argument
that the trial court improperly applied the statute retroactively. Id. at 304.
474. See Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 669 n.l; Juliette Fowler Homes, 793 S.W.2d at 663-64 n.6;
DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 684-85. In Peat Marwick, the court noted that the results in Hill v.
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cated that the result would be the same, the court chose to "leave for another
day" the issues of the applicability of CNCA to all noncompetition agree-
ments and whether the common law principles set out in the three cases
would control in the application of the CNCA.4 75 The similarity between
the statutory and common law requirements suggests that the framework of
the DeSantis, Martin, Juliette Fowler Homes, and Peat Marwick decisions
will extend to applications of the CNCA.
B. Analyzing the Enforceability of the Agreement
The decision in DeSantis contains the supreme court's most thorough and
comprehensive discussion of noncompetition agreements. DeSantis provides
that under common law a noncompetition agreement is unenforceable unless
it meets each of the following three criteria: (1) the agreement must be ancil-
lary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship;476 (2) the restraint
created by the agreement must not be greater than that necessary to protect
the promisee's legitimate interest;477 and (3) the promisee's need for the pro-
tection afforded by the agreement must not be outweighed by either the
hardship to the promisor or any injury likely to the public. 478 A noncompe-
tition agreement that fails to meet all three requirements is unenforceable. 479
Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987), would have been the same under the
pre-Hill common law analysis. Peat Marwick, 818 S.W.2d at 388 n.10 (citing DeSantis, 793
S.W.2d at 683).
475. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 685. The purpose of the Covenants Not to Compete Act was
to overrule Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987) and return to the
supreme court's common law principles developed over the 27 years prior to the supreme
court's Hill decision. Peat Marwick, 818 S.W.2d at 388. For a thorough discussion of the
legislative intent in enacting the CNCA, see Pfeiffer & Hall, supra note 275, at 133-36.
476. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 687 (citing Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 683-84
(Tex. 1973); Potomac Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 18 S.W.2d 929, 934-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1929, writ ref'd); RESTATATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 187 (1981)).
477. Id. at 682 (citing Henshaw v. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. 1983); Weather-
ford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960); RESTATATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(l)(a) (1981)).
478. Id. (citing RESTATATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(l)(b) (1981)).
479. Id. at 681. Under the CNCA, a covenant not to compete is enforceable to the extent
that it:
(1) is ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement but, if the covenant not to
compete is executed on a date other than the date on which the underlying
agreement is executed, such covenant must be supported by independent valua-
ble consideration; and (2) contains reasonable limitations as to time, geographi-
cal area, and scope of activity to be restrained that do not impose a greater
restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of
the promisee.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(1) & (2) (Vernon Supp. 1992). The "ancillary to"
requirement in § 15.50(1) is consistent with the supreme court's decision in Justin Belt Co. v.
Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1973), holding that "contracts which are in reasonable restraint of
trade must be ancillary to and in support of another contract." Id. at 683. The rationale for
the reasonableness test in § 15.50(2) was first set forth in Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Camp-
bell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950 (1960):
Where the public interest is not directly involved, the test usually stated for
determining the validity of the covenant as written is whether it imposes upon
the employee any greater restraint than is reasonably necessary to protect the
business and good will of the employer .... The period of time during which the
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1. Burden of Proof
The burden of proving reasonableness of a covenant not to compete de-
pends upon the nature of the agreement to which the covenant is ancil-
lary.4 80  In personal service contracts (e.g., employment contracts), the
promisee (employer) must prove the reasonableness of the covenant.48' By
contrast, in contracts not involving personal services, such as contracts for
the sale of a business, partnership agreements, and leases, the promisor must
prove that the covenant is unreasonable.482
2. Adequate Consideration
Like any contract, a noncompetition agreement must be supported by ade-
quate consideration to be enforceable. This requirement is satisfied if the
covenant is ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement that is executed
at the same time as the underlying agreement. 48 3 The agreement, however,
must be something more than an employment-at-will relationship. 484 Case
law provides little guidance on what satisfies the requirement for adequate
consideration. General contract law suggests that the consideration must be
something more than a nominal amount, i.e., the consideration must approx-
restraint is to last and the territory that is included are important factors to be
considered in determining the reasonableness of the agreement.
161 Tex. at 312-13, 340 S.W.2d at 951.
Under the supreme court's earlier decision in Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d
168 (Tex. 1987), the court held that a covenant not to compete must meet four broad require-
ments to represent a reasonable covenant: (1) the covenant must be necessary for the protec-
tion of the employer, i.e., the employer must have a legitimate interest in protecting business
goodwill or trade secrets; (2) the covenant must not be oppressive to the employee, i.e., limita-
tions as to time, territory, and activity must be reasonable; (3) the covenant must not be injuri-
ous to the public by preventing competition or by depriving the community of needed goods;
and (4) the employer must give consideration for something of value, i.e., the employer must
impart special training or knowledge to the employee. Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 170-71. The court
also determined that a covenant is unenforceable if it limits competition or restrains the right
to engage in a common calling. Id. at 172.
480. Section 15.51(b) of the CNCA provides:
(b) If the primary purpose of the agreement to which the covenant is ancillary is
to obligate the promisor to render personal services, the promisee has the
burden of establishing that the covenant meets the criteria specified by Sub-
division (2) of Section 15.50 of this code. If the agreement has a different
primary purpose, the promisor has the burden of establishing that the cove-
nant does not meet those critiria. For the purposes of this subsection, the
"burden of establishing" a fact means the burden of persuading the triers of
fact that the existence of the fact is more probable than its nonexistence.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
481. Id.; see also Daytona Group of Texas, Inc. v. Smith, 800 S.W.2d 285, 290 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi, writ denied).
482. § 15.51(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
483. In W.C. Larock, D.C., P.C. v. Enabnit, 812 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no
writ) a chiropractor signed an "Independent Contractor Agreement" that included a noncom-
petition provision. The term of the contract was indefinite and the contract was terminable by
either party. The court found that although the contract purported to be for independent
chiropractic services, the promisor actually worked in the status of an employee. The court
concluded that the contract was not enforceable because there was no meeting of the minds to
enable the formation of a valid contract. Id. at 671. Because the noncompetition agreement
was not ancillary to an otherwise valid contract, the agreement was held unenforceable. Id.
484. Travel Masters, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 255; Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 669-70.
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imate the value of what the employee gives up under the noncompetition
agreement. This could be structured as a monthly payment while employed
or severance pay when terminated. The safest route for assuring enforceabil-
ity is to make the agreement ancillary to an enforceable employment con-
tract under which the employer sacrifices the at-will relationship for the
noncompetition agreement. However, other employment related compensa-
tion, for example, severance pay or eligibility for profit sharing or bonus plan
participation, could serve as the independent consideration with the at-will
relationship retained.
3. The Restraint May Be No Greater Than Necessary to Protect a
Legitimate Interest
Because a covenant not to compete is a restraint of trade, the promisee
must establish that the covenant is necessary to protect a legitimate interest
such as business goodwill, trade secrets,4 85 or other confidential and proprie-
tary information. 486 In DeSantis the supreme court addressed the question
of what constitutes a legitimate, protectable interest.
In DeSantis Wackenhut hired DeSantis to manage its Houston office. At
the beginning of his employment, DeSantis signed a noncompetition agree-
ment. DeSantis worked for Wackenhut for about three years until Wacken-
hut terminated his employment. Within a month of his termination,
DeSantis formed a competing business and began contacting businesses
about his services, including ten to fifteen clients of Wackenhut. Within six
months, one of Wackenhut's customers terminated its contract with Wack-
enhut and signed a contract with DeSantis' company. A second customer
was considering doing the same when Wackenhut filed suit against DeSantis
and his company seeking an injunction to enforce the noncompetition agree-
485. Trade secrets are legitimate interests that may be protected by a noncompetition
agreement. Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 670 n.3. Customer lists and pricing information are exam-
ples of trade secrets. Murrco Agency, Inc. v. Ryan, 800 S.W.2d 600, 604-05 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1990, no writ). Secrecy is key to establishing the existence of a trade secret. The infor-
mation may not be readily available or generally known. Gonzales v. Zamora, 791 S.W.2d
258, 264 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (suit involving not a noncompetition
agreement, but rather breach of confidential relationship and unfair competition). "However,
when money and time are invested in the development of a procedure or device which is based
on an idea which is not new to a particular industry, and when that certain procedure or device
is not generally known, trade secret protection will exist." Id. (emphasis added). In Gonzales
the court placed importance on the efforts made by the employer to keep the information at
issue from competitors. Id. at 265. Thus, if the information provides a competitive advantage
to its user, it may be a trade secret. Murrco Agency, 800 S.W.2d at 605 n.7. Where the proce-
dures and equipment used in a business are well known within an industry, the training and
knowledge gained by an employee about the procedures are unlikely to be considered protect-
able interests. Recon Exploration, 798 S.W.2d at 852 (geophysical exploration procedures
known in the trade).
486. See Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 670 n.3. In Tom James Co. v. Mendrop, 819 S.W.2d 251
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ), the court denied Tom James' appeal from the denial
of a temporary injunction to enforce a noncompetition agreement. The court held that while
special training or knowledge acquired by an employee during employment may constitute a
legitimate interest deserving of protection, it could not conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the injunction. Id. at 253. The court also noted that the issue of validity
of the noncompetition agreement would be determined at a trial on the merits. Id. at 254.
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ment. After a trial on the merits, the trial court enjoined DeSantis from
disclosing Wackenhut's client list and proprietary information, and enjoined
his company from using any of Wackenhut's proprietary information. 4 7
The supreme court found that the covenant not to compete was not neces-
sary to protect any legitimate business interest of Wackenhut and that the
hardship on DeSantis outweighed any necessity for the covenant; therefore,
the covenant was not reasonable and not enforceable. 48 8 The supreme court
rejected Wackenhut's claim that the covenant protected its business goodwill
that DeSantis developed during his employment.4 9 The court noted that
there was only slight evidence that DeSantis had developed any goodwill on
behalf of Wackenhut and that there was no showing that he had diverted
any of that goodwill to his own benefit. 490 Significantly, evidence that he
was competing with Wackenhut was not enough to establish an interest re-
quiring protection. 491 Wackenhut had to prove that the covenant was neces-
sary to prevent DeSantis from trading on Wackenhut's goodwill.492
The court also rejected Wackenhut's claim that the covenant was neces-
sary to protect its confidential information.493 Wackenhut pointed out that
through his employment, DeSantis learned the identity of Wackenhut's cus-
tomers, their special needs and requirements, Wackenhut's pricing policies,
487. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 676.
488. Id. at 684. The Daytona Group court noted that the former employer in that case
failed to prove that the agreement was necessary to protect legitimate interests because there
was no showing that the former employee solicited business from any of the former employer's
customers, that she diverted any sales, or that she received any special training or trade secrets.
The former employer did not show any injury or risk of harm, so it failed to meet its burden of
proof under either the common law or the CNCA. Daytona Group, 800 S.W.2d at 289.
In Hunke v. Wilcox, 815 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ requested) a
pediatric dentist signed a promise not to compete with his employer in pediatric dentistry for
three years after his employment ended. The promisee claimed he had introduced the prom-
isor to several professionals in the area who were regular sources of patient referrals. The
promisee sought not to protect his relationships with his current patients but to protect his
access to the referral sources of new patients. The court concluded that sources of professional
referrals were an illegitimate business interest not protectable by a covenant not to compete.
The court reasoned that restrictions on the cultivation of professional relationships would un-
reasonably restrain trade and encourage small exclusive groups of professionals to exclude
outsiders from practicing in an area. Id. at 858
In Isuani v. Manske-Sheffield Radiology Group, P.A., 798 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1990), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 802 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1991), on remand, 805
S.W.2d 602 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied), the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's permanent injunction against a radiologist upon his withdrawal from a professional
corporation of radiologists to enjoin him from practicing within a 15 mile radius of a particular
hospital for a period of one year. Without discussing any of the elements of § 15.50 of the
CNCA or the common law elements, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in granting the permanent injunction. 805 S.W.2d at 607-08. Interestingly, the
court found the high income of each of the radiologists demonstrated significant business inter-
ests. Id. at 604. It is very doubtful that high income constitutes a legitimate business interest
under the common law or the CNCA. The dissent argued that the professional corporation
failed to prove the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Id. at 608-09 (Burgess, J., dissent-
ing). The dissent observed that the lost income could have been calculated. Id.
489. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 684.
490. Id. at 683-84.
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 684.
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its cost factors, and its bidding strategies. While the court noted that confi-
dential information may be protected by a covenant not to compete, Wack-
enhut made no showing that a covenant was necessary to protect its
customer information.494 The court specifically indicated no showing was
made that Wackenhut's customers could not be readily identified by some-
one outside its employ, that the information carried some competitive ad-
vantage, or that a customer's needs could not be identified by simply
contacting the customer.495 The court also noted that Wackenhut failed to
show that its pricing policies and bidding strategies were uniquely devel-
oped, that the information could not be obtained from the customers them-
selves, or that DeSantis took advantage of Wackenhut's cost factors in trying
to outbid Wackenhut. 496 Based upon these findings, the court held the cove-
nant unenforceable. 49 7
Any agreement not to compete may include only reasonable limitations on
time, geographical area, and scope of activity restrained.498 The limitations
must not be greater than necessary to protect the legitimate interest of the
promisee.499 In Juliette Fowler Homes the court found that the noncompeti-
tion clause at issue was unenforceable because it did not contain any limita-




497. Id. The holding in DeSantis may be the result of a failure of proof. The opinion
suggests the court might have reached a different conclusion if Wackenhut had established
four additional items: (1) it dealt with its customer information in a confidential way; (2) its
customers considered their security needs to be confidential; (3) its pricing policies and bid-
ding strategies were unique; and (4) the use of such information gave its former employee an
unfair competitive advantage.
498. Juliette Fowler Homes, 793 S.W.2d at 663; see TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 15.50(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (agreement must contain reasonable limitations as to time,
geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained). In Property Tax Assocs., Inc. v.
Staffeldt, 800 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ) the plaintiff executed a noncom-
petition agreement that prevented him from competing with his employer in El Paso, Bexar
and Dallas counties for a period of two years after his termination of employment. On appeal,
the court reformed the noncompetition clause to apply to El Paso county only and affirmed the
two-year restriction. Id. at 350-51. In Webb v. Hartman Newspapers, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 302
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) the noncompetition agreement prevented the
plaintiff from engaging in the publishing business within a 50-mile radius of any Hartman
newspaper for three years after his termination of employment. Hartman owned newspapers
in Texas and Oklahoma; however, the plaintiff only worked in Fort Bend County, Texas.
Hartman fired the plaintiff, who began competing against Hartman in Fort Bend County. The
court of appeals modified the covenant to apply to the geographical area of the newspaper
distributed in Fort Bend County, a 10-mile radius, and affirmed it in all other respects. Id. at
304-05. In Sheline v. Dun & Bradstreet, 948 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1991) the plaintiff signed a
resignation and release that included a noncompetition agreement. In return for resigning,
releasing all claims against his employer, and promising not to compete for one year with any
business of the defendant, the plaintiff was to receive 21 weeks salary. Id. The court found the
noncompetition agreement unenforceable as a matter of law because it lacked a geographic
limitation and thus was broader than necessary to protect the defendant's interests. Id. at 177-
78.




4. Balancing the Hardship on the Promisor and the Public Against the
Promisee's Need for Protection
The final consideration in determining whether a noncompetition agree-
ment is a reasonable restraint of trade is the degree of hardship the restraint
causes the promisor and the degree of injury it causes to the public.50' The
DeSantis court indicated the nature of the promisor's job might be a factor in
determining reasonableness, but that it should not be the primary focus. 50 2
Significantly, the supreme court in DeSantis observed that the legislature re-
jected the common calling test of Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc.,503 which
provided that a covenant that limits or restrains one's right to engage in a
common calling was unenforceable as a matter of law.5°4 As the court cor-
rectly observed, if employment can be defined as a "common calling,"505
then it is doubtful that a noncompetition agreement will withstand scrutiny
under the CNCA. 506 Although the nature of the employee's job may relate
to the issue of reasonableness, it is not the focus of the inquiry.50 7
While many cases decided after the effective date of the CNCA do not
address the effect of the CNCA on noncompetition agreements, it is appar-
ent from several supreme court decisions that the common law principles
that existed prior to Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc. are generally equivalent
to the criteria set forth in the CNCA.508 Although the supreme court ac-
knowledged in Peat Marwick that the purpose of the CNCA was to return
Texas law to the pre-Hill common law principles, ° the court failed to rec-
ognize that the legislature's intent by enacting the CNCA was to reverse the
supreme court's presumption that the public policy of the state was against
the enforcement of noncompetition agreements by enacting a statute
designed to enforce such agreements.510 Notwithstanding the fact that the
public policy as expressed by the legislature is clear, the supreme court's
decisions in Travel Masters, DeSantis, Martin, Juliette Fowler Homes, and its
501. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 683.
502. Id.
503. 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987).
504. Id. at 172.
505. The court recognized that the term "common calling" escapes a clear definition and
correctly abandoned it as a test for determining the enforceablity of noncompetition agree-
ments. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 682-83; see Webb v. Hartman Newspapers, Inc., 793 S.W.2d
302, 304 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) (§ 15.50 of CNCA effectively abol-
ishes common calling defense to noncompetition agreement). In Hill Justice Gonzalez criti-
cized the court for adopting the common calling requirement without adopting a definition for
the term. Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 177 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting, joined by Hill, C.J., & Campbell,
J.). For a thorough discussion of the "common calling" test, see Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wen-
dell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 43 Sw. L.J. 81, 104-05
(1989).
506. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 682-83.
507. Id. at 683.
508. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 685 (result would be the same under the CNCA or com-
mon law principles); Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 669 n.1 (same result under CNCA or common
law); Juliette Fowler Homes; 793 S.W.2d at 663-64 n.6 (same result under CNCA or common
law). See also Peat Marwick, 818 S.W.2d at 388 n.10.
509. Id. at 388.
510. For an analysis of the legislative intent in enacting the Covenants Not to Compete
Act, see Pfeiffer & Hall, supra note 275, at 133-36.
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recent extension of the covenant not to compete analysis to a partnership
agreement in Peat Marwick, suggest that the court still finds noncompetition
agreements offensive.
C. Enforcing the Agreement
The common law prior to Hill clearly provided that when an employee
sued for damages, the noncompetition agreement had to stand or fall as writ-
ten and the court could not reform the agreement to make it reasonable. 511
If, however, an employer sued for injunctive relief, the court had the power
to modify and enforce the agreement.5 12 In enacting the CNCA, the legisla-
ture modified the common law. 513 Section 15.51(c) of the CNCA allows a
court to reform a noncompetition agreement if its limitations as to time,
geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained impose a greater
restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest
of the promisee (e.g., employer).5 14 Section 15.51(c), however, requires that
the promisee (employer) affirmatively request that the trial court reform the
agreement.515 If it is unreasonable as written, then the trial court is required
511. See Peat Marwick, 818 S.W.2d at 388; DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 682; Frankiewicz v.
National Comp Assocs., 633 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. 1982); Weatherford Oil Tool v. Campbell,
161 Tex. 310, 314, 340 S.W.2d 950, 952-53 (1960).
512. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 682; Weatherford Oil Tool, 161 Tex. at 314, 340 S.W.2d at
952-53.
513. See Peat Marwick, 818 S.W.2d at 388 (suggesting that the CNCA may have modified
the common law with respect to enforcement of noncompetition agreements). Section 15.51
provides in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (c) of this section, a court may award the
promisee under a covenant not to compete damages, injunctive relief, or both
damages and injunctive relief for a breach by the promisor of the covenant.
(c) If the covenant meets the criteria specified by Subdivision (1) of Section
15.50 of this code but does not meet the criteria specified by Subdivision (2) of
Section 15.50, the court, at the request of the promisee, shall reform the cove-
nant to the extent necessary to cause the covenant to meet the criteria specified
by Subdivision (2) of Section 15.50 and enforce the covenant as reformed, except
that the court may not award the promisee damages for a breach of the covenant
before its reformation and the relief granted to the promisee shall be limited to
injunctive relief. If the primary purpose of the agreement to which the covenant
is ancillary is to obligate the promisor to render personal services, the promisor
establishes that the promisee knew at the time of the execution of the agreement
that the covenant did not meet the criteria specified by Subdivision (2) of Section
15.50 and the promisee sought to enforce the covenant to a greater extent than
was necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee,
the court may award the promisor the costs, including reasonable attorney's
fees, actually and reasonably incurred by the promisor in defending the action to
enforce the covenant.
§ 15.51(a) & (c) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
514. Id. See Peat Marwick, 818 S.W.2d at 388. The absence of a geographical area renders
the covenant not to compete unenforceable. Sheline v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 948 F.2d 174,
176 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 682; Juliette Fowler Homes, 793 S.W.2d at
662; Alexandra Sowell, Comment, Covenants Not to Compete: A Review of the Governing Stan-
dards of Enforceability after DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp. and the Legislative Amendments to
the Texas Business and Commerce Code, 45 Sw. L.J. 1009 (1991)).
515. § 15.51(c); see Gomez v. Zamora, 814 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1991, no writ). The promissor may not seek reformation. Sheline, 948 F.2d at 178.
19921 1795
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
to reform it to make it reasonable.5 1 6 Upon reformation, if necessary, the
employer may be awarded damages and injunctive relief.5 7 If the agree-
ment is unreasonable, and the employer fails to request reformation, the trial
court may not award damages for breach of the agreement before its refor-
mation, it may only award injunctive relief.518 Even if the trial court holds
the agreement reasonable as written, the failure to request that the trial court
reform the agreement waives the right to seek reformation on appeal. 51 9 It is
therefore critical for a promisee (employer) to always request that the trial
court reform the agreement in the alternative to its request for damages and
injunctive relief. In the context of a personal service contract, if the prom-
isor (employee) proves that the promisee (employer) knew at the time of
entering into the noncompetition agreement that its limitations were unrea-
sonable under section 15.50(2), and the promisee seeks to enforce the agree-
ment to a greater extent than necessary to protect its goodwill or other
business interest, then the court may award attorney's fees and court costs to
the promisor if the promisor successfully defends the enforcement action. 520
Following the passage of the CNCA and the decisions in DeSantis, Mar-
tin, and Juliette Fowler Homes, Texas courts of appeals have attempted to
determine the enforceability of covenants not to compete based on either the
statutory requirements or both the statutory and common law require-
ments. 521 Generally, where the covenant was executed on the same date as,
and as part of, a written contract of employment, the covenant has been
found ancillary to an enforceable agreement 522 and reformed if the restric-
tions were unreasonable.5 23 A review of recent decisions suggests that em-
516. § 15.51(c); see Gomez v. Zamora, 814 S.W.2d at 118; W. C. Larock D.C., P.C. v.
Enabnit, 812 S.W.2d 670, 671 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ).
517. § 15.51(c).
518. Id.; see Peat Marwick, 818 S.W.2d at 388.
519. Gomez v. Zamora, 814 S.W.2d at 118; Daytona Group of Tex., Inc. v. Smith, 800
S.W.2d 285, 290 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
520. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.5 1(c).
521. Compare Gomez v. Zamora, 814 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991,
no writ) (unenforceable under statutory requirements) and Property Tax Assocs. v. Staffeldt,
800 S.W.2d 349, 350 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied) (enforced as modified under
statutory analysis) with Daytona Group of Tex., Inc. v. Smith, 800 S.W.2d 285, 288 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied) (discusses both statutory and common law require-
ments in holding covenant unenforceable) and Hunke v. Wilcox, 815 S.W.2d 855, 857 n.1
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ requested) (no need to determine whether statutory or
common law principles govern agreement since no protectable business interest under either
analysis). The similarities in the statutory and common law requirements suggest the same
result under either analysis. Daytona Group, 800 S.W.2d at 288 (CNCA requirements similar
to common law).
522. See Isuani v. Manske-Sheffield Radiology Group, P.A., 805 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied); Staffeldt, 800 S.W.2d at 350; Webb v. Hartman Newspa-
pers, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
523. See Webb, 793 S.W.2d at 305 (enforcing time restriction and modifying geographic
restriction and scope of activity); Staffeldt, 800 S.W.2d at 351 (limiting geographic area to
single county and upholding other restrictions); Isuani v. Manske-Sheffield Radiology Group,
P.A., 798 S.W.2d 346, 352 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990), rev'd per curiam, 802 S.W.2d 235
(Tex. 1991), on remand, 805 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied) (on appeal
from grant of temporary injunction court modified scope and upheld as reformed). Isuani was
reversed because the trial court's final judgment on the permanent injunction enforcing the
agreement rendered the appeal from the temporary injunction moot. Isuani, 802 S.W.2d at
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ployers have achieved some success in enforcing noncompetition agreements
in the courts of appeals.
IV. BEYOND NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS
In addition to actions based on a breach of contract theory arising from a
noncompetition agreement, employers may rely on various causes of action
to protect trade secrets against appropriation by former employees and dis-
closure to competitors.5 24 An employer may on the basis of unfair competi-
tion, which is based on fraud in which a party has suffered or will suffer
consequential harm. Two elements are necessary to obtain injunctive or
monetary relief - existence of a trade secret and its unconsented use or
disclosure. This cause of action is separate and apart from any breach of
contract for alleged violation of a noncompetition agreement. Additionally,
an employer may sue for breach of nondisclosure contract, if one exists, or
breach of confidential relationship.5 25 In Texas, a trade secret is defined as:
[A]ny formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a
formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating
or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list
of customers .... 526
Secrecy is key to establishing the existence of a trade secret. The informa-
tion may not be readily available or generally known.5 27 "However, when
money and time are invested in the development of a procedure or device
which is based on an idea which is not new to a particular industry, and
when that certain procedure or device is not generally known, trade secret
protection will exist."528 One court placed importance on the efforts made
by the employer to keep the information at issue from competitors.5 29 Thus,
235. The promisee must seek reformation in the trial court or the right to reformation will be
waived. Gomez v. Zamora, 814 S.W.2d at 118 (right to reformation waived because seeking
injunctive relief narrower in scope than covenant's limitations is not request for reformation);
Daytona, 800 S.W.2d at 290 (failure to request reformation at trial court waives the right). A
promisee seeking to enforce a noncompetition agreement should always request reformation in
the trial court as an alternative remedy to avoid waiving the right should an appellate court
find the covenant unreasonable.
524. See also P. Jerome Richey & Margaret J. Bosik, Trade Secrets and Restrictive Cove-
nants, 4 LAB. LAw 21 (1988).
525. Gonzales v. Zamora, 791 S.W.2d 258, 265 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ)
("Protection is available even in the absence of an express agreement not to disclose materials;
when a confidential relationship exists, the law will imply an agreement not to disclose trade
secrets.").
526. Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
898 (1958) (adopting definition in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939)). See
Murrco Agency, Inc. v. Ryan, 800 S.W.2d 600, 604-05 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ)
(customer lists and pricing information are trade secrets).
527. Gonzales v. Zamora, 791 S.W.2d at 264 (suit involving breach of confidential relation-
ship and unfair competition).
528. Id. (emphasis added); see Bryan v. Kershaw, 366 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 386 U.S. 959 (1967); Ventura Mfg. Co. v. Locke, 454 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1970, no writ).
529. Gonzales v. Zamora, 791 S.W.2d at 265.
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if the information provides a competitive advantage to its user, it may be a
trade secret. 530 Other factors considered by the courts include the existence
of a nondisclosure agreement and the nature and extent of security precau-
tions to prevent unauthorized disclosure or use of the information.53  On
the other hand, where the procedures and equipment used in a business are
well known within an industry or generally known and readily available, the
training and knowledge gained by an employee about the procedures are
unlikely to be considered protectable interests. 532 Additionally, former em-
ployees are free to use general knowledge, skill, and experience acquired dur-
ing employment 533 or information publicly disclosed. 534
Generally, employers can protect secret customer lists and other confiden-
tial information from use by former employees and preclude those employ-
ees from using it in competition with the employer. For example, a former
employee may not use knowledge of purchasing agents and credit ratings of
the customers of his former employer to compete against that employer.5 35
Similarly, one court granted an injunction to prevent a former employee
from competing against his former employer through the use of disparaging
remarks about his former employer's products based on the employee's in-
side knowledge and experience. 536 Thus, if secret information comes into an
employee's possession due to a confidential relationship with the employer,
the employee has a duty not to commit a breach of the confidence by disclos-
ing or otherwise using it to the employer's disadvantage. 53 7 When a former
employee commits the tort of unfair competition, an employer may be able
to enjoin the employee from using or disclosing the secret or confidential
information. 538 In addition, monetary damages can be awarded for lost
profits based on the difference between the employer's market position
before and after the misappropriation of the confidential information. 539
530. Murrco Agency, 800 S.W.2d at 605 n.7.
531. See Daily Int'l Sales v. Eastman Whipstock, 662 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [lst Dist.] 1983, no writ); Rimes v. Club Corp. of Am., 542 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (information learned during employment for which there was no
duty of nondisclosure imposed by the employer may be used freely by the employee after
employment termination).
532. Recon Exploration, Inc. v. Hodges, 798 S.W.2d 848, 852 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no
writ) (geophysical exploration procedures known in the trade); Gonzales v. Zamora, 791
S.W.2d at 264; Hall v. Hall, 326 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (manner of making and installing product widely known); see also Wissman v. Boucher,
150 Tex. 326, 330, 240 S.W.2d 278, 279 (1951) (common knowledge is not a trade secret).
533. Executive Tele-Communications Sys. v. Buchbaum, 669 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
534. Gonzales v. Zamora, 791 S.W.2d at 764.
535. Crouch v. Swing Mach. Co., 468 S.W.2d 604, 605-07 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1971, no writ).
536. Johnston v. American Speedreading Academy, Inc., 526 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
537. Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. O'Donnell, 627 S.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
538. Elcor Chem. Corp. v. Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
539. Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. at 585, 314 S.W.2d at 776.
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V. ERISA AND WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
A. ERISA Preemption of Texas Common Law Claims
The primary purpose of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) 54° is to protect the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans and their beneficiaries. Accordingly, ERISA requires disclosure and
reporting, establishes certain fiduciary standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligation, and authorizes appropriate penalties against employers,
trustees, and other entities who fail to comply with its mandates.54 1 With
respect to employment status, ERISA strictly prohibits discharging an em-
ployee under certain circumstances. 542
The United States Supreme Court defined the breadth and impact of the
ERISA preemption doctrine in two unanimous decisions: Metropolitan Life
Insurance. Co. v. Taylor 543 and Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.5 "4 In
those decisions, the Supreme Court expressly held that the preemption
clause of ERISA provides that ERISA supersedes all state laws insofar as
they relate to any employee benefit plan, except state laws that regulate in-
surance.545 Recognizing that the preemption provisions of ERISA are delib-
erately expansive, the Supreme Court observed that Congress provides
explicit direction that ERISA preempts common law causes of action filed in
state court.5
4 6
The breadth of ERISA pre-emption was again recognized by the Fifth
Circuit in Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp.547 In Christopher Mobil provided
retirement benefits for employees through a defined benefit plan, under
which employees received a pension based on years of service, salary history,
and life expectancy. Until 1977, the standard method of receiving these pen-
sions was in the form of an annuity. In 1977, however, Mobil added a lump
sum option, enabling certain employees to receive the actuarial equivalent of
their annuity, discounted at 5%, in one payment following retirement. To
be eligible for the lump sum option, an employee had to be fifty five years old
and have either an accrued lump sum pension benefit, or a net worth in-
dependent of the pension, equal to at least $250,000. On July 2, 1984, Mobil
announced certain changes to the lump sum option of the retirement plan,
including an increase in the discount rate from 5% to 9.5%, an increase in
the eligibility threshold from $250,000 to $450,000, and a linking of the new
threshold to the consumer price index. The changes would apply to all em-
540. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
541. Id. § 1001(b).
542. Id. § 1140. Under ERISA, an employer cannot discharge an employee "for exercising
any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan.., or for the
purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such [employee] may become
entitled under the plan .... " Id.
543. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
544. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
545. There are limited exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(b), 1144
(1982).
546. 481 U.S. at 44-45.
547. 950 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir. 1992).
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ployees retiring after January 31, 1985. Thus, employees otherwise eligible
to retire had a six-month window in which they could retire subject to the
lower threshold and lower discount rate. Gerald Christopher was among
the approximately 1,100 Mobil employees who elected to take early retire-
ment during the six-month window.
Thereafter, Mobil sought a determination from the IRS that the plan as
amended continued to meet the IRS requirements for favorable tax treat-
ment, including the requirement that pension plans not discriminate in favor
of highly compensated employees. After the IRS expressed concern that the
amended plan could result in benefits favoring highly compensated employ-
ees, Mobil adopted another plan amendment allowing Mobil, in its sole dis-
cretion, to waive the eligibility threshold. After insertion of this provision,
the IRS issued to Mobil a favorable determination letter which was depen-
dent, however, upon its effect in operation. Mobil announced the IRS ap-
proval to its employees, but did not notify its employees of the waiver
provision until well after the expiration of the six-month window. Because
of a later IRS revenue ruling, Mobil eventually entirely deleted the lump
sum eligibility threshold.
Christopher submitted his retirement notice between August and October
1984, and retired as of January 1, 1985. On March 1, 1989, he filed an age
discrimination claim against Mobil with the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission. Christopher alleged that Mobil's conduct in amending the
plan and concealing the waiver provision was a concerted scheme to reduce
its workforce. Christopher argued that "[b]y purporting to increase the
lump sum threshold and concealing its awareness that applicable tax law
precluded that action .... Mobil induced hundreds of older employees into
retirement without the need to pay them an early retirement bonus. '548
Christopher later filed suit after the claim was dismissed as untimely, alleg-
ing a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, common law
fraud, civil conspiracy, unlawful interference with contract rights, breach of
employment contract, negligence and gross negligence. In the alternative, if
the state law claims were held to be preempted by ERISA, Christopher al-
leged that Mobil's conduct violated section 510 of ERISA, prohibiting inter-
ference with an employee's attainment of a right under ERISA.54 9
The district court held that these claims were preempted because they
"relate to Mobirs retirement plan which is governed by ERISA, and directly
overlap with the provisions of ERISA. ' 550 The Fifth Circuit noted that "the
Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the expansiveness of the 'relate
to' standard and its purpose of establishing the regulation of pension plans as
an exclusively federal concern."' 55' Further, the court stated that "this Cir-
cuit has held that the fact that a claim sought damages measured by pension
benefits sufficed as the requisite connection to an employee benefit plan for
548. Id. at 1213.
549. Id.
550. Id. at 1217.
551. Id.
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preemption purposes." 55 2 Rejecting plaintiff's fraud claim, the court noted
that "although there would undoubtedly be cases of fraudulently induced
retirement that were not preempted, the specific conduct here . . . relates
directly to the operation of an ERISA plan."" 3
The Fifth Circuit also rejected Christopher's argument that "even if their
state law claims are preempted to the extent that the damages sought are
deemed to be benefits, the preemption would not bar the claims in their en-
tirety, and that the claims for loss wages, exemplary damages, and the like,
would survive as state law claims. '554 The court concluded that "this type
of partial preemption is inappropriate . . . .,555 Distinguishing Krause v.
Dresser Industries, Inc.,556 the court stated that "here, by contrast, the basis
of the claims themselves is the operation of the pension plan; if [Christo-
pher's] claims were stripped of their link to the pension plans, they would
cease to exist."5 57 With respect to Christopher's section 510 constructive
discharge claim, the Fifth Circuit found that the dismissal of this claim was
premature. The court held that the alleged deceptive conduct might be
found to vitiate the voluntariness of Christopher's decision to retire and
there was insufficient evidence in the record to affirm the dismissal of the
constructive discharge claim. 558
In a trilogy of recent cases, the Texas supreme court clarified ERISA's
preemptive effect on state law causes of action which relate to employee ben-
efit plans. 559 In Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Insurance. Co. 560 the supreme
court addressed whether state law claims relating to an employee benefit
plan that are brought under the Texas Insurance Code and the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act (DTPA) are saved from ERISA preemption under the
ERISA savings clause.5 6 1 In Cathey James Cathey sued his employer, Dow
Chemical, and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company to recover for the
wrongful denial of a claim under his employer's medical insurance plan.
Cathey did not assert any causes of action under ERISA and instead pro-
ceeded under the Texas Insurance Code, the DTPA and various other com-
mon law causes of action. 562 The trial court granted summary judgment,
holding that Cathey's claims were preempted under ERISA. The court of
appeals and the Texas supreme court affirmed the summary judgment.
552. Christopher, 950 F.2d at 1218.
553. Id. at 1219.
554. Id.
555. Id.
556. 910 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1990). In Krause the main nexus to an employee benefit plan
was only the calculation of damages.
557. Chirstopher, 950 F.2d at 1220.
558. Id. at 1223.
559. See Gorman v. Life Ins. Co., 811 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 88
(1991); Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Small, 806 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. 1991); Cathey v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 805 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2855 (1991).
560. 805 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.), cert denied 11 S. Ct. 2855 (1991).
561. The ERISA "savings clause," 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), saves from preemption state
laws which regulate insurance.
562. Plaintiff brought suit under TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, §§ 16, 3.62, (Vernon




On appeal, Cathey argued that his claims did not "relate to" an employee
benefit plan and were therefore not preempted. In the alternative, he argued
that even if his claims related to an employee benefit plan, they were saved
from preemption because he filed action under Texas state laws which regu-
late insurance. The supreme court disagreed. First, the supreme court de-
termined that Cathey's statutory causes of action related to an employee
benefit plan. 563 Relying on United States Supreme Court decisions which
had loosely defined the parameters of the "relate to" requirement, 5' and
appellate court decisions which had addressed similar issues, the court con-
cluded that "courts have not hesitated to find that state laws having an effect
on employee benefit plans relate to such plans and are therefore preempted
by ERISA. '5 65 The court then determined that ERISA's savings clause
could not save from preemption state laws which provide remedies not pro-
vided by ERISA. The court reasoned that the United States Supreme Court
in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux 566 "announced that ERISA's civil
enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive. '567 The court added
that the United States Supreme Court in Pilot Life and Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon 5 68 held that Congress intended all suits alleging improper claims
563. Cathey, 805 S.W.2d at 390.
564. The court analyzed the United States Supreme Court decisions concerning the "relate
to" requirement under ERISA as follows:
The United States Supreme Court has loosely defined the parameters of the "re-
late to" requirement. "A law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal
sense of the phrase, if it has a connection or reference to such a plan." Shaw,
463 U.S. at 96-97, 103 S. Ct. at 2899-2900. Also, the Court declared that "[t]he
phrase 'relate to' was given its broad common sense meaning." Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2389, 85 L.
Ed. 2d 728 (1985). The Court has repeatedly stated that the words "relate to"
should be construed expansively. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97, 103 S. Ct. at
2899-2900; Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 46-48, 107 S. Ct. at 1552, 53; Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne, 42 U.S. 1, 8, 107 S. Ct. 2211, 2215-16, 96 L. Ed. 2d 1
(1987). ERISA preemption applies not only to state laws, but to all forms of
state action dealing with the subject matter covered by this federal statute. 29
U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (1988); see also Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98, 103 S. Ct. at 2900. In
keeping with this broad interpretation, the Court held that a cause of action for
wrongful termination related to an ERISA plan where it was based on the alle-
gation that the employer fired the employee to avoid paying benefits under a
pension plan. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 478, 112
L. Ed. 2d 474 (1990).
Id. at 389-90 (footnotes omitted).
565. Id. (citing Ramirez v. Inter-Continental Hotels, 890 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1989); Boren
v. N.L. Indus., 889 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3283 (1990); Sommers
Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., 793 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987); Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d
489, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 (1989); Misic v. Building Serv. Employees Health & Welfare
Trust, 789 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1986); Juckett v. Beecham Home Improvement Prods., Inc.,
684 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Tex. 1988); E-Systems, Inc. v. Taylor, 744 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1988, writ denied); Giles v. Texas Instruments Employees Pension Plan, 715 S.W.2d 58
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Felts v. Graphic Arts Employee Benefits Trust,
680 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ)).
566. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
567. Cathey, 805 S.W.2d at 391.
568. 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990).
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processing be governed only by ERISA.5 69 The court then held that articles
21.21 and 3.62 of the Insurance Code and section 17.50(a)(4) of the DTPA
provide recovery not included under ERISA. Thus, because the United
States Supreme Court had decided that ERISA's civil enforcement scheme
could not be supplemented by state law remedies,-7 0 the court concluded the
provisions in question would be preempted as "laws that provide remedies
that are inconsistent with the civil enforcement provisions provided in ER-
ISA. '5 7 1 Accordingly, the supreme court held that Cathey's action was pre-
empted by ERISA.5 72
Shortly after its decision in Cathey the Texas supreme court clarified when
ERISA preemption must be pled as an affirmative defense and when it may
be asserted for the first time on appeal. In Gorman v. Life Insurance Co. 573
plaintiffs, the wife and child of Dale Gorman, a deceased Tenneco employee,
brought suit against Tenneco and the benefit plan insurer, Life Insurance
Company of North America (LINA), under various state law causes of ac-
tion. The plaintiffs filed suit after their claim for benefits under Dale
Gorman's life insurance policy was denied.574 At trial, the trial court
granted the defendants' motion for judgment non obstante verdicto (n.o.v.)
and ordered that plaintiffs take nothing. 57 5 Reasoning that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state law claims, the
court of appeals held that the trial court erred in entering the judgment
n.o.v. and further held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that they were enti-
tled to recover under the provisions of ERISA.5 76
The Texas supreme court reversed in part and affirmed in part. On ap-
peal, the defendants asserted that the plaintiffs' causes of action were pre-
empted by ERISA because they "related to" an employee benefit welfare
plan organized pursuant to the authority and requirements of ERISA 5 77 In




573. 811 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. 1991).
574. The plaintiffs brought suit for breach of contract, common law fraud, breach of fiduci-
ary duty, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, statutory violations
under TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 3.62 and 21.21, violations of applicable regulatory orders
issued by the State Board of Insurance, and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act under the TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 7.46-7.62. On appeal, plaintiffs sought to recover against the
insurer for breach of contract, gross negligence and violation of the Texas Insurance Code, and
against the employer for breach of fiduciary duty.
575. Dale Gorman was killed in automobile accident. His wife and child were the benefi-
ciaries under an accidental policy that formed part of his employee benefit plan. At issue
during trial was whether Dale Gorman was in travel and sojourn on the business of Tenneco at
the time of his death. In granting the judgment n.o.v., the trial court determined there was no
evidence supporting the issue of whether Gorman was working at the time of the accident.
Garman, 811 S.W.2d at 543-44.
576. Id. at 544.
577. Id. A law relates to an employee benefit plan if it has any connection or reference to
such a plan. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). "The Court has repeat-
edly stated that the words 'relate to' should be construed expansively." Cathey, 805 S.W.2d at
390 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97; Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 46-48; Fort
Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 8 (1987)). "ERISA preemption applies not only to
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response to the defendant's assertion, plaintiffs argued that ERISA preemp-
tion, to the extent applicable, merely affects the law to be used in the case
and does not deprive the state court of subject matter jurisdiction. The
plaintiffs further reasoned that unless the cause of action alleged is created
by ERISA or contains a right or immunity created by ERISA, the suit is not
brought under ERISA and is not within the federal court's exclusive juris-
diction. Consequently, the plaintiffs maintained that ERISA must be
pleaded and proved or it is waived. 57 8 Regarding subject matter jurisdiction
under ERISA, the supreme court noted that sections 1132(a)(1)(B) and (e)
of ERISA provide that state courts of competent jurisdiction and district
courts of the United States have concurrent jurisdiction of actions by a bene-
ficiary: (i) to recover benefits due under the terms of the plan; (ii) to en-
force rights under the plan; or (iii) to clarify rights to future benefits.5 7 9 All
other ERISA actions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts.580 Thus, depending on the nature of the lawsuit, a state court may or
may not have subject matter jurisdiction over the action. If the matter falls
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the courts, asserting ERISA preemp-
tion would affect only the choice of law, not the choice of forum. In such
actions, preemption is an affirmative defense which must be set forth in the
defendant's answer or it is waived. 58 1 If the matter falls outside the concur-
rent jurisdiction of the state court, asserting ERISA preemption implicates
the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and may be asserted for the first
time on appeal. 582
The plaintiffs' only claim against Tenneco was one for breach of fiduciary
duty. With respect to this claim, plaintiffs alleged in their petition that
" '[b]y procuring insurance coverage for its employees, Tenneco, Inc., oper-
ated in the capacity of a fiduciary and an insurer for its employees.' ",583 The
plaintiffs also alleged that Tenneco " 'assumed the duties of a fiduciary as to
its employees generally.' "584 The supreme court determined, without expla-
nation, that the plaintiffs' claim for breach of fiduciary duty related to an
employee benefit plan governed by ERISA. 58 5 The supreme court further
determined that the claim did not fall within the three types of ERISA
claims that state courts may hear. Consequently, the plaintiffs' claim against
Tenneco fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. Thus, the
trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear this claim, and Tenneco's ERISA
preemption defense could be raised for the first time on appeal. 586
With respect to the plaintiffs' actions against LINA, the supreme court
state laws, but to all forms of state action dealing with the subject matters covered by this
federal statute." Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (1988)).
578. Gorman, 811 S.W.2d at 545.
579. Id.
580. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1988)).
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. Gorman, 811 S.W.2d at 547.
584. Id.
585. Id. at 545.
586. Id.
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determined that the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim was a claim for bene-
fits due under the terms of an ERISA benefits plan; therefore, the supreme
court held that the state court had concurrent jurisdiction over the claim.587
As to the plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees, the supreme court recognized
that ERISA authorizes state courts to award reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs to either party.5 88 Therefore, the state court had concurrent jurisdic-
tion to determine the breach of contract claim and the awarding of attor-
neys' fees.589 The plaintiffs' claims against LINA for mental anguish and
punitive damages, the supreme court determined, did not fall within the
scope of one of the three categories where state courts have concurrent juris-
diction; thus, the assertion of ERISA preemption was jurisdictional, and
could consequently be raised for the first time on appeal. 590 The plaintiffs'
remaining causes of action 591 also fell outside the scope of the concurrent
jurisdictional categories; therefore, the insurer's assertion of ERISA preemp-
tion as to those claims for damages precluded recovery.5 92
In Southland Life Insurance Co. v. Small 593 Small brought action against
her former employer, Mandel-Kahn Company, and Mandel-Kahn's group
health insurer, Southland Life Insurance Company, alleging various state
law causes of action.594 The trial court granted Southland's motion for sum-
mary judgment based upon several non-ERISA related defenses. On appeal
Southland asserted for the first time that all of Small's claims were pre-
empted by ERISA.595 The court of appeals rejected Southland's argument
on the basis that it had been waived by its nonpresentation to the trial
court.5 96 The court of appeals reversed and remanded the judgment of the
trial court. The Texas supreme court reversed the court of appeals. Citing
Gorman and Cathey, the supreme court held that the plaintiff's claims were
among those defined as relating to an employee benefit plan and were, there-
fore, preempted by ERISA.5 97 The court stated "under Gorman and
Cathey, the court of appeals erred in holding that the preemption claim had
been waived, since this defense is jurisdictional and can be raised initially on
appeal." 598 The court, therefore, granted Southland's application for writ of
587. Id. at 547-48.
588. Gorman, 811 S.W.2d at 548.
589. Id.
590. Id.
591. These causes of action included common law fraud, breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing, negligence and statutory violations under the Texas Insurance Code, TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. arts. 3.62 and 21.21, and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 7.46-7.62.
592. Gorman, 811 S.W.2d at 549.
593. 806 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. 1991).
594. In her petition against the defendants, the plaintiff alleged breach of contract, breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, negligence, gross negligence, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, and violations of the Texas Insurance Code, the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, and ERISA.
595. Small, 806 S.W.2d at 800.
596. Id.




error and, without hearing oral argument, reversed and rendered judgment
in favor of Southland.
ERISA's preemptive provisions do not apply to claims arising before its
enactment. The preemption clause provides that ERISA does not govern
any cause of action which arose, or any act or omission which occurred,
before January 1, 1975.5 99 In Petrolite Corp. v. Barnhouse6°° the court of
appeals addressed the issue of whether ERISA's preemption clause would
apply to an action where the alleged act or omission occurred prior to Janu-
ary 1975, but the claim was denied after that date. In Petrolite the em-
ployee, James Barnhouse, had begun employment with Petrolite in 1956. In
1959, he was approached by the vice president of operations for Petrolite in
South America about working for the company in Venezuela. As an induce-
ment, Barnhouse was allegedly told that he would receive, in addition to
increased salary and living expenses, a year and a half credit for each year
worked overseas toward calculating his retirement benefits and retirement
age. These oral representations were never reduced to writing and were not
included in the terms of the retirement plan.WI Barnhouse filed suit against
Petrolite and Petrolite's retirement plan when his claim for benefits based
upon the alleged oral representations was denied. Barnhouse alleged fraud,
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and failure to pay benefits in
accordance with the terms of the benefit plan. 6° 2 The jury found in favor of
Barnhouse, and Petrolite appealed, claiming that Barnhouse's action was
preempted by ERISA. Barnhouse argued that ERISA did not apply to his
action because it arose prior to ERISA's enactment.
The court of appeals found that an ERISA cause of action does not accrue
until a claimant is formally denied pension benefits. 6° 3 While Barnhouse
was denied benefits on April 18, 1984, the court recognized that a more
difficult question was presented because at least some of the acts or omis-
sions complained of occurred prior to ERISA's enactment. 6°4 The court
observed that the majority of the federal circuits had interpreted the phrase
"acts or omissions" to require ERISA preemption in cases involving pre-
ERISA conduct when benefits were denied post-ERISA. 605 Relying on
Degan v. Ford Motor Co.,6 the court reasoned that the majority view com-
ported with Congress' intention that exceptions to ERISA preemption be
narrowly construed.6°7 Moreover, the court added that the majority view
had the added advantage of certainty because courts need only look to the
date of a plan's determination of benefits to ascertain whether ERISA ap-
plies. 608 The court consequently found that the critical act or omission in
599. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(1).
600. 812 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ).
601. Id. at 343.
602. Id.
603. Id. at 344.
604. Id.
605. Barnhouse, 812 S.W.2d at 344.
606. 869 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1989).
607. Barnhouse, 812 S.W.2d at 345.
608. Id.
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the case was the denial of pension benefits which occurred after ERISA's
effective date." Accordingly, the court held that Barnhouse's claim did not
arise prior to ERISA's enactment and that ERISA's preemptive provisions
could extend to his claim.610
B. Employer Retaliation Actions Under ERISA
ERISA prevents employer retaliation against employees for exercising any
right to which they may be entitled under the provisions of an employee
benefit plan. An employee may bring action against his employer for the
employer's retaliatory acts under section 510 of ERISA.611 Recently, in a
case of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, the court held that the two-year
statute of limitations applicable to employment discrimination claims applies
to employer retaliation claims under ERISA. 612 In that case William Mc-
Clure, a former employee of Zoecon, was allegedly exposed to pesticides dur-
ing his employment. The alleged exposure occurred in February 1985.
McClure later learned from a doctor that this exposure had harmed him. In
May 1985, Zoecon fired McClure. In May 1989, exactly four years after he
was fired, McClure sued Zoecon, claiming that he had been fired to prevent
him from collecting medical and disability benefits in violation of ERISA.
Zoecon filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the claim was
barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The trial court agreed and
granted Zoecon's summary judgment.61 3
Because ERISA provides no statute of limitations for retaliation claims,
the court of appeals held that McClure's claim was subject to the Texas
limitations statute which governed the action most analogous to McClure's
section 510 claim. 614 Zoecon argued that a retaliation claim under ERISA
was similar to a wrongful discharge or employment discrimination claim,
and, therefore, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to these claims
applied to McClure's section 510 retaliation claim. McClure, however, ar-
609. Id.
610. Id. Once it established that ERISA's preemptive provisions extended to the plaintiff's
action, the court decided whether the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claim.
Using the analysis set forth in Gorman, the court determined that the trial court had subject
matter jurisdiction only with respect to the breach of contract claim. Id. at 346. Nonetheless,
because plaintiff's breach of contract claim was premised on impermissible oral modifications,
the court concluded that the plaintiff's breach of contract claim was not actionable under
ERISA. Id.
611. 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Section 510 of ERISA provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline,
or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to
which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan .... It
shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discrimi-
nate against any person because he has given information or has testified or is
about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this act or the welfare
and pension plans disclosure act ....
Id.
612. McClure v. Zoecon, Inc., 936 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1991). Section 510 of ERISA does





gued that a retaliatory discharge claim under ERISA was more like a con-
tract claim and urged the court to apply the four-year statute of limitations
that governs contract claims. 615 While no prior Fifth Circuit decisions had
decided the statute of limitations applicable to an ERISA retaliation action,
the court noted that nearly all other courts which had considered the ques-
tion had construed these types of ERISA claims as wrongful discharge or
employment discrimination claims.616 The court observed that because ER-
ISA proscribes specified acts of "discharge" and "discrimination," claims
falling under section 510 were more analogous to wrongful discharge or em-
ployment discrimination claims. 617 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that the two-year statute of limitations applicable to employment
discrimination claims applied to retaliation claims under ERISA. 618
VI. COMPELLING ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
Arbitration has traditionally been used for the settlement of labor disputes
involving union employees. Nevertheless, as a result of the substantial judi-
cial and statutory erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine during the
1980's, some employers are now turning to arbitration, rather than the
courts, as a means of resolving disputes even with nonunion employees.
The Federal Arbitration Act6 19 (FAA) provides the framework for arbi-
tration of employment-related disputes in the nonunion context. The FAA
provides in section 2 that contractual arbitration agreements in maritime
transactions or transactions involving commerce shall be "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract. '620 The courts have construed "commerce"
broadly within the meaning of the FAA. 62 1 The FAA provides two parallel
devices for enforcing an arbitration clause in a nonunion employment agree-
ment. Section 3 empowers the courts to stay judicial proceedings when a
valid arbitration agreement exists. 622 Section 4 authorizes a party, aggrieved
by the failure of another party to arbitrate, to obtain an order from the court
615. Id.
616. Id. (citing Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 843-46 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987); Held v. Manufacturers. Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197
(10th Cir. 1990); Young v. Martin Marietta Corp., 701 F. Supp. 567, 569 (E.D. La. 1988);
Gladich v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 703 F. Supp. 1331, 1333 (N.D. I11. 1989); Corkery v.
Super X Drugs Corp., 602 F. Supp. 42 (M.D. Fla. 1985)).
617. McClure, 936 F.2d at 777.
618. Id. at 779.
619. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988). All 50 states and the District of Columbia have adopted
arbitration statutes similar to the FAA. The Texas General Arbitration Act specifically ex-
cludes from coverage collective bargaining agreements between an employer and a labor union.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 224-238-6 (Vernon 1973 & Supp. 1992). Arbitration be-
tween employers and employees is governed generally by TEX. REV. Civ. STAT, ANN. arts.
239-249 (Vernon 1973 & Supp. 1992).
620. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
621. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967); Creson v.
Quickprint, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 984, 986 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
622. 9 U.S.C. § 3. See Home Club, Inc. v. Barlow, 818 S.W.2d 192, 192-93 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1991, orig. proceeding) (court granted writ of mandamus and held that denial of
motion to stay pending arbitration under the FAA may be reviewed by mandamus).
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directing that such arbitration proceed. 6 23
The only limitation to the FAA's coverage is found in section 1 which
specifically excludes from coverage "contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or inter-
state commerce. '624 On its face this provision appears to greatly limit the
use of arbitration in the employment context. Some courts, however, have
construed the exclusion to apply only to workers directly employed in the
transportation industries. 625
Although the FAA has traditionally been used to resolve contract dis-
putes between the parties to an employment agreement, courts have increas-
ingly held that tort claims associated with the employment relationship are
covered by arbitration clauses in employment contracts. 626 Until the recent
United States Supreme Court decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.62 7 however, it appeared that courts would not enforce arbitration
agreements that waived an employee's right to bring a judicial action against
his employer involving claims of discrimination arising under federal law.628
Gilmer involved a claim brought under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
623. 9 U.S.C. § 4. The FAA preempts contrary state law and is enforceable in both federal
and state courts. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Wilson, 805 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 1991, no writ) (holding fraud
claim sufficiently interwoven with contract claim to bring dispute within arbitration agree-
ment). One Texas court of appeals recently held that the FAA does not authorize an interloc-
utory appeal from a state court order that denies a motion to compel arbitration asserted under
the FAA. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hughes, 809 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Tex.
App.--Corpus Christi 1991, writ requested). This holding requires a trial on the merits of the
underlying cause of action before the refusal to compel arbitration can be considered by a
court of appeals, a result which precludes the party attempting to enforce the agreement from
receiving the benefits of arbitration.
624. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
625. Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468
F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972).
626. Zolezzi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 789 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986) (defamation,
invasion of privacy); Morgan v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 729 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir.
1984) (slander); Block 175 Corp. v. Fairmont Hotel Management Co., 648 F. Supp. 450 (D.
Colo. 1986) (breach of fiduciary duty, intentional or reckless breach of duty); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Thomson, 574 F. Supp. 1472 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (breach of
restrictive covenants); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McCollum, 666 S.W.2d
604 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (tortious interference with con-
tracts), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985); see P. Gillette & J. Flanagan, Paper delivered to the
American Bar Association Annual Meeting of the Labor and Employment Law Section (Aug.
8, 1989).
627. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
628. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the Supreme Court held
that a prior unfavorable arbitration decision did not bar an employee from asserting race dis-
crimination in a subsequent Title VII lawsuit. The court considered arbitration an inappropri-
ate forum for the final resolution of rights created under Title VII. Id. at 60. Applying the
Gardner-Denver rationale to wage disputes under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the
Court in Barrentine v. Arkansas - Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981), held that an
employee may pursue an action in federal district court, claiming a violation of FLSA mini-
mum wage provisions, despite the fact that the claim had been submitted unsuccessfully to a
grievance committee. Id. at 746. In light of these decisions, many employers considered it




ment Act (ADEA) by a manager of financial services.6 29 Gilmer's employer
required that he register with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 630
As part of his NYSE application, he signed an agreement to arbitrate any
dispute that might arise between him and his employer.631 After Gilmer was
terminated at age sixty two, he brought a claim for age discrimination in
federal district court under the ADEA.632 His employer sought to compel
arbitration of the claim, relying on the arbitration agreement and the
FAA. 633 The Supreme Court enforced the agreement, finding nothing in the
language or legislative history of the ADEA that precluded arbitration.6 34
The Court found that arbitration was not inconsistent with the ADEA's
purposes of "address[ing] individual grievances" and "further[ing] impor-
tant social policies."'635 This conclusion refutes the belief held by some that
the Court disfavors arbitration of discrimination claims that arise under fed-
eral law.6 36
A question remains for employers who seek to enforce arbitration agree-
ments that are part of an employment contract. The arbitration agreement
at issue in Gilmer was not between the employee and the employer; rather, it
was part of the plaintiff's NYSE agreement. 637 In a footnote, the Court
stated that it would be inappropriate to address the question of whether the
limitation in section 1 of the FAA excluded all employment contracts from
the statute's coverage. 638 Thus, it remains unsettled whether the FAA allows
employers and employees to directly contract to arbitrate employment
disputes.639
629. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1650.
630. Id.
631. Id.
632. Id. at 1651.
633. Id.
634. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1652.
635. Id. at 1653.
636. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) (compel-
ling arbitration of Title VII claim upon remand from Supreme Court subsequent to Gilmer).
The 5th Circuit stated that its earlier decision in Alford to deny arbitration was based on its
reading of Gardner-Denver. Id. at 230. The court reasoned that Gilmer rquired compulsory
arbitration of a Title VII claim in part because both the ADEA and Title VII are similar civil
rights statutes that are enforced by the EEOC. A similar result was reached by the Sixth
Circuit. Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 1991) (compelling
arbitration of Title VII claims). A recent district court opinion addressed the enforceability of
an agreement to arbitrate an ERISA claim. Fabian Fin. Servs. v. Kurt H. Volk, Inc. Profit
Sharing Plan, 768 F. Supp. 728 (C.D. Cal. 1991). Despite the plaintiff's argument that ER-
ISA's broad preemption provision ensures that all ERISA claims be heard in federal court, the
court found arbitration not inconsistent with the statute. Id. at 734.
637. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1650.
638. Id. at n.2. The Court noted that Gilmer did not raise the issue in the lower courts. Id.
In addition, the agreement was not between Gilmer and his employer. Id.
639. Compare Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159,
1162 (7th Cir. 1984) (FAA § 1 only excludes workers in transportation industries) and Erving
v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972) (contract to play
basketball not excluded from FAA) with Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305,
310 (6th Cir. 1991) (employment contracts outside coverage of FAA) and Bacashihua v.
USPS, 859 F.2d 402, 404-05 (6th Cir. 1982) (collective bargaining agreements excluded from
FAA because they are employment contracts.)
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VII. CONCLUSION
Developments within the field of labor and employment law continue to
occur at a rapid pace. The rights of employees and employers in Texas are
being defined and redefined against a background of both federal and state
laws. It appears that the only constant is change itself.
Wrongful discharge and related claims have received the greatest degree
of legislative and, especially, judicial attention. The risks and associated
costs, both direct and indirect, borne by employers who defend against such
claims are increasing in significance. To help control the economic impact
caused by the explosion in the number of employment related suits involving
high dollar tort claims, Texas employers and their counsel should carefully
consider the Model Uniform Employment-Termination Act and the use of
written employment agreements that provide for arbitration of employment
disputes under the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act.

